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Abstract 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore into the relations between 
semantic theory, concept theory and Peirce‘s semeiotic in relation to 
knowledge organization.  
The dissertation enquires into the character and scope of representation 
demonstrated by different kinds of knowledge organization systems, how 
theories of concepts are approached, and how cognitive semantics and 
semeiotic perspectives may offer a more elaborate understanding of 
concepts and provide for an alternative analytical framework for 
knowledge organization.  
The findings of the dissertation arrive at the conclusion that semeiotic 
theory may provide for a more elaborate and dynamical understanding of 
concepts, and supplement traditional approaches to knowledge 
organization with deeper insights into the nature of concepts, knowledge 
and communication.  
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Resumé 
Formålet med denne afhandling er at undersøge forholdet mellem 
semantik, begrebsteori og pragmatisk semiotik i relation til 
vidensorganisation. 
Afhandlingen undersøger karakteren og omfanget af vidensrepræsentation, 
som den fremgår af forskellige former for videnorganisationsystemer. 
Dvs. hvordan teorier om begreber bliver anvendt, og hvordan kognitiv 
semantik og semiotik kan tilbyde en mere detaljeret forståelse af begreber 
og dermed bidrage med en alternativ analytisk ramme for 
vidensorganisation. 
Resultaterne af afhandlingen er, at semiotik kan bidrage til en mere 
omfattende og dynamisk forståelse af begreber og supplere de traditionelle 
tilgange til vidensorganisation med en dybere indsigt i forhold til 
begreber, viden og kommunikation. 
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1 Introduction  
What is a representation and how does it motivate a particular meaning? This is the 
fundamental question that drives this dissertation. The question is intricate and should 
be essential for knowledge organization (KO)
1
. It should be essential because KO is 
concerned with theories and methods for organization and representation of information 
sources
2
 in information systems. It is intricate because what constitutes a representation, 
its meaning and truth value depends on epistemic assumptions. And different 
assumptions about representations lead to different understandings of information 
systems. 
Traditionally, knowledge organization systems (KOS) represent subject categories, their 
hierarchical structure, and different kinds of relationships. Subjects are in the context of 
KO thought of as conceptual, and as such a KOS in principal expresses an organization 
of concepts and categories that are useful labels for information sources.  
KO is considered a fundamental part of Library and Information Science (LIS), and KO 
is concerned with theories about systems and processes connected to subject 
representation and retrieval of information sources. 
KO can also be distinguished into a broader and narrower perspective (Hjørland, 2008). 
The narrower perspective is concerned with the applied nature of KO. The broader 
perspective addresses the context and theoretical foundation of KO. According to 
Hjørland (2003) the broader concept of KO includes ‗the social division of society‘, 
‗social institutions‘, ‘languages and symbolic systems‘, ‘conceptual systems‘ and 
concept theories‘, ‗literatures and genres‘. Additionally, KO relates to other LIS areas as 
information retrieval (IR) and information seeking
3
 that fundamentally depends on the 
quality of KOS.  
In particular the narrow perspective in KO has been given much attention. Popular 
textbooks within the scholarly community are mainly concerned with KO in the narrow 
sense cf. (Hagler, 1997; Lancaster, 2003; Rowley & Hartley, 2008; Tayler, 1999). The 
wider perspective on KO has however gained increased interest among LIS scholars. 
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1.1 The context of knowledge organization: some philosophical aspects 
of information science  
The philosophical aspects of information science appear to be of increasing interest 
among LIS scholars. This development is indicated e.g. by the special issue of Library 
Trends (winter 2004, 52(3)) which is dedicated to the philosophy of information (PI). 
Similarly, a special issue of Journal of Documentation (2005, vol. 61(1)) is dedicated to 
LIS and the philosophy of science. Though, as pointed out by (Buckland, 2005), a 
glance at the substance of the different contributions in the mentioned issues reveals that 
the philosophical perspectives proposed and discussed by the contributors are very 
different in nature and even incompatible. This may lead to the impression that LIS is 
struggling with its philosophical foundation or that LIS as science is immature.  
I believe LIS lacks a unifying theoretical framework, that address the communicative 
functions of KOS, and it may arguably be explained as a consequence of the applied 
character of LIS and its sub-disciplines
4
. The success of KOS is for that reason mainly 
considered from the perspective of problem solving of, i.e. the particular problems that 
relate to the activities of cataloguing, indexing and retrieving documents and less on 
theories based in concept theory and philosophy. Many librarians may even say that 
philosophy is fascinating, but too remotely connected with the particular work tasks and 
processes that take place in the everyday library life.  
Speaking from the perspective of libraries, naturally the focus is on the life cycle of the 
library functions. Meta-theoretical reflections may be appropriate; however reflections 
on epistemology and paradigms may seem a bit excessive when dealing with daily 
library tasks.   
I consider KO and the applied nature of KOS as key research areas within the field of 
LIS; however, the continuous theoretical reflection and problematization of praxis is 
important, and the only way to insure future developments of new and better 
information systems.  
Organizing concepts is no simple task. In principle it involves reflections on how 
concepts are understood (e.g. intended vs. perceived meaning), represented 
(lexicalized), internally organized (intensional defined), externally related to other 
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concepts and structurally coupled to individuals, to culture/society, and to the 
surrounding world.  
Concepts are dynamical, and exist in a continuum. The meaning of concepts is thus 
closely related to a universe of discourse, and affected by new discoveries; and what is 
considered knowledge now may be altered or modified by future investigations. As a 
consequence, a theoretical approach to KO that provides for a deeper understanding of 
concepts, how concepts develops and matures, how they relate to other concepts, and 
how they are used in communication within a community, is required. In other words, 
we need a theoretical approach that transcends the formal descriptive methods and 
prescriptive focus of objectivist lexical semantics and information architecture, without 
giving in to subjective relativism. In order to do so, at least four dimensions of 
understanding are necessary.  
 
 
Figure 1:1: Four dimensions of understanding concepts 
Firstly, in relation to the subject, concepts are intellectual, and thus implicate reasoning. 
Secondly concepts in order to be communicable, demand a system of communication, 
e.g. language. Language is considered the sign system that enables subjects to 
Sign 
system
Object / 
Concept
World 
Subject Observations
General ideas
Facts
Terms
Language
Symbols
Natural world
Social world
Culture
Mental world
Subjective 
knowledge
Sensing
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communicate about objects. Thirdly, the concept/object dimension is considered the 
matter, whether abstract or concrete, that subjects communicate about when using 
language. Fourthly, the world dimension is considered the phenomenological world that 
embraces the other dimensions.  
Understanding representations of knowledge as e.g. demonstrated by a KOS, thus 
implicates knowledge about the sign system itself, how it is structured and thus 
decoded, how a sign stands for an object, how it is recognized by a subject, and how its 
meaning is determined by the context of an outer world.   
1.2 Semiotics in LIS 
Semiotics is generally understood as the study of signs and sign processes. More 
specifically semiotics studies the interrelated properties of representation, meaning and 
communication. Semiotics is thus concerned with how signs become signs of meaning, 
how signs relate to other signs, and how signs communicate intentionally and 
effectually.  
Semiotics has been promoted explicitly within LIS as meta-theoretical framework cf.  
(Brier, 1996, 1997, 2004, 2006; Mai, 2000, 2001; Thellefsen, 2004; Thellefsen & 
Thellefsen, 2004) and in relation to information retrieval cf. (Blair, 1990; 
Karamuftuoglu, 1998). Semiotics is also known in related applied fields, e.g. as social 
semiotics (Halliday, 1978; R. Hodge & Kress, 1988), semiotics of terminology 
(Myking, 2001; Wüster, 1974)  and computer semiotics (Bøgh Andersen, 1990).  
Brier combines the pragmatic semiotics of Peirce with second order cybernetics in order 
to establish a unified theoretical perspective on information science under the label 
‗cybercemiotics‘ (Brier, 2004, 2008).  
According to Brier (2004), cybersemiotics combines the cybernetic functionalistic 
approach with a pragmatic understanding of meaning as mediated by signs, and 
accordingly, meaning is considered social and embodied.  
Furthermore, cybersemiotics argues against the information-processing paradigm within 
LIS, and opposes to an objectivist and subjectivist theory of information and 
communication.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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…LIS requires a theory of the cognition and communication of 
signification by different types of systems. Neither the objective syntactic 
approach of the information-processing paradigm nor the personal 
phenomenological approach of Machlup can deliver a framework 
encompassing communication processes in social, biological, and 
technical systems. (Brier, 2004, p. 631) 
 
By combining semiotics with second-order cybernetics
5
, Brier introduces the concept of 
autopoiesis, or self-organization, to LIS. Language is itself a self-organizing and a self-
reflective system. Accordingly, meaning is a result of mutual coupling between humans 
in society. In other words, meaning is emergent within social systems, with a common 
ground, that again is emergent on human social activity. Furthermore, the cybernetic 
view in particular addresses the concept of intentionality and the role of the observer.  
I believe that the cybersemiotic view establishes a significant, profound and ambitious 
transdisciplinary philosophical framework that addresses the complexity of information, 
cognition, and communication.  
The work promoted in this dissertation is in line with Brier, and is in many ways 
inspired by Brier in particular (Brier, 1997), however where Brier tries to establish a 
general unified transdisciplinary theory of information, my focus is on KO, how 
knowledge (or information sources) are organized and represented, which may be 
considered sub-ordinate in relation the ambition of a general theory of information.  
In relation to KOS, Mai (2000, 2001) applies semiotic theory as a method for analyzing 
the process of subject indexing, with particular focus on the interpretive process.  
 
Peirce‘s concept of unlimited semiosis states that any interpretation is 
based on previous interpretations and will generate new interpretations.  
When the subject indexing process is analyzed in terms of Peirce‘s idea of 
unlimited semiosis, the high degree of interpretation in the process is 
emphasized. (Mai, 2000, p. 313) 
 
From the perspective of semiotics, any representation relates to an intepretant even 
though we may distinguish between different kinds of indexing procedures, as e.g. 
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automatic extraction algorithms, document and content oriented indexing, user and 
requirement oriented indexing, and they all establish a level of interpretation.  
I agree with Mai, that semiotic theory provides for a deeper understanding of the nature 
of interpretation; after all, semiotics may be considered a genuine theory of 
interpretation.  
Mai provides a thorough analysis of the process of indexing from the perspective of the 
indexer, and appreciates Peirce‘s notion of unlimited semiosis as an imperative in the 
indexing process.  
Karamuftuoglu and Blair consider semiotics in relation to information retrieval (IR). 
Karamuftuoglu argues that information retrieval is about communication of 
information, and considers semiotics as the discipline that addresses human 
communication by means of signs. Both Karamuftuoglu and Blair relate sign systems to 
language games.  
The perspective presented in this dissertation appreciates the work conducted by Mai, 
Blair, Karamuftuoglu and Brier. The semiotic perspective seems to have an important 
message to tell, namely that the study of LIS and its sub-fields is attached to concepts of 
representation (signification), interpretation (meaning), knowledge (observations, facts, 
theories) and social conduct. 
I therefore consider the four dimensions of understanding concepts depicted by figure 
1:1 as genuinely equally important semiotic dimensions that need to be balanced in a 
semiotic analysis. Also the theoretical foundation of semiotics is important in order to 
get at clear understanding of what is actually meant by signs and sign processes. 
1.3 Objectives of the Dissertation 
The overall objective of this dissertation is in general terms to examine the theoretical 
implications of Peirce‘s semeiotic6  theory and cognitive semantics; how they relate to 
concepts and successively whether semeiotic theory is a fruitful perspective for 
understanding KO and KOS.  
I believe this analysis involves at least four perspectives, 1) a semeiotic perspective, that 
investigates into the nature of representation, 2) a library perspective, that investigates 
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into the characteristics of KOS, 3) a semantic perspective, that investigates into the 
meaning of concepts, and 4) a social/cultural perspective, that investigates into the role 
of domains and its implications for KOS.  
1.3.1 The Semiotic perspective 
Semiotics is the study of signs and how they may be meaningful to someone. Signs, 
however, exist at different conceptual levels, and we may at one end speak of 
biosemiotics, that explores the semiotic processes of life itself, and at the other end we 
may speak of social semiotics that explores the signs of social and communicative 
processes and products connected to living and acting in society.  
According to Eco (1976, p. 7) ‗semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken 
as a sign‘, in other words semiotics is about anything (a sign) that stands for something 
else (an object). 
We may furthermore define semiotics as the study of meaning, of how signs or sign 
systems represents aspects of reality, and of how meaning is inferred from 
representations.  
Semiotics may be characterized as a type of research, as a doctrine, as a theory or a set 
of methods (Sebeok, 1994). Therefore, semiotics may be approached differently by 
different disciplines, spanning from pure instrumentalism to a general principle that 
perfuses the universe. 
The semiotic perspective promoted in this dissertation is in line with Charles S. Peirce 
(1839-1914), who defines a sign as something which is open for interpretation for a 
perceiving mind. A sign is something which stands for something else, and which 
produces a correlate in a perceiving mind. Therefore, a sign is something which stands 
in relation to an object and an interpretant (perception). Peirce‘s semiotic theory 
consists of a triadic, irreducible relation between a representamen (a sign), an object 
(the signified) and an interpretant (meaning). In his early writings, e.g. (CP 2.227)
 
 
Peirce simply defines semiotics as the formal doctrine of signs. However, the formal 
branch of ‗semeiotic‘, the name preferred by Peirce, is later divided further into 
‗speculative grammar‘, ‗critic‘, and ‗methodeutic‘. 
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The Peirce Scholar James Lizka provides an overview of Peirce‘s classification of the 
theoretical sciences, and shows how semeiotic is part of philosophy and, furthermore, a 
normative science. 
 
 
Figure 1:2: Peirce’s classification of philosophy. Excerpt from the model described in (Lizka, 1996, 
p. 4) 
 
Another prominent branch within semiotics, often named ‗semiology‘ was founded by 
Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. As is the case with Peirce‘s semeiotic, Saussure‘s 
semiology is concerned with the meaning of signs. Saussure, however, perceives 
language as a semiotic system of differences. And the sign is divided in two, a signifier 
and a signified.  
The point of departure for Saussure was the semiotic system of language, and a 
separation of the formal structure of ‗langue‘ and its actual use, ‗parole‘. The 
fundamental differences between Saussure‘s semiology and Peirce‘s semeiotic are, 
however, outside the scope of this dissertation.  
The present perspective regards KO as a genuine semiotic activity, an activity whose 
function is to organize particular information objects according to a particular sign 
system. Furthermore, KOS are considered semantic systems that function as mediators 
between information warrants and documents; KOS are thus sign systems that at 
different levels of granularity establish a connection between a representation, 
information warrants and information sources.   
 
  Philosophy
Phenomenology
Normative Sciences
Aestethics
Ethics
Semeiotic
Grammar
Critical Logic
Universal Rhetoric
Metaphysics
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1.3.2 The Library perspective 
KO is a core concept within LIS. It is associated with different kinds of representation 
systems that are designed for managing, storing and searching for different kinds of 
information sources. Classic knowledge organization systems (KOS) are e.g. Dewey 
Decimal Classification (DDC) and universal classification system (UDC) that form a 
distinct part in the history of LIS.  
The development of modern information technology and especially the Internet has 
changed the information environment and the information behavior of users and 
producers. Concepts like digital libraries, virtual universities, e-learning, e-publishing, 
e-books have emerged along with the Internet and its increased possibilities for 
information exchange. The technological side of information is an unavoidable 
important factor in the 21
st
 century‘s information environment. 
Access to information has by today‘s standard in many ways become easier, in what 
may be called the electronic era of information, at least when it comes to finding 
something useful. The concept ‗to Google something‘ or ‗googling‘ are widespread, but 
the prize of ease of access and use of Internet search machines is insurmountable 
information overload.  
KO now have to find its footing, and new role in a dynamic and ever-changing 
electronic information environment where fundamental concepts such as ‗bibliographic 
control‘ and ‗document‘ are under pressure. What is important, however, is that the 
communicative relation between a representation and an interpretation is only affected 
by the technology, in terms of access, speed, downloads etc. The access to information 
may, thus, have become easier, and some KOS may have become easier to navigate, but 
the cognitive process of recognizing and understanding the meaning of a representation 
is the same.  The digital developments of the information environment and its impact on 
KOS is, however, not analyzed in detail, but mentioned as an aspect in the development 
of new KOS technologies, as ontologies and the semantic web. 
For analytical purposes KO and KOS are addressed separately. This division makes it 
possible to discuss the theories and context of KO apart from the actual representation 
systems. I consider this division fruitful because developments and changes within the 
information environment have consequences for the development of KOS and how 
Knowledge organization - signs, concepts and terminology. A semeiotic framework 
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information sources are represented and retrieved. The fundamental conception of 
knowledge, information and mediation is first and foremost related to theory and 
epistemology. 
The function of KOS may be thought of as mediation of information sources, and 
defining KOS as a ‗mediator‘ of information sources has some important implications. 
Firstly, it has a uniting function; systems and users are regarded in a complementary 
manner. Secondly, it accentuates the important relations between representation, 
interpretation and concepts. And thirdly, it provides KOS with a purpose that offers a 
different outlook on the processes of IR systems and user interaction. An outlook that is 
sensitive to how meaning is grounded in a community. The community thus becomes 
more important than the particular system or the particular user. This view is in line 
with the socio-cognitive (Temmerman, 2000) and domain analytical view (Hjørland, 
2002b, 2004; Hjørland & Albrechtsen, 1995) 
1.3.3 The Semantic perspective  
 
Language is an instrument for conveying meaning. The structure of this 
instrument reflects its function, and it can only be properly understood in 
terms of its function. To study language without reference to meaning is 
like studying road signs from the point of view of their physical properties 
(how much they weigh, what kind of paint are they painted with, and so 
on) or like studying the structure of the eye without any reference to 
seeing. (Wierzbicka, 1996, p. 3) 
 
Semantics is the study of linguistic meaning, and is a diverse field that involves 
different theories and approaches to linguistics. According to (Geeraerts, 2010) five 
traditions of lexical semantics are predominant: historical-philosophical semantics, 
structuralist semantics, generativist semantics, neo-structuralist semantics and cognitive 
semantics.  
In more general terms we may speak of strong and weak semantic theories. Where 
strong semantic theories seek out objective definitions of concepts, incorporating 
principles of formal logic, formal structures, truth value and correspondence, and thus 
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incorporate a high degree of semantic interoperability, weak semantic theories define 
concepts in relation to contextual meaning, to theories and purpose, and thus have a 
more relative, constructivist and pragmatic approach. According to Tredinnick (2006), 
strong models of representation are implicit within (L)IS. 
 
Strong models of representation are implicit within librarianship, 
information science and computer science, and generally go 
unchallenged. We have seen, for example, that wihin librarianship 
aboutness stands in place of meaning in the creation of surrogates, and 
that this relies on an assumption about mimetic qualities of information 
and knowledge. Within information science, interpretation became 
understood as a subjective process after the cognitive shift, but the means 
by which information artefacts represent knowledge, experience or the 
world remained largely uninterrogated. The reliance on set logic and the 
Shannon model within digital computing incorporated a reductive 
approach to representation. All three are examples of a classical model 
which operates on the assumption of a direct correspondence between the 
tokens in symbolic systems of various kinds and the thing for which they 
stand in place. (Tredinnick, 2006, p. 118) 
 
KOS are considered semantic systems related to semantic theory, and two important 
aspects are considered: 1) how concepts are represented, organized and structured in 
KOS, and 2) how meaning is related to these representations. 
Cognitive semantics is in opposition to strong semantics. It is a theoretical movement 
within linguistics that considers conceptual structures as embodied. Lakoff (1987) 
defines cognitive semantics as a philosophy of experiential realism. The meaning of 
conceptual structures relates to perception, culture, and motor movement.  
Cognitive semantics and cognitive linguistics apply experientialism to categorization 
and language (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999) and 
mark a significant turning point in linguistic theory. The meaning of language is not 
related to objective categories in the world, or to internal formal syntax of grammar. In 
(Lakoff, 1987), Lakoff delivers a significant blow to the objectivistic paradigm within 
general linguistic philosophy.    
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On the traditional view, reason is abstract and disembodied. On the new 
view, reason has a bodily basis. The traditional view sees reason as 
literal, as primary about propositions that can be objectively either true or 
false. The new view takes imaginative aspects of reason – metaphor, 
metonymy, and mental imagery – as central to reason, rather than a 
peripheral and inconsequential adjunct to the literal. (Lakoff, 1987, p. xi) 
 
Lakoff shows, that concepts and categories are developed according to what he names 
idealized cognitive models (ICM) and prototypes. Categories are not objective but 
influenced by language and thus relative to culture and communities. Categories are not 
clear cut, but show prototypic features, e.g. within the category of birds, the sparrow is 
considered more prototypical than e.g. an ostrich. 
Theory of language has been approached within LIS. Especially in relation to 
information retrieval (Blair, 1990, 2003). Blair bases his theory of information retrieval 
on the later Wittgenstein and his theory of language games, and includes aspects of 
semiotics. Blair considers language as a system of signs which become meaningful with 
reference to a particular language game. The language game establishes the context for 
meaningful communication. According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of concepts cannot 
be separated from its use within a community (Wittgenstein, 1958).  
Representation of knowledge is deeply tied to language. And language is related to 
semiotic theory. Words and concepts are signs of meaning; however, the meaning of 
words and concepts is not neutral or objective, but motivated by social circumstances, 
perspective, language game and theory. The semantic angle discusses by what means 
the meaning of signs are motivated. The theory of cognitive semantics is considered 
because it provides an elaborate theoretical framework for addressing the biological, 
social and cultural aspects of meaning that is tied to linguistic signs. 
1.3.4 The social/cultural/pragmatic perspective  
The social perspective is important, because it investigates into how social 
circumstances determine the meaning of concepts.  
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Cognitive semantics operates with ‗idealized cognitive models‘ (ICM) that express the 
conventional meaning of a concept. An ICM is determined by a cultural frame that 
delimits the use and meaning of a concept. The meaning of an ICM is thus socially and 
culturally contingent.  
Peirce uses the concept universe of discourse in a similar way to delimit a social or 
collaborative framework. For Peirce, however, the ‗universe of discourse‘ is a 
prerequisite determination of world acquired through ‗collateral experience‘7, and is 
related to scientific facts, e.g. a theoretical framework. In this way the universe of 
discourse is a more precise and determinate frame, than the ICM. In a communication 
process, the universe of discourse is thus a determination of the utterer‘s familiarity 
with a world, acquired through collateral experience, and the perceiving mind‘s ditto 
(Liszka, 1996). Communication is possible only when the speaker and auditor exhibit a 
common or shared understanding of what is communicated.  
The importance of social structures and shared understandings in relation to 
communication and meaning making is included both in cognitive semantics and 
semiotic theory. However, an important difference is that where Peirce argues from a 
philosophical perspective, according to which, knowledge is determined by scientific 
investigations, Lakoff argues that knowledge is structured by means of culturally 
determined cognitive models (ICM). It may however be possible to combine the two 
views, in a unified communication model.  
1.4 Research Question 
If KO is concerned with theories and methods for organizing and representing concepts 
and concept relations, and KOS, fundamentally, is the prerequisite tool for information 
seeking, it is significant to enquire into the character and scope of different kinds of 
KOS. Furthermore, if KOS‘s, in general, are normative semantic systems that provide 
for organization and control of semantic units, semantic theories should be relevant for 
KO. Also, if KOS‘s are considered intentionally to signify concepts, and, thus, systems 
that communicate a particular meaning, KOS‘s are in principle genuine sign systems 
that presuppose a communicative intention expressed by the KOS, a receptive effect 
Knowledge organization - signs, concepts and terminology. A semeiotic framework 
 
 14 
that presupposes an interpreting mind, and a general meaning that presupposes more 
than the individual mind.  
From this line of thought follow, that the relation between a representation and an 
interpretation is a communicative process that takes place between a speaker/utterer that 
communicates with a certain intent, and an interpreter, which is the object for which the 
communication is directed.  I do not at this point wish to distinguish between an oral 
speaker and a text (which includes KOS‘s) communicated by a medium. Both cases are 
considered acts of communication. Consequently, the signs represented in KOS are 
intentional, which means they are considered to communicate a certain meaning to a 
user. The character of this communication represented by different kinds of KOS is 
considered based on assumptions that emanate from different semantic approaches.  
Based on this chain of reasoning, the research question is stated by the following 
paragraph:  
 
If this line of thought is plausible, then what is the character and scope of 
representation demonstrated by different kinds of KOS? What theories of 
concepts in relation to KOS are at play? And also, can semeiotic and cognitive 
semantic theory offer a more elaborate understanding of concepts and provide for 
an alternative framework for how concepts may be approached in KO? 
 
The sequential character of the research question will be approached by investigating 
into the character of different kinds of KOS, with a particular focus on semantic 
relations, and, successively, demonstrating that KOS‘s are related to assumptions based 
in concept theory. Secondly, the aim is also to demonstrate a relation between Peirce‘s 
semeiotic theory and concept theory, in particular the cognitive semantic approach as 
formulated by George Lakoff. Combining the two theoretical approaches provides for 
the development of a semeiotic communication model (the Dynacom), that 
demonstrates how meaning may be transferred between a speaker/utterer and a 
hearer/interpreter. Finally, it is investigated, by elaboration of the constituent parts in 
the model, how the model may be useful as an analytical framework in relation to KOS. 
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The last part includes a minor tentative case study that exemplifies how the model can 
be used as an instrument of reflection.   
1.5 Methodological Considerations  
As implied by the research question, the dissertation has its focus on representation and 
how concepts are in fact represented and organized within the context of KO.  
Furthermore the research question expresses an implicit criticism of how existing 
theories within KO deals with concepts. Therefore, the shortcomings of dominating 
theory and praxis within KO will be demonstrated.  
In order to approach the research question  a selection of traditional and contemporary 
types of KOS are reviewed, based on the taxonomy suggested by Hodge (2000). 
Hodge‘s taxonomy is non-exhaustive, but it covers the main types of KOS, thus 
organizing the types into the main categories: ‗term lists‘, ‗classification and 
categorization systems‘ and ‗relationship lists‘. Thus providing an overview of how 
different types of KOS express concepts and concept relations, it is possible to see how 
they relate to concept theory.  
Based in (Ereshefsky, 2001), concept theory is divided into three main categories: 
essentialist concept theories, cluster analytical theories and the historical approach.  
More elaborately, essentialist concept theories suggest the existence of clear cut 
objective categories, where category members share similar traits, which are considered 
both necessary and sufficient for category membership. Cluster analytical concept 
theories, are less strict in demarking category membership. Not all traits are necessarily 
shared by category members, and as a consequence, graded categories are allowed. This 
gives rise to socio-cognitive theories and models of concepts that are culturally 
motivated and thus contingent, and based in embodied experience. In particular 
cognitive semantics is given attention, because it deliberately formulates an extensive 
and fundamentally serious critique against essentialist concept theories. The historical 
approach takes a different departure, by not exclusively focusing on qualitative 
similarity of category members, but is instead explanation based, and thus gives priority 
to causality, coherence, and theoretical commitments. The semiotic approach developed 
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in this dissertation, is in line with the historical approach. However, it also takes the 
theory of cognitive semantics into account. Cognitive semantics as formulated by 
Lakoff (1987) and Lakoff & Johnson (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999) is therefore discussed 
in detail, and related to Peirce‘s semeiotic. From this comparative analysis, that explores 
the fundamental assumptions of the two approaches, the concept of significance-effect 
is developed. Significance-effect is inspired by Lakoff‘s notion of basic level 
categorization, metaphor and ICM; however, where basic level categorization is a 
fundamental structuring principle of simple categories, e.g. artifacts, it becomes more 
complicated when we address abstract concepts. Abstract concepts may not express 
basic level categorization, or the basic level of an abstract concept may be more 
dependent on the knowledge of the interpreter. As a consequence the concept of 
significance-effect is developed, based in the assumption that a concept has an effect of 
meaning, which is relative to what is already known by a perceiving mind.  Basic level 
categorization, metaphor and ICM are cognitive schemes that influence and delimit the 
cognitive space that determines the meaning of an expression. 
The concept of significance-effect is eventually elaborated and incorporated into a 
model of communication that is based in the interpretive level of the signification 
process. It is thus argued that the semeiotic approach provides for a deeper 
understanding of concepts and how they communicate meaning to somebody.  
The principles of the theoretical developments are finally exemplified by minor case 
study in ‗Occupational therapy‘ and the ending discussion relates to how this approach 
may be useful in relation to developing future KOS.  
1.6 The Research Process  
The ideas promoted and discussed in this dissertation have their roots in my master 
thesis from 1998, which was revised and eventually published in Semiotica (Thellefsen, 
Brier, & Thellefsen, 2003). In many ways, the present dissertation can be seen as a 
follow-up on this work.  
The research process may, because of its cross-disciplinary approach, be considered 
atypical for a LIS dissertation. However, I have chosen to focus on aspects of KO from 
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a conceptual perspective, thus trying to apply theory rather than methodology, and thus 
focusing on understanding the complexities of conceptual systems and processes of 
representation, rather than ‗doing‘ or constructing a new system. Consequently, the 
dissertation has the character of an explorative study that seeks to unravel assumptions 
and interpret their consequences for KO.  
As put forward in my research question, KO is related to semeiotic and semantic theory. 
And the outcome of this application is the result of the research process.  
I would therefore characterize the method of the present work as explorative, conceptual 
and analytical.   
1.7 Structure of the Dissertation  
The argumentative structure of the dissertation follows from its explorative nature. 
Chapter 2 thus has the function of providing the context for addressing KO and to 
characterize different manifestations of KOS. The objective of the chapter is to argue 
that KOS are systems of knowledge representation that build upon linguistic units, and 
depend on the reasoning capabilities of a perceiving mind, and, furthermore to 
demonstrate that KOS are systems that organize words, concepts and classes and 
consequently can be analyzed as systems of signification. The purpose of this chapter is 
also to demonstrate that the different kinds of KOS implicate different understandings 
of concepts and thus different approaches to representation. Chapter 3 elaborates further 
on how to reason about concepts and classes by discussing three general philosophical 
schools of scientific classification: essentialism, cluster analysis and historical 
classification. The purpose of this chapter is to establish a theoretical framework that 
connects KO to different theories of concepts and categorization. Lakoff‘s theory of 
cognitive semantics is explored as an exemplification of cluster analysis (or graded 
categorization) in linguistics. Cognitive semantics is in opposition to essentialism and 
formulates an elaborate socio-cognitive framework on concepts and categorization.  
Lakoff‘s theory is of particular interest because it investigates how language is used 
within culture, and analyzes how culture plays an active role in the formation of 
concepts. Thus Lakoff provides us with insights about how the meaning of concepts is 
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motivated, structurally organized, and how concepts are connected to situations, 
perspectives, and cultural habits. In particular, Lakoff‘s idea of how concepts become 
meaningful to somebody is important from a semeiotic viewpoint.  
Because cognitive semantics is concerned with concepts, their structuring mechanism, 
and how they represent meaning, cognitive semantics is considered a theory of 
interpretation, and may thus be related to semeiotic.  The relation between cognitive 
semantics and semeiotic is explored further in chapter 6.  
The semeiotic view as formulated by Peirce is however also related to the historical 
approach. And it is argued that the historical approach provides for a more elaborate and 
context sensitive analysis of concepts. The chapter argues that the cluster analytical 
approach expresses a synchronic perspective on concepts, where the historical and 
semeiotic approach provides for a diachronic and discursive perspective. The value of 
the latter is explored in chapter 4 and 5.  
Chapter 4 introduces the reader to semiotics, and in particular Peirce‘s semeiotic theory. 
The objective of the chapter is to establish a general understanding of key semeiotic 
concepts, including Peirce understanding of ‗a sign‘ and the fundamental division of 
sign triconomies and sign-classes. The taxonomy of Hodge is revisited and analyzed 
from the perspective of semeiotic. This analysis makes it possible to explain different 
types of semantic systems (KOS) as sign systems of different semeiotic complexity. The 
chapter connects to the discussions of concept theory, and thus consolidates the 
theoretical fundament of the dissertation.   
Based in the theoretical fundament elaborated in the previous chapters, chapter 5 
develops the concept of sign-displacement. The concept of sign-displacement relates to 
meaning and is a consequence of semeiotic reasoning. Because a sign cannot represent 
its object as it is by itself (objectively), but entails an interpretive element (a subject), 
the meaning of a sign is displaced from its object. 
The chapter has a particular focus on the divisions of the interpretant and the object. The 
purpose is to establish a deeper understanding of the semeiotic processes related to 
representation and communication.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 19 
In chapter 6 cognitive semantics is revisited and related to semeiotic. The difference 
between the two approaches to concepts and categorization is explored further, and the 
concept of significance effect is developed. 
The chapter concludes in a communication model, the Dynacom, which is based in the 
triadic sign model, placing the universe of discourse and collateral experience as 
prerequisite for the possibility of significance-effect, and the occurrence of the 
cominterpretant.  
Chapter 7 discusses how the Dynocom contributes to our understanding of KO and 
KOS. The constituent elements of the Dynacom is elaborated, and related to three levels 
of understanding. The concept of significance-effect is thus emphasized as a sub-
cognitive level of understanding that relates to a universe of discourse and collateral 
experience. The significance-effect thus expresses a relative effect of meaning within a 
communication process.  Also, the chapter includes a tentative case study, that 
exemplifies the principles of the Dynacom compared to occupational therapy. 
Chapter 8 concludes the findings of the dissertation 
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2 Knowledge Organization and Knowledge Organization 
Systems 
Introduction 
 
Knowledge organization (KO) is considered a sub-area of Library and Information 
Science (LIS), and is concerned with numerous different systems and processes 
developed for organizing (or managing) knowledge. KO is generally associated with the 
library institutions (including digital libraries, archives and museums) and different 
kinds of knowledge organization systems (KOS), as e.g. the library catalogue, 
bibliographies, classification schemes etc. Furthermore, the different kinds of systems 
has been developed in different historical periods, and thus with different technological 
approaches. Also, they have been developed for different purposes, ranging from 
general universal systems, such as the DDC and UDC, to systems that are developed 
with a particular disciplinary focus.  
The developments in KO include the perspectives of different more or less overlapping 
disciplines: LIS, Information Science (IS), computer science, computer linguistics, and 
Terminology. In this chapter I will, based on Hodge (2000), discuss the function of 
traditional KOS. Hodge‘s taxonomy of KOS is chosen because it provides a general 
overview of fundamental types of KOS, and furthermore it also suggests a systematic 
order based on semantic complexity. Also, I will demonstrate that the categorization of 
KOS imply a kinship with the related disciplines of computer linguistics (in particular 
regarding ontology and knowledge representation (KR)) and Terminology/ 
Lexicography.  
Hodge‘s taxonomy is by no means exhaustive, but suggests a general overview of 
different kinds of KOS. Hjørland (2007b) formulates a dissimilar organization based on 
different theoretical approaches in KO, and thus includes the IR tradition, the 
bibliometrical approach, the domain analytical approach and other approaches, 
including semiotics, critical-hermeneutical, discourse analytical and genre based 
approaches.  Hjørland demonstrates that KOS basically are systems that represent 
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concepts and semantic relations, and thus argues that knowledge about concepts and 
semantics is important for research within KO. Hjørland‘s insights are contrasted with 
Hodge‘s overview, and an organization based on ‗kind‘, ‗character‘ and ‗function‘ is 
suggested. The field of Terminology is considered related to KO, because of its unique 
focus on concepts and terms. The classical onomasiological view is contrasted with the 
socio-cognitive view. Both views are dedicated to terminology work, but promote 
different understandings of how language and social activity affects the meaning of 
concepts.   
The purpose of this chapter is eventually to demonstrate that KO includes a variety of 
different approaches and that KOS, despite their differences, share a common trait in 
being systems dedicated to systematic representation of linguistic units, concepts and 
knowledge. For that reason, KOS are considered semantic systems that at different 
levels of granularity express concept and concept relations. Also, besides demonstrating 
that KOS are systems that organize semantic units, it is also argued that KOS should be 
considered from a pragmatic perspective that takes the social nature of knowledge 
production and communication into account. The chapter is concluded by a section that 
relates the concept of representation to semiotic theory. 
2.1 Defining Knowledge Organization (KO) 
The field of KO is understood as a sub-area within the LIS community, having a 
particular focus on bibliographic representation. In Hjørland (2007b) KO is defined as 
the field that is concerned with construction and evaluation of semantic tools for 
information retrieval (IR). More specifically, KO is concerned with activities such as 
indexing, abstracting and classification of bibliographical items and within libraries, 
databases, archives etc. KO thus investigate the nature and quality of knowledge 
organization processes (KOP) as performed by information specialists and computer 
algorithms, as well as knowledge organization systems (KOS) used to organize 
documents, representations of documents and concepts (Hjørland, 2008).  
KO thus includes a wide array of research interest, e.g. the theoretical basis of KO, the 
history of KO, terminological issues, domain studies, genre studies, the social 
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organization of the sciences etc., and as such, KO may be considered in at least two 
perspectives: 1) a narrow perspective that has a particular focus on the different parts of 
the information systems, e.g.  ‗metadata‘, ‗the bibliographic record‘, its structure, its 
function, and its interrelated parts. At a more general level, there is a focus on ‗the 
knowledge organization system (KOS)‘, its structure of ‗subject classes‘ and ‗concepts‘. 
In the narrow sense, KO is related to design of information architecture and its 
application. Also, KOS may be universalistic as DDC and UDC, or specialized in 
organizing the knowledge of a particular discipline, as e.g. is the case with the ‗The 
Dickinson Classification‘ (Bradley, 1968), that was designed specifically to organize 
collections of music at Vassar College. 
KO may, however, also be considered in 2) a wider perspective that includes disciplines 
such as sociology of knowledge and culture studies (cf. Hjørland, 1997), literature 
genres and rhetoric (cf. J. Andersen, 2004), semiotics (cf. Mai, 2000), and  bibliometrics 
(cf. Schneider, 2006).   
KO in a wider perspective is interdisciplinary, and expresses a more complex and 
pragmatic understanding of KOS. This dissertation is mainly concerned with the wider 
perspective on KO, however, the structuring principles of different kinds of KOS are 
also considered important.    
I will demonstrate that KOS are semantic systems that 1) provide the necessary 
structure of concepts that meets the functions and purpose of the system, and 2) that the 
pragmatic dimension as expressed by the wider perspective of KO provides important 
qualitative reflections useful for KOS design. The tenets of KO thus have two legs, a 
semantic leg, that in principle is dedicated to information architecture, i.e. structuring 
the semantic relations of concepts within the system; and a pragmatic leg, that 
investigates the nature of concepts, how they become meaningful and how they are used 
as units of communication in a social environment. 
2.1.1 Knowledge Organization Systems (KOS) 
Traditionally, library systems are designed from the perspective of providing physical 
access to documents and have their roots in the historical developments of libraries and 
information sources. The basic functions and the purpose of KOS can be listed as 1) 
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facilitation of information retrieval (IR-function), 2) providing information about 
documents (document information function), and 3) shelf arrangement (ordering 
function) (Broughton, Hansson, Hjørland, & López-Huertas, 2005). 
At the general level, Hodge (2000) suggests that KOS encompass all types of systems 
designed in order to provide access to information sources. 
 
The term knowledge organization systems is intended to encompass all 
types of schemes for organizing information and promoting knowledge 
management. Knowledge organization systems include classification and 
categorization schemes that organize materials at a general level, subject 
headings that provide more detailed access, and authority files that 
control variant versions of key information such as geographic names and 
personal names. Knowledge organization systems also include highly 
structured vocabularies, such as thesauri, and less traditional schemes, 
such as semantic networks and ontologies. Because knowledge 
organization systems are mechanisms for organizing information, they are 
at the heart of every library, museum, and archive. (Hodge 2000)  
 
Hodge provides a useful non-exhaustive overview of the general types of KOS and 
orders them in three main categories: 
 
Term lists 
1. Authority files 
2. Glossaries 
3. Dictionaries 
4. Gazetteers 
Classification and categories 
5. Subject headings 
6. Classification schemes, taxonomies and categorization schemes 
Relationship list 
7. Thesauri 
8. Semantic network 
Chapter 2: Knowledge Organization and Knowledge organization Systems. 
 25 
9. Ontologies 
 
Term lists: are lists of terms that provide control for variant names of an entity.  1) 
Authority files are lists of preferred terms and forms used for describing a bibliographic 
item. 2) Glossaries and 3) dictionaries contain definitions of specialized terminology, 
and may furthermore be useful tools for term list development. 4) Gazetteers list names 
of places and contain information about geographical makeup, country region, social 
statistics etc.  
By including dictionaries in the term list category, Hodge also indicates a close relation 
between KOS and design and compilation of dictionaries. Or formulated differently, by 
including dictionaries in his taxonomy, dictionaries are considered a kind of KOS. 
However, dictionary craftsmanship, both regarding general dictionaries and specialized 
dictionaries, is usually related to the discipline of lexicography, not KO, and this 
relation is relatively unexplored by researchers within the field of KO. Few studies 
within the field of Terminology exist that link lexicography and terminology work to 
KO, see e.g. (Cabré, 1999; Sager, 1990). Terminology, which is closely related to 
lexicography, but in particular focused on standardization of terms and construction of 
term databases, seems also related, but is likewise unexplored.  
Classification and categories: 5) Subject headings are words and phrases which 
constitute a controlled vocabulary.  Subject headings are used in catalogues to describe 
the subject of a document. Subject headings may be general as LCSH
8
 or specialized as 
TOTSH
9
 or MESH
10
. 6) Classification and categorization schemes provide subject sets, 
while the terms classification schemes, taxonomies and categorization schemes are 
often used interchangeably (G. Hodge, 2000), but the terms ‗taxonomy‘ and 
‗categorization‘ may also suggest other connotations than bibliographical classification 
schemes, e.g. biological taxonomy and linguistic categorization. However, the most 
important function of KOS under the category of ‗classification and categories‘ is its 
particular focus on hierarchical relations.  
Relationship lists: has as ‗term lists‘ a particular focus on semantic units. As indicated 
by the category, relationships between terms are the primary function. These 
relationships can be hierarchical and associative. Furthermore, the different kinds of 
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KOS that fall under this category also provides authority control, and thus includes, 
from an analytical perspective, the functions of both ‗term lists‘ and ‗classification and 
categories‘. 7) Thesauri are controlled vocabularies that, beside authority control, 
express hierarchical relationships of concepts and add associative relations to other 
concepts in the system. One may say that thesauri express both vertical (hierarchical) 
and horizontal (associative) relations, where classification systems primarily are focused 
on the hierarchical organization of concepts. 8) Semantic networks and 9) ontologies are 
not normally considered genuine KOS, but are associated with computer linguistics and 
formal knowledge representation (KR). Ontologies and semantic networks are systems 
that are able to express subject categories and concepts with even greater precision than 
thesauri normally do.  
Hodge‘s taxonomy of different types of KOS suggests that KOS as research field goes 
beyond a narrow LIS perspective. And if this assumption is correct, KOS should be 
considered interdisciplinary internally as well as externally, where new developments 
may be motivated by theories imported from other sciences, as e.g. sociology, 
philosophy and linguistics, but also inspired by technologies developed in other 
disciplines, in particular computer science and applied linguistics.  
Other kinds of KOS apart from the kinds suggested by Hodge are bibliometric maps, 
concept maps, topic maps, folksonomies etc. In particular the value of bibliometric 
maps has been discussed by Hjørland (2002a). These other kinds should all be 
considered types of KOS within the category of relationship lists.  
In the following section I will exemplify Hodge‘s three main categories of KOS, and 
discuss their practical and theoretical implications. The section is concluded by an 
investigation of the related approaches: Ontologies and knowledge representation (KR).  
2.1.2 Term Lists 
Term lists are lists of terms that provide control for variant names of an entity. 
According to Hodge (2000), authority files, glossaries, dictionaries and gazetteers 
belong to the category of term lists. Authority files are defined as approved terms for 
describing a bibliographical item; authority files ensure consistent use of proper names 
and concepts, and connect various terms that are inherently intertwined. Authority files 
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provides for preferred term for equivalence, hierarchic and associative relationships, 
meaning that it relates variant terms for the same concept, and selects an authoritative 
one as the main term (Hagler, 1997). Authority files are helpful when searching 
databases where similar items may be named with variant terms.  
Glossaries and dictionaries are tools that provide definitions of terms, and are useful 
tools for identifying reliable candidates for a controlled vocabulary.  
As argued, Terminology and lexicography are related disciplines of KOS. Terminology 
is in particular dedicated to standardization of terms and development of term databases. 
Lexicography is on the other hand dedicated to crafting dictionaries.  
An important distinction between the category members is that authority files are 
thought as controlled vocabularies, made for searching a database, where glossaries, 
dictionaries and gazetteers are descriptive or prescriptive, and is produced for purposes 
different than searching databases. 
For analytical purposes, we may argue that term lists are particular types of KOS that 
have the function of defining a semantic unit (dictionaries, glossaries, gazetteers), and 
controlling a vocabulary and its semantic relations (authority files). 
2.1.3 Classification and Categories  
‗Subject headings‘ is a type of pre-coordinate vocabulary used to organize 
bibliographical items. As is the purpose of term lists, the function of subject headings is 
to assist the search for information using a controlled vocabulary; however, the 
technology was developed in the post-online era, and thus essentially based on the 
tradition of Charles A. Cutter (Cutter, 1904), meeting the requirements of manually 
searching a library catalogue. Subject headings use a single word and/or phrase to 
represent a particular subject or concept. Subject headings may be an outdated 
technology, however, it is still used e.g. by Library of Congress (LC). LCSH is the 
vocabulary most widely used within library cataloguing. Mainly because of economical 
factors, but also because it is a user friendly tool for indexing and for quickly and easily 
locating something relevant to a request (Hagler, 1997). 
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The purpose of subject headings is to catalogue the content of documents according to 
the vocabulary. However, subject headings identify concept(s), not documents, and are 
thus conceptual.  
LCSH also provides for semantic relations as equivalence (synonym or near synonym), 
generic relations (broader term BT/ narrow term NT) and associative relations (related 
term RT), and thus includes the functions of the thesaurus.      
Traditionally, within classification theory, one distinguishes between enumerative and 
faceted classification
11
, which refers to the principles of structuring concepts, and 
universal vs. specific classification, which refer to the level of specificity. Where 
universal classification systems aim at organizing all knowledge in a library system as 
e.g. DDC and UDC, the specified classification systems aim at organizing a particular 
subject area or a discipline. 
Also, the ambitions of the different kinds of systems are different. The DDC was 
developed in a historical period where no unified library system existed. Every library 
thus maintained their respective local organization system. The DDC was developed 
from the perspective of library management, with a particular focus on usefulness, 
standardization and cost reduction. Milvin Dewey (1851-1931), the father of the DDC, 
insisted on practical techniques and effectiveness, thus giving priority to the internal 
structure of the system rather than revising it according to the developments in 
knowledge itself. Also, the first edition of DDC was created in 1876, where the 
information environment was different, where physical access to documents was the 
priority and thus management of a library document collection was essential. The 
subsequent 22 editions have gradually changed the system considerably, in particular 
due to the severe growth of knowledge production in the 20
th
 century. Furthermore, 
documents have become increasingly specialized and genre specific, thus putting 
pressure on the specificity of subject classes. In the era of digital information, DDC is 
still in development, and is continuously adjusting to the developments of information 
sources, refining the structure of its subject classes, and it is still widely used by public 
libraries.   
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The UDC, was initiated by Paul Otlet and Henri La Fontaine, and represents a modified 
and enhanced version of the DDC, with a particular focus on knowledge and knowledge 
production within scholarly communities.  
 
In contrast to the foregoing practices associated with typical general 
library classification schemes, Otlet and La Fontaine dealt with specialist 
articles from the start and not simply in a few cases but rather in the great 
majority of cases. Further, they believed that scientists and specialists 
were only interested in materials at confined (specific) levels. (Miksa, 
1998, p. 54) 
 
The enhancements of the UDC were the introduction of subject facets in the universal 
classification system, thus making it possible to express more complex subject 
descriptions by means of numbers. 
As recently discussed by Ducheyne (2005), Paul Otlet subscribed to an objectivist 
epistemology that assumes the possibility of a universal classification of all human 
knowledge.  
In many ways, traditional library classification has been challenged by new information 
technology and the era of the Internet. The importance and influence of DDC and UDC 
within the library community is, however, undisputed; but the strength of the systems is 
their focus on subject classes, the hierarchical organization of concepts, and their 
management facilities by the use of decimal number notations.  
The DDC and UDC are mentioned because of their historical importance and prevalent 
status within library classification. However, also subject specific or disciplinary 
classification systems exists, and in many cases the DDC or UDC are impractical if the 
focus is on a particular subject area. Also, specialized classification systems may be 
closer related to the subject area, the discourse community, the discipline, etc. they tend 
to organize.  
Classification systems are conceptual and express a perspective on how subject classes 
are organized, sub-divided and related within the system. In summary, classification 
systems order items according to subject classes based on some properties.  They may 
be universalistic or specific to a domain, and they specify generic relations between 
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classes. Classification systems are ordered systematically, with an alphabetical index; 
they are normative and specify classes.  
2.1.4 Relationship Lists 
Like term lists, the thesaurus is a controlled vocabulary. It differs, however, from the 
term list by its more developed structure.  
Traditionally, a thesaurus is defined as a semantic tool that offers the user a systematic 
representation of concepts, e.g. by establishing a hierarchical outlook from general to 
more specific concepts. The thesaurus normally contains information about conceptual 
relations by using the following operators:  
 
BT – Broader term 
NT – Narrow term 
RT – Related term  
SN – Scope note 
USE – Authority control 
 
A thesaurus is usually domain specific and is a tool designed for subject indexing and 
for searching a bibliographical database. Therefore a thesaurus should be based on a 
thorough understanding of the information environment (Lykke Nielsen, 2002). How 
this understanding may be established has been discussed by (Hjørland, 1998, 2007b; 
Jacob, 2001; Jacob & Shaw, 1998).   
The methodology used to identify appropriate concepts can be based on empirical 
investigations of different kinds. One may ask domain experts within a particular 
subject field in order to identify concept candidates for a thesaurus or one could analyze 
a corpus of documents and investigate domain specific dictionaries and encyclopedia or 
even combine the approaches. Lykke Nielsen (2002), showed how the concept of the 
association test can be of value as methodology for identifying important concepts in a 
larger medical corporation. This approach incorporated users from different areas of the 
corporate organization.  
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The process of identifying appropriate semantic categories is thus normally based on 
empirical investigations or different kinds of warrants. The generation of conceptual 
categories that may be used as descriptors in indexing can successively be explained by 
relating them to broader or narrower terms, thus providing the system with a top down 
logic. The top level terms mark the ontological boundary of the system.  
A thesaurus may also contain facets (thesaurofacets
12
) and information about 
polyhierarchies
13
.  The following example illustrates the structure of a Thesaurus. The 
example is provided by (Hunter, 2000, p. 8): 
 
Water Sports 
BT Sports 
NT Boating  
NT Sailing 
NT Swimming 
NT Waterskiing 
NT Windsurfing 
RT Air sports 
 
The same structure can also be reflected by a diagrammatic tree structure: 
 
Figure 2:1 Diagrammatic tree structure of ‘Sports’ example 
Sports 
Water sports Air sports 
Boating 
Sailing 
Swimming 
Waterskiing Windsurfing 
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The point made by Hunter is that the thesaurus explicitly expresses semantic relations, 
but also contains a classificatory hierarchy demonstrated by the implicit tree structure.  
As suggested by the example, the thesaurus proposes hierarchical relations (BT, NT), 
supplemented by the associative relation (RT). However, even though the associative 
relation is a key functionality within a thesaurus structure, it is also extremely 
ambiguous and may include e.g. ‗causal relation‘, ‗similarity‘, ‗processes‘, ‗location‘, 
‗time space continuum‘, etc. 
These qualitative aspects are specified in faceted classification (as facets) and in 
ontologies.  
In particular Dagobert Soergel have worked with the transition of thesaurus and 
classification schemes from traditional KOS to new semantic tools by taking advantage 
of the formal specifications demonstrated by ontologies. Soergel et al. (2004), 
summarizes the limitations of traditional KOS as follows: 
 
 Lack of conceptual abstraction  
 Limited semantic coverage  
 Lack of consistency 
 Limited automated processing  
 
By applying the specifications of relationships of ontologies to thesauri, it is possible to 
overcome these limitations and provide for a more extensive and semantically rich 
knowledge representation that ultimately improves information organization (indexing) 
and retrieval. 
Soergel‘s research marks the transition of KOS from an ‗analogue‘ to a digital 
information environment. Also, this transition creates a bridge between the traditional 
conception of KOS and more developed and technologically advanced semantic tools, 
taking ontologies and knowledge representation into account.  
2.1.5 Related Approaches 
1. Semantic networks 
2. Ontologies 
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3. Knowledge representation 
2.1.5.1 Semantic network 
As argued by Hodge, a semantic network is considered a type of KOS in the category of 
relationship lists.  
A semantic network or net is a graphical notation representing concepts and concept 
relations. Semantic networks are related to computer science and artificial intelligence, 
and are used within machine translation. Semantic networks are thus used to represent 
knowledge or to support automated systems for reasoning about knowledge (Sowa, 
2000). According to (Salem & Alfonse, 2008), semantic networks are declarative, thus 
providing reasoning capacities to the system. Ontologies are on the other hand a 
vocabulary, often specialized to a domain or a subject matter. Ontologies represent 
concepts within a domain and the relationships between them.  
 
 
Figure 2:2: Semantic network as demonstrated in Wikipedia
14
. The figure expresses a simple example 
of a semantic network. 
The relations demonstrated by the example (fig. 2), show part-whole relationship 
[Mammal has Vertebra], categorical membership [Cat is a Mammal] and locative 
relation [Whale lives in Water].  
Semantic networks may also be more complex and detailed, and dedicated to different 
purposes. However, common to all semantic networks is their declarative graphical 
form of representation. Some are, as demonstrated by the example, informal, expressing 
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general generic relations, and other kinds are highly formally defined systems of logic. 
Sowa (1992), identifies six common kinds of semantic networks: Definitional networks, 
assertional networks, implicational networks, executable networks, learning networks 
and hybrid networks. Figure 2:2 demonstrates a definitional network, the other kinds are 
closely related to formal logic, computer science and AI.  
 
2.1.5.2 Ontologies  
The concept ‗ontology‘ originates from philosophy, and within this context ontology 
relates to metaphysical statements about reality or existence. An ontology thus 
constitutes the epistemic threshold for reasoning.  
Within information science, ontologies are considered semantic tools that describe a 
particular part of the world by formal specifications. The threshold is here delimited to a 
particular information system. 
The concept ‗ontology‘ as tool for knowledge organization has lately been put forward 
and discussed in the LIS literature, especially with reference to the ‗semantic web‘ (G. 
Hodge, 2000; Soergel, 1999; Vickery, 1997). Recently, the concept has been included in 
the ‗Encyclopedia of library and information science ‘, where Bruijn & Fensel (2005) 
defines the ontologies in the following manner: 
 
An ontology is a formal explicit specification of a shared 
conceptualization [and] A conceptualization is an abstract simplified view 
of the world that we wish to represent for some purpose. The ontology is a 
specification because it presents the conceptualization in a concrete form. 
It is explicit because all relevant concepts and constraints of the domain 
are explicitly defined. It is formal which means that the ontology should be 
machine processable. It is shared – the ontology captures consensual 
knowledge. (Bruijn & Fensel, 2005, p. 1) 
 
According to this definition the ontology restricts itself to a particular and specified 
domain of knowledge.  
In many ways an ontology resembles the different types of the semantic systems 
discussed above. One could argue that the facet analytical approach to classification is 
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very similar to the logic of ontologies; however, there are different views on how to 
define and delimit the scope and role of ontologies as semantic tools within LIS. Poli 
(1996), suggests the following distinction of ontologies:  
 
…an ontology is not a catalogue of the world, a taxonomy or a 
terminology. If anything, an ontology is the general framework within 
which catalogues, taxonomies, and terminologies may be given suitable 
organization. (Poli, 1996, p. 313).  
 
Poli here defines ontologies as top-level categorizations, and general frameworks for 
knowledge organizing systems. However, other scholars want to include all specific 
concepts in an ontology in order to reveal distinct formal relations between concepts, 
see (Guarino, 1995, 1997; B. Smith, 1995; Barry Smith, 2003; Uschold, 1998; Uschold 
& Gruninger, 1996). As expressed by Vickery:  
 
Another distinction among those working in this field is between those 
who aim to build a general ontology, taking all knowledge for its province, 
and those who are concentrating on an ontology for a specific domain – a 
distinction analogous to the makers of general and special classifications 
in our field. (Vickery, 1997, p. 279). 
 
Vickery‘s statement is in line with (Bruijn & Fensel, 2005), and suggests that ontologies 
have at least three different layers of abstraction. We may speak of top-level ontologies 
that capture domain-independent knowledge, e.g. PMEST
15
 as proposed by 
Ranganathan. Mid-level ontologies are domain ontologies that provide for definitions 
and relations between domain dependent concepts, e.g. medical ontologies. Sub-level 
ontologies are ontologies specified for e.g. an application, i.e. an ontology representing 
the structure of a particular web site (Bruijn & Fensel, 2005). 
In (Grenon & Smith, 2004), basic formal ontology (BFO) are divided into the concepts 
of SNAP and SPAN. SNAP relates to time, as instances (or snapshots) in a continuum; 
SNAP thus provides for a series of snapshots i.e. synchronic representations of entities 
existing at some given instant. The SPAN ontology is defined as the totality of 
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processes. SNAP distinguishes different sorts of parts of substances, SPAN 
distinguishes structural parts of processes. The point made by Grenon & Smith is that a 
focus on instances and their parts gives priority to a particular structure between 
substances, and a focus on the relations between substances and their parts gives 
priority to processes exhibited by substances. In medical science, the relations between 
objects are important; for instance, a particular drug may have a particular intended 
effect, but also have side effects. These effects may be seen as consequences of the 
object in the ontology.   
Besides reflecting knowledge at a particular level of granularity, representation systems 
may be arranged as suggested by (Bruijn & Fensel, 2005), by level of formalization. A 
term list provides for a low level of formalization (authority control), the thesaurus 
provides for a more developed level of formalization, supplying terms with synonymic, 
hyponymic and generic relations. Ontologies express an even more developed 
formalization, for instance are so-called expressive ontologies highly formalized and 
contain detailed relationships between concepts, allowing for higher order logic and 
computation. What particularly adds to the functions of formal ontologies compared 
with the thesaurus is the advanced expressiveness that includes description logic 
together with web technology such as XML
16
 and RDF
17
.  
The development process of creating ontologies follows as suggested by (Noy & 
McGuinness, 2001), seven steps: 
 
1. Determine the domain and scope of the ontology 
2. Consider reusing existing ontologies 
3. Enumerate important terms in the ontology 
4. Define the classes and the class hierarchy 
5. Define the properties of classes—slots [attributes] 
6. Define the facets of the slots 
7. Create instances 
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These steps, however, resemble the process of thesaurus construction, but what 
differentiates the construction of an ontology from e.g. the thesaurus is the more 
detailed specification of hierarchies and semantic relations of classes/concepts. 
Ontologies are designed for the digital information environment. It is closely related to 
computational linguistics and the semantic web, and provides for a well-defined 
semantic structure and a precise description of concepts, concept properties and concept 
relations.  
The advantage of domain specific ontologies is semantic interoperability. By specifying 
the meaning of concepts by stating generic and semantic relations, the meaning of 
concepts can be represented with greater precision.  
In relation to KOS, the ontology reduces semantic ambiguity by allowing unique 
identifiers to be assigned to each concept. Concepts and their relations are explicitly 
defined as unique entities, and the ontology thus provides for internal structural 
consistency and clear semantics that allow for interoperability between different KOS. 
(Soergel, et al., 2004). 
2.1.5.3  Knowledge Representation (KR) 
Knowledge representation (KR) originates from computer science and is a key concept 
within contemporary computational linguistics and is related to logic, semantic 
networks, frames and conceptual graphs. (Sowa, 1999). KR provides us with the basics 
of conceptual modeling. KR accordingly expresses a formal language which is applied 
in order to gain control and organize units of knowledge in a systematic and uniform 
way. The purpose of KR is expressive adequacy and notational efficiency. Expressive 
adequacy refers to whether a method is capable of describing or representing all kinds 
of information needed in a knowledge representation. The notational efficiency 
concerns the syntactic use of the language (Liu, 2000). 
Technologies as ontologies and semantic networks are considered essential models of 
KR. However, KR has with increasing effect also surfaced in the KOS literature (Ding, 
2001; Gilchrist, 2003; Morrissey, 2002; Poli, 1996; Soergel, 1999; Soergel, et al., 2004; 
Vickery, 1997).  
Davies et al. (1993), lists five distinctive roles of KR:  
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 A knowledge representation (KR) is most fundamentally a surrogate, a substitute 
for the thing itself, used to enable an entity to determine consequences by 
thinking rather that acting, i.e., by reasoning about the world rather than taking 
action in it. 
 It is a set of ontological commitments, i.e., an answer to the question: In what 
terms should I think about the world? 
 It is a fragmentary theory of intelligent reasoning, expressed in terms of three 
components: (i) the representation‘s fundamental conception of intelligent 
reasoning; (ii) the set of inferences the representation sanctions; and (iii) the set 
of inferences it recommends. 
 It is a medium for pragmatically efficient computation, i.e., the computational 
environment in which thinking is accomplished. One contribution to this 
pragmatic efficiency is supplied by the guidance a representation provides for 
organizing information so as to facilitate making the recommended inferences. 
 It is a medium of human expression, i.e., a language in which we say things 
about the world. 
(Davis, Shrobe, & Szolovits, 1993, p. 17) 
 
Where an ontology is concerned with the existence of an object, KR is concerned with 
modeling and reasoning about objects and concepts. As stated by Davies et al., the 
function of KR is to determine how to think, rather than act in the world, and as such a 
KR is considered a metal model of the world.  
KR differs from the other kinds of KOS by being dedicated to formal modeling. It 
provides description logic for organizing information and facilitates inferential 
processes. It is, thus, not in itself a KOS, but a semantic tool that may enhance the 
efficiency of KOS.    
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2.2 KOS and semantic relations 
Semantics is considered the study of meaning in language. However,  
 
The study of linguistic meaning is generally divided in practice into two 
main fields, semantics and pragmatics. Semantics deals with the literal 
meaning of words and the meaning of the way they are combined, which 
taken together form the core of meaning, or the starting point from which 
the whole meaning of a particular utterance is constructed. Pragmatics 
deals with all the ways in which literal meaning must be refined, enriched 
or extended to arrive at an understanding of what a speaker meant in 
uttering a particular expression. (Kearns, 2000, p. 1) 
 
Semantics, thus, expresses and determines the meaning of terms and concepts, and maps 
the structure of concepts and their relations to other concepts. Pragmatics deals with 
how meaning is achieved in communication, and how it is determined and refined by 
context; where semantic deals with determination of meaning, pragmatics deals with 
understanding.  
According to Martinich (1996), philosophers distinguish between three areas of the 
study of language: syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Syntax may be considered 
synonymous with ‗grammar‘, and studies the rules that describes well-formed sentences 
in purely formal terms (ibid., p. III). Semantics studies the meaning of linguistic 
expressions in relation to 1) its reference (extension), 2) its truth value, 3) its intension, 
and 4) its relation to what a competent user of an expression must know (e.g. being able 
to recognize the structure and building blocks of a sentence). Pragmatics studies the 
context dependent features of language, and presupposes knowledge that goes beyond 
the semantic structures. In table 1, the three areas of study are summarized with 
reference to Charles W. Morris, who originally formulated the distinction between the 
areas within the philosophy of language.      
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 Syntax or grammar (relation between signs)  
o  Studies words and sentences  
 Semantics (the relation between signs and the world)  
o Includes syntax  
o Studies propositions and the reference to an object/concept 
 Pragmatics (how signs are determined by use)   
o Studies the linguistic act and the context in which they are performed 
o  Studies the context-dependent features of language 
Table 1: The interdependent dimensions of language: syntax, semantics and pragmatics after 
Charles W. Morris (1946) 
 
Where syntax studies the characteristics of words and sentences (form and syntax), 
semantics study the meaning of concepts. Semantics is concerned with the 
determination of concepts (intension), how they relate to objects (reference), and the 
particular items that fall under a concept (extension). Pragmatics is concerned with how 
concepts are determined by use, how meaning depends not only on syntax and 
semantics, but involves the context of how concepts are used in communication 
including the intention of the communicator and the motivation of the receiver. The 
pragmatic aspect is unclearly addressed in most kinds of KOS. However, the thesaurus 
may provide for context information by means of scope notes.  
In a KOS context, the meaning of concepts is determined by semantic relations. The 
traditional kinds of KOS (authority files, classification systems and thesauri) normally 
include at least equivalence (synonymic), generic (hierarchical) and associative 
relationships. The contemporary kinds of KOS (ontologies and semantic networks), 
may include several more specific, semantic relations. The general kinds of semantic 
relations relevant for KOS are listed below:  
 
 Synonymy – the word A expresses the same as word  B. (equivalence) 
 Polysemy – a word is polysemious if it has multiple related meanings. 
 Antonymy – a word with the opposite meaning e.g. rich / poor, or fat / thin. 
 Hypernymy – a word that includes a subset of subordinate terms, e.g. Martial 
Arts is hypernym to Ju Jitsu or Karate. (is also determined a ‗Is-a relation‘). 
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 Hyponymy – A is a hyponym of B if the meaning of B is part of the meaning of 
A and A is a subordinate of B. (is also determined a ‗has part relation). 
 Holonymy – names a whole where meronymes names its parts.  
 Meronymy – means part of a whole (is also determined a ‗part of relation‘). 
 Acronymes – abbreviations, e.g. LIS is acronym for Library and Information 
Science.  
 Locative – the location of an object e.g. A being placed in B 
 
However, other important kinds of semantic relations that, according to Hjørland 
(2007b), may be considered pragmatic are: 
 
 Scholarly, paradigmatic or discourse specific 
 Specific to specific empirical languages (e.g. national languages, or language for 
special purposes (LSP)) 
 User oriented, e.g. a company, a work group (corporate language, jargon) 
 
And according to (Thellefsen, 2009; Thellefsen, et al., 2003; Thellefsen & Thellefsen, 
2004) 
 
 Semeiotic  
 
The pragmatic kinds of semantic relations, however, require more than descriptive and 
declarative knowledge about the domain investigated. It is outside the scope of the 
dissertation to investigate into the kinds suggested by Hjørland; however, the semeiotic 
approach is at the core of the dissertation, and includes several aspects suggested by 
Hjørland.  
Different kinds of KOS meet different demands and serve various knowledge interests 
and they are approached with different expectations. The different purposes of KOS are 
determined by their contexts of use, i.e. in relation to a particular task; a dictionary may 
be useful if information about a word or a concept is sought, a thesaurus is useful in 
relation to searching information by means of a controlled vocabulary in a database. 
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Semantic networks (or conceptual graphs) are useful tools for modeling or mapping 
generic structures of concepts. Table 2 provides an overview of the characteristics of the 
different kinds of KOS.  
KOS Relations Semantic order Is characterized by 
Term lists 
 
Synonymy 
Polysemy 
Homonymy 
(some include generic 
relations as hypernymic 
and meronymic relations) 
Alphabetically 
 
Orders words/terms 
Controlled vocabulary 
Authority control  
Prescriptive  
General or specific 
Dictionaries & 
glossaries  
 
In principle all kinds of 
semantic relations 
dependent on the  type of 
dictionary 
Alphabetically  
 
Orders words/terms 
Definition of terms and 
concepts, by means of terms and 
concepts. 
Characterized by being either 
descriptive or prescriptive 
Related to Leksikography 
General or dedicated specialized 
functions dependent on the type 
of dictionary 
Classification 
systems 
 
Primarily generic relation: 
 Hypernymy 
 Hyponymy 
 Holonymy 
 Meronymy 
 
Systematically  
 
Orders classes 
Controlled vocabulary 
Authority control  
Specifies generic relations 
between classes  
Prescriptive  
Universal or specific 
Thesauri 
 
Includes the functions of 
term lists and the generic 
relations of classification 
systems.  
Adds associative relations 
Alphabetically  
 
Orders concepts and 
structures concepts 
systematically 
Controlled vocabulary 
Authority control 
Prescriptive and specific  
Weak semantics (RT) 
Semantic networks 
(concept network) 
In principle include the 
relations demonstrated by 
the thesaurus 
The relations however are 
expressed formally, and 
allows computation 
Systematically  
 
Represent concepts 
using graphical  
notation that reveals 
semantic relations  
Graphical representation of 
semantic relations among 
concepts 
Prescriptive and specific 
Uses formal language or 
description logic 
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Ontologi May in principle include 
the full spectrum of 
relations demonstrated by 
the other kinds of KOS 
Systematically  Formal representation of 
concepts and its relations within 
a domain 
Prescriptive 
Related to KR 
General or specific 
Formal language or description 
logic (strong semantics) 
KR Expresses possible 
relations by means of 
formal logic 
Systematically  Provides a set of ontological 
commitments 
Is a medium for efficient 
computation 
Uses description logic 
Related to AI and computer 
science 
Used in ontologies 
Table 2: Specification of semantic relations of KOS 
According to Hodge (2000), dictionaries and glossaries are considered types of KOS 
because they offer either descriptive or prescriptive information about words and 
concepts. However, the category of dictionaries and glossaries include numerous 
different kinds that serve diverse specialized functions and thus meet different user 
needs
18
. Dictionaries are not in particular designed as tools for information seeking, 
even though they may be helpful for users seeking information.  
KOS deal with controlling the meaning of concepts, how they are related to other 
concepts/objects, and how they may be used as descriptors or units of classification in 
databases. However some KOS are more concerned with standardization of concepts 
and semantic relations, and other kinds are more closely related and thus more sensitive 
to progress and alterations of concepts within a domain.  
Following the taxonomic structure of table 2, the ontology may be considered the most 
inclusive and developed kind of KOS that, depending on level of granularity, may 
incorporate the semantic structures of the other kinds of KOS. It may also be argued 
that where term lists and classification systems are types of KOS well suited for the 
analogue information era, the relationship lists is a direct consequence of the increasing 
importance and development of digital information, and the online era.   
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In summary we may argue that semantics is concerned with prescribing the correct use 
and meaning of particular words and concepts and how they may be combined. 
Pragmatics is concerned with how concepts are understood and used within 
communities. The latter dimention is essential from a semeiotic perspective. 
2.3 KOS and Terminology19 
A discipline closely related to KO is Terminology. Terminology is also related to 
linguistics; however, it differs by its exclusive focus on LSP. As KOS, Terminology is 
also dedicated to the organization concepts, but is in particular concerned with 
standardization of concepts.  
Modern Terminology emerged in the 1930 with the work of Eugene Wüster (1898 – 
1977) in Vienna. Wüster was dedicated to Esperanto and his ideas of ‗Terminologie 
Lehre‘ was driven by the ambition of standardizing technical language to an extent, that, 
rendered scientific communication more effective and independent of national language 
and dialect.  In his Doctoral dissertation, Wüster established the methods and principles 
for Terminology, which aimed at standardization of scientific language.  
 
Wüster considers [T]erminology as being located at the intersection of 
linguistics, logic, ontology, information science, computer science and 
individual disciplines. The interdisciplinarity of [T]erminology is 
determined by the characteristics of terminological units, which are 
simultaneously language units (linguistics), cognitive elements (logic and 
ontology, i.e. part of cognitive science) and vehicles of communication 
(communication theory). Terms appear in specialized communications 
(information science) and computers are usually employed in 
terminographic activity (computer science).  (Cabré, 1999, p. 25) 
 
The classic view of Wüsterian Terminology implies three conditions. The first condition 
emphasizes the focus on the concept.  
 
Ausgehen von den begriffe. – Erstens: Jede Terminologiearbeit geht von 
den Begriffen aus. Sie zielt auf scharfe Abgrenzung zwischen den 
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Begriffen. Das reich der Begriffe wird in der Terminologie als unabhängig 
vom Reich der Benennungen ( = Termini) angesehen. Daher sprechen die 
Terminologen von Begriffen, während die Sprachwissenschafter in bezug 
auf die Gemeinsprache von Wortinhalten sprechen. (Wüster, 1985, p.: 1, 
p. 1) 
 
According to the first condition, each terminological work proceeds from the concept 
(the onomasiological view). It aims at a sharp demarcation between concepts. The area 
of the concept is regarded as independent of the area of designation. The terminographer 
speaks of concepts, while the linguist speaks of word content. 
This condition thus implies that concepts can be clearly and exclusively defined, that 
they are language independent, and, consequently, abstract, cognitive entities referring 
to objects and relation of the real world.  
 
Terminology shares with logic a basic interest in concepts. As opposed to 
semantics, which is interested in the name-meaning relationship, 
terminology is primarily concerned with the relationship between objects 
in the real world and the concepts that represent them. (Cabré, 1999, p. 8) 
 
The focus of moving from concepts to terms distinguishes the methods used in 
Terminology from methods used in lexicography. The former aims at naming concepts, 
where the latter, lexicography, starts with the word, i.e. a dictionary entry, and describes 
its functional and semantic aspects. Moving from word to concept is the opposite 
direction of Terminology, and is described as a semasiological approach.  
The second condition stipulates the naming function of Terminology and goes as 
follows:  
 
Beschränkung auf den Wortschatz. – Zweitens: Der Vorrang der Begriffe 
in der Terminologie bewirkt auch eine andere Einstellung gegenüber dem 
sprachlichen Ausdruck. Nur die Bennennungen der Begriffe, der 
Wortschatz, ist den Terminologen wichtig. Flexionslehre und Syntax sind 
es nicht. Die Regeln hierfür können aus der Gemeinsprache übernommen 
werden. (Wüster, 1985, p.: 2, p. 2) 
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Focusing on the concept consequently reduces the linguistic expression to a naming 
function. The vocabulary is important to the terminographer, whereas inflection and 
syntax is not. Inflection and syntax lies within the domain of general language, and is 
thus ignored within Terminology.   
Finally, the third condition follows from the two previous conditions: 
 
Synchronische Sprachbetrachtung. – Drittens: Der Vorrang der Begriffe 
hat zwangsläufig dazu geführt, daß die terminologische 
Sprachbetrachtung synchronisch ist. Für die Terminologie ist das 
Wichtigste an einer Sprache das Begriffsystem, das ihr zugrunde liegt. 
(Wüster, 1985, p. 2) 
 
The priority of concepts leads to the fact that the language view in terminology is 
synchronic. In Terminology, the concept system is of greatest importance.  
Wüster‘s view on the conditions for terminology is summarized in the following model 
that demarcates four fields. The vertical line demarcates the border between meaning 
and representation (symbol), and the vertical line demarcates the border between 
individual objects and different forms of representation and concepts and symbols. The 
field of individual objects or entities is represented by a1, a2 …, the field of meaning by 
A1, A2 … This means individual concepts express the properties of the individual 
objects, which eventually are generalized by the top level, concept A, again expressing a 
set of characteristics common to A1, A2 …. B constitutes the linguistic symbol that 
represents the meaning of A. B is assigned to A, and A is the meaning of B. B1, B2… 
are individual concepts, and b1, b2… represent different forms of B. 
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Figure 2:3 Wuster’s term model, translated by Felber 1980 (Felber, 1984, p. 100) 
As we may recall, the concept is prior to symbolic representation. Wüster defines the 
concepts as elements of thinking, a mental construct representing a material or 
immaterial individual object.  
 
Concepts are mental representations of individual objects. A concept may 
represent only one individual object or – by abstraction – comprise a set 
of individual objects having certain qualities in common. It serves as a 
means for mental ordering (classification) and with the aid of linguistic 
symbol (term, letter, graphical symbol) for communication. The concept is 
therefore an element of thinking. (Felber, 1984, p. 115) 
 
Furthermore 
Concepts may be the mental representation not only of beings or things 
(as expressed by nouns), but, in a wider sense, also of qualities (as 
Concepts 
(language 
system)
B A
Symbol Meaning
B1 B2 A1 A2
speaking or 
writing of the 
language
individual 
objects
b1 b2 a1 a2
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expressed by adjectives or nouns), of actions (as expressed by verbs or 
nouns), and even of locations, situations or relations (as expressed by 
adverbs, prepositions, conjunctions or nouns). (ibid, p. 115) 
 
The methodologies of terminology work are considered either descriptive or 
prescriptive. However, it may be difficult to make a clear distinction, because even 
descriptive terminology may be used in a prescriptive manner (Felber, 1984). 
The onomasiological approach to terminology work considers concepts in their abstract 
and variate form and their relation to other concepts, and eventually selects an 
appropriate linguistic representation, a term as a signifier for one concept. 
The ambition of Wüster‘s Terminology work is based in the idea of formalizing and 
standardizing technical language in order to minimize unclear scientific communication, 
and from this perspective a terminology will always include a prescriptive function.  
Within KO, in  particular Ingetraut Dahlberg has developed principles of concept 
analyses based in the work of Wüster cf. (I. Dahlberg, 1978; I.  Dahlberg, 1994)  
Sociocognitive terminology is formulated as an alternative to Wüster‘s Terminology. 
Firstly, sociocognitive terminology is in opposition to the onomasiological view, and 
agues in favor of a semasiological view, meaning that priority is not ultimately given to 
the concept, but rather to the social environment from where concepts emerge. 
Therefore concepts are defined by how they are used to address particular phenomena 
or objects. Furthermore concepts are not always clear cut and exclusive, and there may 
not be a sharp demarcation between concepts and categories. 
Secondly, sociocognitive terminology sees language as functional and ascribes it an 
active role in the formation, conception and communication of concepts and categories. 
There is more to language than its naming function. 
Thirdly, sociocognitive terminology promotes a diachronic perspective on concepts and 
categories. Concepts and categories evolve as the result of social praxis, and terms and 
concepts eventually change their meaning.  
The ―classic‖ view of terminology is abandoned with reference to empirical evidence 
provided by studies of how terminology is used within different scholarly communities. 
Inspired by the work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & 
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Johnson, 1980, 1999), the socio-cognitive terminology demonstrates the classical 
view‘s shortcomings by empirical investigations of concepts in biotechnology.  
The socio-cognitive view is at odds with cognitive science, see (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1999), and stresses the importance of discourse communities as fundamental 
bases for concepts and categories. The meaning of language depends on social and 
cultural context, and involves experiential interaction and communication with others. 
The meaning of concepts is thus negotiated within the context of a discourse 
community. The sociocognitive view promotes a methodology for concept analysis that 
reflects how terminology is used within discourse communities, opposing the normative 
and functionalist role of classic terminology that in its aim for standardization imply 
how terms should be used in order to ensure consistency and communicative economy.  
The discussion of objectivist versus socio-cognitive terminology is important because of 
their different emphasis on language. Objectivist terminology, as formulated by Wüster, 
disregards actual language as important in concept formation. The meaning of concepts 
is considered independent of expression. Consequently, objectivist terminology is only 
concerned with its naming function. The socio-cognitive approach takes the opposite 
approach and argues for the importance of social and communicative processes in 
concept formation.   
2.4 KOS from a semeiotic perspective 
From a semeiotic view, any representation is a sign. A sign is something that refers to 
another (a second), i.e. an object, and in between, a relation of interpretation (a third) 
that creates a more developed sign in a perceiving mind. C.S. Peirce defines the notion 
of a sign in the following quotation:  
 
A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, 
creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more 
developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the interpretant of the first 
sign. The sign stands for something, its object [or referent]. It stands for 
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that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I 
have sometimes called the ground of the representamen (CP 2.228) 
 
Peirce‘s semeiotic theory will be discussed in detail later; for now it is sufficient to use 
Peirce‘s definition to establish that representations are considered signs, and signs have 
a reference and a meaning to an interpreter. What motivates a particular interpretation 
is, however, essential.  
Hjørland considers KOS as semantic tools, and argues that different approaches to KO 
imply different approaches to semantics. For instance, the principle of literary warrant 
locates semantic relations in scientific and scholarly literature, and bibliometrics 
consider documents semantically related by means of citations (Hjørland, 2007b). Small 
(1978) and Schneider (2006) suggest that highly cited documents develop into concept 
symbols (or rather metonyms), meaning that a document by receiving citations, grow 
into representing particular ideas or meanings.  
Semeiotic offers a theoretically and practically oriented view that embraces a wide 
perspective on knowledge, and suggests that knowledge production takes place in every 
part of society, being deeply tied to the social activities, thus establishing the common 
ground for conceptual meaning and communication. The meaning of a concept should 
therefore be considered in relation to its function and purpose defined within a universe 
of discourse, and cannot be separated from this context without loss of information. 
The meaning of a sign relation is produced by the interpretant. The interpretant mediates 
between a sign (a representamen) and an object. However, a further elaboration on the 
function of the interpretant suggests that the interpretant functions at different 
conceptual levels: 1) the level of signification, 2) the level of cognition and 3) the level 
of communication.  
KOS thus organizes concepts in a structure that at the first level, studies the relation of 
concepts to concepts, or signs to signs (the general conditions of signs being signs 
(grammar) (CP 1.444)).  
 
Something becomes a sign not because of any inherent feature it has but 
because it acquires the formal characteristics that any sign must have, 
namely, that it correlate with an object and that it produce an interpretant 
Chapter 2: Knowledge Organization and Knowledge organization Systems. 
 51 
in a process in which the three are irreducibly connected (Liszka, 1996, p. 
19).  
 
The second level studies the formal conditions of the truth of representation (critical 
logic).  Critical logic is concerned with valid inferences. According to Peirce, the logic 
of induction, deduction and abduction are principal to reasoning. Induction relates to 
experience or observation of facts (probability), deduction to the necessary 
consequences that follows from premises (necessecity), and abduction to the forming of 
hypothesis (possibility).  
The third level studies the formal conditions of inquiry, and is considered the formal 
study of rhetoric or communication. Defining concepts as signs thus implicate grammar, 
logic and rhetoric, and the formal features of signification, cognition/inference and 
communication.   
 
 
The level of signification The level of cognition The level of communication 
Syntax Logic  Pragmatics  
Grammar Denotation  Connotation 
Form  Substance   Use  
Word Concept  Context 
Table 3: Three conceptual levels of the interpretant 
 
The first level (syntax) determines the nature of representations, i.e. how  signs are signs 
of something. E.g. how a substantive is considered a term/a lexeme that stands for an 
object/concept. The level of cognition determines the meaning of a sign being a 
concept. It implicates a reasoning capacity that connects the level of signification with a 
determinate meaning. The third level determines how the sign acts as a communicator 
of meaning in a community.  
The structure of table 3 resembles the interdependent dimensions of language described 
in table 1. This is no coincidence, because Morris developed his distinctions based in 
Peirce conceptual levels of the interpretant. From the perspective of semeiotic, however, 
the conceptual levels of the interpretant is itself triadic.   
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2.5 Summary 
What have we learned from this presentation of KOS? 
 
 That KOS are systems designed in order to provide order in a chaotic world of 
concepts 
 That KOS are tools that are helpful in providing intellectual access to 
information sources 
 That KOS are systems of representation 
 That KOS are systems that depend on reasoning and language  
 That KOS fundamentally are influenced by language and perspective 
 That different approaches to KO require different semantic approaches 
 That concepts are semantic units that require an interpretive effort 
 That the interpretive effort is a semeiotic activity 
 That KOS accordingly can be addressed from a semeiotic perspective 
 
KO is considered a subfield within the LIS community. It is concerned with theories 
and methods for organizing knowledge. KOS‘s are generally speaking semantic systems 
whose function is to represent and structure knowledge for somebody. The knowledge 
structure provided by KOS‘s, are based on semantic units, i.e. concepts, classes or 
signs/symbols. It has been argued that the traditional kinds of KOS may be regarded as 
variants of each other, but with a different focus on semantic relations. However, the 
traditional types of KOS ignore the social and cultural aspects of concepts, and tend to 
favor logical decomposition as governing principle in KOS design. 
The related approaches, Ontology and KR, which may include the traditional types of 
KOS, are closely related to AI and computer linguistics and, thus, formal language 
representation. As a consequence, these approaches, when integrated in KOS, contribute 
with a high level of formal structure, well suited for computation.  
The function of this chapter has been to demonstrate that the mentioned kinds of KOS 
share a similar purpose, namely in being systems that organize words, concepts and 
categories. It is also indicated by Hodge‘s taxonomy and more elaborate by table 2 that 
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the different KOS, from term lists to ontologies, also express an increase in formal 
semantics. Even though term lists are normative, determining the ‗preferred‘ labels for 
concepts, it is only at the level of semantic networks and ontologies, we may speak of 
computation. The aim has also been to point out that the semantic relations of concepts 
also implicate a pragmatic dimension, which often is disregarded in KO.  
So far, the discussions of KOS have departed from the perspective of representation and 
systematization of semantic units. The remaining part of the dissertation will focus on 
the value of incorporating the pragmatic dimension, in terms of communication, as 
guiding principle in relation to KOS development. 
The focus of the next chapter thus adds language, communication and meaning to the 
picture, and demonstrates why theories of concepts, philosophy of language and 
meaning are important perspectives on KOS.    
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3 Concepts, Language and Organization of Knowledge 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to determine the consequences of different approaches to 
concept theory. Based on Ereshefsky‘s division  (Ereshefsky, 2001), the discussion of 
concepts are divided into essentialism, cluster analysis and the historical approach. 
Essentialism is according to Ereshefsky associated with rationalism and empiricism, and 
traces back to Plato and Aristotle. Generally, essentialism can be characterized as the 
doctrine that objects have essential and accidental properties. Essential properties are 
necessary properties that objects have; in contrast, accidental properties are properties 
that objects of a particular kind may lack. The classical theory of categorization follows 
form the essentialist claims that a category is defined by a given property or collection 
of properties which are necessary and sufficient to define the category.    
The discussion of the cluster analytical approach involves a family of theories, 
including Kuhn‘s concept theory (H. Andersen, 1997; H. Andersen, Barker, & Chen, 
1996; Kuhn, 1990), and Wittgenstein‘s theory of language games. Also the theory of 
cognitive semantics formulated by George Lakoff is related to cluster analysis. Cluster 
analysis is considered less restrictive (weak model of representation) than essentialism; 
no traits are considered either necessary or sufficient for category membership.  
The historical approach contrasts the theories formulated under essentialism and cluster 
analysis by emphasizing the aspects of evolution, continuity and causality.  
 
The historical approach reverses the roles of qualitative similarity and 
causal relations: Causal relations are primary and qualitative similarity is 
important only when it serves as evidence for causal relations. 
(Ereshefsky, 2001, p. 28-29) 
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It is argued that KOS mostly are related to strong models of representation (Tredinnick, 
2006), i.e. essentialism, and that contemporary KOS as ontologies and semantic 
networks are deeply rooted in strong models of representation. The cognitive semantic 
approach argues that language and concepts fundamentally are embodied and their 
meaning determined by culture and experience. Cognitive semantics is thus in 
opposition to essentialism, and introduces the term ‗experientialism‘ and ‗embodied 
realism‘. It is argued that cognitive semantics provides for new insights when 
considered in relation to KO and KOS, however, cognitive semantics is unclear when it 
comes to the concepts of evolution, continuity and causality.  
It is argued that Peirce‘s semeiotic theory embraces the historical approach, and in 
particular is sensitive to the evolution, continuity and causality of scientific knowledge. 
The chapter is concluded by a section that relates the different approaches of concept 
theory to KO.  
3.1 Concept theory 
As discussed in the previous chapter, KOS‘s are systems that represent semantic units, 
and as such the function of KOS is to organize documents (shelving), representations of 
documents (bibliographical records) and concepts (subjects).  
Concepts are in particular important, because concepts relate to subjects and thus to 
indexing and classification.  
To classify is to arrange particular objects into categories according to general features 
or properties. However, how is the pertinence of features determined? Which criteria 
should be applied in order to organize similar objects into the same category? What is 
the epistemological status of a class? And what is exactly meant by similarity, 
subjective / objective similarity or descriptive / analytical similarity? 
Generally speaking, classification of objects is a fundamental biological and socially 
determined activity that enables humans to act, adapt and survive in the surrounding 
environment. One of the most basic classifications learned by the human child is the ego 
/ non-ego distinction. A similar kind of basic classification is to distinguish between e.g. 
edible and poisonous, or between friend and enemy. It is within the human nature to 
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classify the objects of the world. This may be regarded as common sense, however, the 
rationale of human intelligence provides for actions that rest on the ability to recognize 
features of objects in the world and to organize experiences into purposeful categories 
in order to survive.  The human species alone has developed language, which enables 
humans to address and communicate experiences by means of conventionalized 
symbols. The big philosophical problem, however, is related to the determination of the 
status of concepts and language. In other words, in what way do our concepts actually 
correspond to objects in the world? 
Within science, classifications of objects are based on theories (and concepts). Different 
theories provide for different methods for investigating and classifying objects of 
interest. Empiricism gives priority to experience; knowledge is considered a posteriori, 
and our concepts about the surrounding world are therefore derived from experience. In 
the philosophy of science, rationalism is considered the logical opposite of empiricism 
and gives priority to reason and a priori concepts.  
Within philosophy, the problems concerning the relation between concepts, 
classification and the world itself can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle
20
.  
In (Ereshefsky, 2001) the problem of scientific classification is related to three general 
philosophical schools: essentialism, cluster analysis and historical classification. 
According to Ereshefsky, essentialism represents traditional concept theory originating 
from Plato and Aristotle. The essentialism of Plato and Aristotle are different in nature; 
Plato divides the universe into the essential universe, which is perfect, and the perceived 
universe, which is the imperfect reality. For Plato, the essential universe is real and the 
perceived reality less real. Thus, the identity of a creature is therefore defined by its 
essential and perfect features. The variation of actual exemplars of a kind is part of the 
perceived reality; however, the exemplar of a kind would contain essential features that 
are the same for all exemplars of a kind. This division between an essential and 
perceived reality provides for Plato‘s dualist distinction between form and matter. This 
distinction is fundamental in Plato‘s metaphysics (Robinson, 2006).  
Aristotle argued against Plato‘s distinction between form and matter; according to 
Aristotle, the properties (or essence) of things do not relate to a distinct and separate 
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universe of ideas, but is an essential part of the thing itself. Accordingly, forms, or 
ideas, do not exist independently of their instances.  
Both Plato and Aristotle promoted a realist epistemology. However, in modern 
philosophy one may interpret Plato‘s metaphysics as a kind of idealism related to 
rationalist epistemology - knowledge of reality derives from the intellect and not the 
senses, and thus resembles the epistemology promoted much later by Descartes 
(Newman, 2005).  
According to Aristotle, real essences are powers or functions which are embodied in 
matter, but they are not material, but pure form (Ereshefsky, 2001). Aristotle‘s 
metaphysics may from a modern philosophical perspective be considered as a kind of 
materialism and related to empiricist epistemology. Furthermore, Aristotle seems to 
combine both rationalism and empiricism in his philosophy. Concepts are defined 
rationally, by necessary and sufficient conditions, but they do not exist independently of 
actual entities. Aristotle may also be considered functionalist, by conceiving real 
essences as teleological functions. Powers are considered means to achieve ends. 
Aristotle thus inhabit evolution and pragmatism in his philosophy. These aspects of 
Aristotle was acknowledged by the American psychologist and philosopher William 
James (1842-1910), who admitted that pragmatism is no more than ―A New Name for 
Some Old Ways of Thinking‖ (James, 1907) with a clear reference to Aristotle‘s 
teleology.  
Cluster-analysis
21
, or cluster concepts, on the other hand, as defined by Ereshefsky 
(ibid.), covers a wide range of theories about the status and formation of language and 
subsequently the definition of concepts.  
 
All forms of cluster analysis make two common assumptions: the members 
of a taxonomic group must share a cluster of similar traits, and those 
traits need not occur in all and only the members of a group. Still, cluster 
analyses vary: first, on the breath of similarities desired among the 
members of a taxonomic group, and second, on the relationship between 
similarity and theory (Ereshefsky, 2001, p. 24).  
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One common aspect of the theories that are defined as cluster-analysis is that they argue 
against the classical definition of classes and concepts as defined by Aristotle. Particular 
entities of the world may fit poorly into a class defined by necessary and sufficient 
conditions. The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), demonstrated 
this in his ‗Philosophische Untersuchungen‘ (Wittgenstein, 1958), by his example of 
games, that the particulars of a category may show what Wittgenstein labeled family 
resemblance rather than meeting a set of essential features defined by a particular 
concept.  
A fundamental concept in cluster analysis is ‗similarity‘ or ‗resemblance‘, but in graded 
rather than absolute form.  
In biology, the concept ‗phenetics‘ or ‗numerical taxonomy‘ signify the idea of 
grouping species by shared characteristics.  
 
The basic pheneticist idea is to identify species, and higher taxa, by 
investigating a very large number of phenotypic traits, and constructing a 
measure of the ―overall similarity‖ of any two organisms, based on how 
many of these traits they share. Species are then defined as the largest 
groupings whose members bear a certain minimum degree of overall 
similarity to each others. (Okasha, 2002, p. 199) 
 
However as pointed out by (Ereshefsky, 2001; Lakoff, 1987; Okasha, 2002) which 
properties should be determined valid as a shared characteristic and which should be 
ignored? Which kind of criteria can provide for an objective classification of species?  
 
The major problem with pheneticism is that by weighting traits differently, 
different measures of ―overall similarity‖ can be constructed, leading to 
incompatible taxonomies. (ibid, p. 199) 
 
The shared overall similarities that provide for the intension of a particular kind 
resembles essentialism as discussed above, however according to Ereshefsky (2001), no 
traits are considered either necessary or sufficient for membership of a category, and 
therefore phenecism is less restrictive than essentialism. 
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Several other approaches give priority to even less restrictive ideas of concepts and 
categorization. Within linguistics, the cognitive semantics provides for a philosophy of 
prototypes (Lakoff, 1987). A concept is within this perspective defined by an example 
or a prototype, meaning that an object is an instance of a concept, not by virtue of 
meeting the necessary and sufficient conditions of the concept, but by resemblance with 
a prototype. An object is an instance of a concept C if it resembles the characteristics of 
prototype ‗C‘ more closely than the prototypes of concepts other than C. Furthermore, 
prototypes are considered culturally relative.  
Temmerman (2000), takes the idea of cognitive semantics into the study of terminology 
and argues in favor of a new paradigm in terminology labeled socio-cognitive 
terminology. As is the case with cognitive semantics, cognitive terminology considers 
knowledge to be experiential, meaning that what we know and understand about the 
world ultimately is the result of sensory perceptions. Furthermore, language plays an 
active part in our conception of the world. Language is considered a means for 
categorization (Temmerman, 1997). 
On the basis of empirical investigations of concepts, within the field of life science, 
Temmerman provides a serious critique of the dominating objectivist paradigm within 
terminology and essentialist classification.  
Temmerman summarizes the critique of the principles of objectivist terminology in the 
following table: 
 
Principles of traditional Terminology Our observations concerning the 
terminology of special language 
First principle: Terminology starts from 
the concept without considering language. 
Language plays a role in conception and 
communication of categories 
Second principle: a concept is clear-cut 
and can be assigned a place in a logically 
or ontologically structured concept 
system. 
Many categories are fuzzy and cannot be 
absolutely classified by logical and 
ontological means. 
Third principle: a concept is ideally 
defined in an intensional definition 
An intensional definition is often neither 
possible nor desirable  
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Fourth principle: A concept is referred to 
by one term and one term only designates 
one concept 
Polysemy, synonymy and figurative 
language occur and are functional in 
special language 
Fifth principle: the assignment 
concept/term is permanent 
Categories evolve, terms change in 
meaning, understanding develops. 
Table 4: Traditional vs. socio-cogntive terminology. (Temmerman, 2000, p. 16), provides an overview 
of the main differences between the traditional terminology school and the contemporary socio-cognitive 
paradigm. 
 
The traditional terminology paradigm, as formulated by Wüster, is in line with 
essentialism and rationalism which defines concepts as clear-cut and permanently 
structured within a concept-system. It is considered objective and final. 
The paradigm advocated by Temmerman is in line with cluster-analysis, and gives 
priority to empirical occurrences as point of departure for defining concepts and 
categories. Concepts are not considered clear-cut, because investigations of language 
used within particular discourse communities, show that categories are graded, and 
should for that reason not be forced into a fixed and formalized structures. 
Consequently, socio-cognitive terminology considers concepts as dynamical, 
inconclusive and (inter)subjective. 
As we may see, the conflict between the two paradigms is grounded in the classical 
philosophical dichotomy between rationalism and empiricism. Should priority be given 
to reason and logical subdivision and eventually universality, or should priority be given 
to empiricist epistemology, which rejects universal a priori knowledge, replacing it with 
experientialism. The socio-cognitive view concludes that the meaning of concepts is 
manifested by their actual use within different contexts and communities, and opposes a 
normative essentialist view that aims at defining the right meaning and use of concepts.  
According to the American physicist and philosopher of science, Thomas Kuhn (1922-
1996), scientific knowledge is organized around a paradigm. A paradigm may be 
thought of as a complex system of social interests, values and practices that constitutes a 
discourse community. According to Kuhn, the history of science shows that scientific 
knowledge is based on assumptions about the world that may be fundamentally changed 
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by new and future assumptions or theories. Kuhn introduces the concept of normal 
science which is the state where the scientific paradigm within a community is stable 
and undisputed. A crisis may occur as a result of discrepancies between theory and fact, 
which may provide for the emergence of new or alternative scientific theories.  The 
crisis provided by anomalies may eventually result in a change of paradigm, a scientific 
revolution that in the end will establish alternative fundamental assumptions about the 
world and eventually provide for a new period of normal science. According to Kuhn, 
the change between stages of normal science, crisis and revolution, followed by the 
emergence of a new stage of normal science, constitutes the life-cycle of a paradigm. 
However, the normal science state that comes out of a scientific revolution is considered 
incommensurable with the old paradigm. Kuhn believes that science is a form of puzzle 
solving within a paradigm. A new paradigm provides new puzzles, but the theoretical 
commitments of a paradigm also provides for new anomalies, so the puzzle will never 
be complete.   
The meaning communicated by scientific concepts is thus relative to a particular domain 
of knowledge. Concepts that seem alike may be defined and contextualized differently 
by different knowledge domains. Similar concepts can exist in different knowledge 
domains, but with different influential values and meanings. 
The meaning of scientific concepts is therefore complex and depends on how they are 
used to address particular research interests within a discursive framework.  
Kuhn regarded scientific knowledge as the product of social interaction. Kuhn dismisses 
the continuity of science. Truth is relative to a paradigm, what counts as true knowledge 
in one paradigm is different from what counts as true knowledge in a different 
paradigm. In other words truth does not transcend a scientific revolution.  
The British philosopher Roy Bhaskar (1991) relates Kuhn‘s notion of paradigmatic 
incommensurability to what he names critical realism. Kuhn stresses that ‗though the 
world does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterward works in a 
different world‘ (Kuhn, 1974, p. 121). 
 
once we disambiguate ‗the world‘ into ‗social, historical, transitive‘ and 
‗natural, (relatively) unchanging intransitive‘ we can transcribe the 
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sentence, without paradox, as: ‗Though the (natural (or object)) world 
does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist afterward works 
in a different (social or (cognitive)) world. (Bhaskar, 1991, p. 10) 
 
Bhaskar saves Kuhn from total relativism by relating ‗the natural world‘ to the domain 
of the intransitive and ‗the social world‘ to the domain of the transitive. In other words, 
there may be an external world that is relatively enduring and independent of human 
perception, but cognition depends on perception, and thus our concepts about the world 
are fallible and only likely (transitive). Failure to recognize this division between reality 
and observed reality, thus confusing statements about being (ontological statements) 
and statements about knowledge of being (epistemological statements) leads to an 
epistemic fallacy. As a consequence, Bhaskar argues that Kuhn‘s paradigm theory 
imply metaphysical realism, but epistemological pluralism. 
As discussed by (H. Andersen, 1997), Kuhn‘s account of scientific concepts is clearly 
inspired by Wittgenstein. However, Kuhn‘s account of family resemblance extents 
Wittgenstein‘s theory by including dissimilarity as an essential and decisive aspect 
among instances of a concept.  
Furthermore, Kuhn claimed that scientific practice is based on ‗exemplary solutions‘ 
that sets the standard for future research. These ‗exemplary solutions‘ supply the novice 
with basic scientific concepts. Concepts are thus closely related to a particular kind of 
practice of doing science. And the meaning of concepts are thus internalized and learned 
through practice. Kuhn thus clearly bases his theory of concepts in constructivist 
epistemology.  
The cluster-analytical tradition provides for graded categories, because concepts are 
defined by resemblance between instances. However, as argued by Andersen (1997), we 
can always find some relations between particular objects, and the problem thus 
becomes a problem of infinite regress. How do we determine important similarities 
from less important ones?  How do we specify the relevant similarity properties apart 
from the irrelevant, without reproducing the essentialist account of concepts? 
Kuhn tries to solve the problem of under-determination by providing an account of 
conceptual structure that is not only determined by similarity, but also includes 
dissimilarity and contrast sets. 
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…it is an essential part of Kuhn‘s philosophy of science that, on the 
background of some adopted classification, a new object may be 
encountered which judged from some features is an instance of one 
concept, but judged from other features is an instance of a contrasting 
concept. In such a situation, people using these different features in 
judging similarity and dissimilarity will ascribe the new object to 
contrasting categories. However although they may categorize the object 
differently, they still agree that they cannot all simultaneously be correct. 
(H. Andersen, 1997, p. 97) 
 
Membership of a particular category thus depends on what features are endorsed by a 
particular scientific theory, or in other words, what paradigmatic viewpoint that is 
considered to be correct. Therefore dissimilarity is as important as similarity for a 
particular classification.   
In many ways the cluster-analytic tradition as described in Ereshefsky (2001), promotes 
an anti-realist epistemology where language, culture and embodied activity constitute 
the epistemic threshold for how knowledge about the world can be achieved.   
The historical approach to concept formation deviates from the essentialist and cluster-
analytic traditions by prioritizing causal relations opposed to essential qualities and 
similarity.  
In Ereshefsky (2001), the historical approach is considered based on evolutionary 
principles. A member of a category is a member not by virtue of qualities, but because 
of causal relations that are unique for a particular species.  
 
…humans, for example, should be sorted into the species Homo sapiens 
not because they look alike, but because all humans form an uninterrupted 
and unique causal sequence of organisms. (Ereshefsky, 2001, p. 29) 
 
If we want to know why particular species has particular features, organs, abilities, etc. 
we need to unravel the historical and evolutionary conditions that has made these 
abilities feasible. Instead of describing the qualities that distinguish natural kinds by 
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similarity and differences, the historical approach seeks a deeper explanation of the 
qualities that are manifest in a particular kind. 
Even though the historical approach is considered from the perspective of biology, the 
perspective of genealogy and evolution is not exclusively related to biology, but has 
been considered by philosophers within other scientific areas, such as human history, 
sociology, classification, systems analysis and linguistics.  
The historical approach is concerned with the origins of a class, its environment, its 
theoretical foundation, its relation to historical facts, etc. The historical approach may 
thus be considered more context sensitive than the essentialist and cluster-analytical 
approach.  
The concept of ‗historical approach‘, however, includes several different viewpoints 
that seem incommensurable. The historical approach e.g. includes discourse analysis, 
critical theory, and culture studies; and concepts and categories are considered part of 
society and formed by human activity within culture and society. Knowledge structures 
thus emerge as consequences of social activity; and knowledge structures, including 
concepts and categories, are closely tied to the activities conducted within discourses (J. 
Andersen & Skouvig, 2006).  
Ereshefsky‘s exposition of the three philosophical schools of concept theory, thus 
divides concept theory in to objectivist, socio-cognitive and discursive epistemologies.   
3.2 Philosophy of language and Concept Theory 
Linguistic theory has been heavily influenced by the philosophy of language that 
traditionally is concerned with logic, meaning and sense making, i.e. true and false 
statements, in relation to the real world, and can be traced back to the British empiricist 
John Locke and his ideational theory of meaning (Malmkjær, 1996), see also (Grayling, 
1997). Further influential theories in linguistics are: logical positivism, often mentioned 
by reference to the Vienna Circle
22
, which was concerned with correspondence theory 
and verification of meaning between concepts and objects in the world in order to 
establish absolute truth. In relation to the Vienna Circle the most influential person was 
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Rudolph Carnap
23, but also the young Wittgenstein‘s ―Tractatus Logico-philosopicus‖ 
was of major influence.  
Austin‘s speech act theory (Austin, 1971; Searle, 1971), has been a valuable 
contribution in the philosophy of language, and is seen as a direct reaction against logic 
positivism.  
 
Austin points out that there are many declarative sentences which do not describe, 
report, or state anything, and of which it makes no sense to ask whether they are 
true or false. (Malmkjær 1996, p. 416) 
 
Searle develops the notion of speech acts further (Searle, 1969), and identifies four 
major types of speech acts: utterance acts, propositional acts, illocutionary acts, and 
perlocutionary acts. These four types of speech acts are used as tools for analyzing the 
structure and types of communication in language use. What is of special interest is the 
aspect of act, or action, where communication is seen as a tool for achieving something.  
Other important theories in the philosophy of language is the structuralist linguistics 
rooted in Ferdinand de Saussure‘s (1857-1913) semiology, see (Saussure 2000); and 
generative grammar developed by Noam Chomsky, see (Chomsky, 1975).  
Saussure‘s linguistic semiology has been significantly influential in semiotics, and is 
often referred to as the European tradition in semiotics, which also incorporates Louis 
Hjelmslev (1899-1966), Jacques Derrida (b. 1930) and Roman Jacobsen (1896-1982). 
The object of Saussure‘s semiology was to describe socially determined signs, the 
systems, which they form, the rules governing their use, and their evolution in time. 
Signs are fundamental constructs and products of social communication. The meaning 
of signs is derived and conventionalized from this social activity. The structuralist 
perspective was in opposition to the traditional philosophy of language, which main 
concern was absolute truth, disregarding language, culture and social conventions. The 
structuralist perspective rejects the notion of transcendental ideas, existing 
independently of language and cultural codes. Concepts exist only within a certain 
structure of meaning which is anchored in human culture and activity (Sebeok, 1994).  
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Chomsky‘s generative grammar is concerned with the deep structure of language and 
considers the utterance of language as mere surface structure.  
Chomsky‘s theory represents a rationalistic and cognitive approach to language; the 
deep structure is rooted in the human brain and is universal for all languages. The 
generative grammar is conceived as the set of rules that defines the unlimited number of 
sentences of the language and associates each with an appropriate grammatical 
description (Malmkjær 1996). However, even though Chomsky is concerned with the 
structure of language, it is not to be confused with the linguistic structuralist sense.  
Chomsky‘s theory of generative grammar is controversial, but has been valuable in 
relation to the development of software systems, e.g. automatic translator systems and 
expert systems in computer science. 
3.2.1 Cognitive linguistics 
Recent studies in cognitive semantics and cognitive linguistics apply experientialism to 
categorization (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000) 
and mark a significant turning point in linguistic theory. The meaning of language is not 
related to objective categories in the world, or to internal formal syntax of grammar. 
Cognitive semantics breaks fundamentally with the objectivistic tradition. It is an 
epistemology about man and man's understanding of himself and the surrounding world 
as well as man's interaction with the surrounding world. Cognitive semantics breaks 
with traditional linguistic theories, which has its theoretical background in logic and 
cognitivism. Furthermore, cognitive semantics breaks with the idea that the syntax is the 
staple and decisive level for meaning - and thus with the generative grammar of 
Chomsky that started the research into the connection between language and cognition. 
Cognitive semantics claims about semantics that the content in language has to do with 
cognitive problems, not logical ones alone (Lakoff 1987; Lakoff and Johnson 1999). 
 
On the traditional view, reason is abstract and disembodied. On the new 
view, reason has a bodily basis. The traditional view sees reason as 
literal, as primary about propositions that can be objectively either true or 
false. The new view takes imaginative aspects of reason – metaphor, 
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metonymy, and mental imagery – as central to reason, rather than a 
peripheral and inconsequential adjunct to the literal. (Lakoff 1987, p. xi) 
 
Lakoff shows, that concepts and categories are developed according to cognitive models 
and prototypes; meaning that the categorizations made by language depends on how it is 
used in communities. Categories are not clear cut, but show prototypic features, e.g. in 
the category of birds, the sparrow is more prototypical than e.g. an ostrich. As discussed 
later, scientific categorization is also explanation based and thereby not objective 
(Bryant 2000). The concepts of basic level categorization, prototypes and cognitive 
models will be addressed in the following sections.  
The fundamental assumptions of cognitive semantics or cognitive linguistics may be 
summarized by the following three statements: 
 
 Language is not an autonomous cognitive faculty  
 Grammar is conceptualization  
 Knowledge of language emerges from language use 
(Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 1) 
 
The hypotheses clearly oppose to objectivist theories of language and cognition. and 
thus to objective concepts and categories. Cognition cannot be separated from language, 
as suggested by the generative grammar.  
Grammar itself is conceptualization, and not objective symbol manipulation. There is no 
reason to believe that linguistic knowledge is different from knowledge based in other 
cognitive tasks such as visual perception and motor activity (Croft & Cruse, 2004).  
Furthermore knowledge emanates from language use. Thus, the meaning of language is 
related to praxis and context.  
3.2.1 Basic-Level Categorization  
When an indexer describes a document by means of subject indicators what does this 
representation actually express? A subjective (the indexers) interpretation of what the 
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document is about? Or is some kind of objectivity assumed, based on the KOS or the 
users of the domain? Or does it express the intentions of the author of the document?  
These are questions of aboutness, considered within the research of KO and IR. 
Aboutness is a complicated concept (and will not be discussed in detail here, see e.g. 
(Ingwersen, 1992), that may be related to different perspectives and conceptual levels 
within the indexing process. It is difficult to state objectively what a document is about; 
one should maybe, as discussed by Hjørland (1997), rather ask what functions or 
interests the document is thought to fulfil within a particular community.  
Furthermore, subject indicators are always assigned in relation to something else. This 
‗else‘, or the relation the indexer creates between concepts and documents, is a 
manifestation of what Lakoff refers to as a confluence of gestalt perception, the capacity 
for bodily movement, and the ability to form rich mental images.  
That is, a subject indicator communicates a particular meaning from one structure (i.e., 
a KOS) to another structure (a document), and thus establishes a connection.  
A similar situation appears in the information searching process where the user may 
agree to the suggested relations between subject indicators and documents. 
Basic level categorization relates cognitive models and prototypes to meaning making, 
and deviates from the classical Aristotelian concept theory. Additionally, basic level 
categorization establishes a hierarchical structure or organization of concepts by 
addressing their cognitive function. Basic level categorization is characterized by the 
following features: 
 
(1) It is the most inclusive level at which there are characteristic patterns of 
 behavioral interaction. 
(2) The most inclusive level for which a clear visual image can be formed. 
(3) The most inclusive level at which part-whole information is represented. 
(4) The level used for everyday neutral reference. 
(5) Individual items are more rapidly categorized as members of basic level 
 categories than as members of superordinate or subordinate categories.  
 
(Croft & Cruse, 2004, p. 85) 
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Furthermore, basic level categorization is 
 
 The highest level at which category members have similarly perceived overall 
shapes; 
 The highest level at which a single mental image can reflect the entire category; 
 The highest level at which a person uses similar motor actions for interacting 
with category members; 
 The level at which subjects are fastest at identifying category members;  
 The level with the most commonly used labels for category members;  
 The first level named and understood by children;  
 The first level to enter the lexicon of a language; 
 The level with the shortest primary lexemes;  
 The level at which terms are used in neutral context. For example, ‗There‘s a 
dog on the porch‘ can be used in a neutral context, whereas special contexts are 
needed for ‗There‘s a mammal on the porch‘, or ‗There‘s a wire-haired terrier on 
the porch‘. 
 The level at which most of our knowledge is organized 
 
 (Lakoff, 1987, p. 46) 
 
If we consider the concepts ‗dog‘ and ‗chair‘ it is obvious that they fit the above-
mentioned definition of basic level categories, while concepts such as ‗mammal‘ and 
‗furniture‘ do not; we are for instance not able to imagine single mental images that 
represent the superordinate categories. ‗Furniture‘ is too abstract and requires several 
mental images, while also requiring different motor movements.  
According to Lakoff, the superordinate category does not provide for additional 
information in relation to the basic level category.  
The subordinate level provides for more specialized information. A chair can be of a 
particular kind, for instance a rocking chair; however, the motor movement involved 
‗sitting in a chair‘ remains the same. The way in which we interact with objects (i.e. 
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chairs, tables, beds etc.) is conditional to certain motormovements. We do not (strictly 
speaking) use a bed as a table or a chair as a bed. Each kind of furniture prescribes a 
sequence of different body movements. 
 
When performing the action of sitting down on a chair, a sequence of body 
and muscle movements are typically made that are inseparable from the 
nature of the attributes of chairs — legs, seat, back etc. (Rosch, 1978, p. 
33) 
 
Rosch made some tests where she had a person describe as detailed as possible which 
motor movements she made when she sat down in a chair. Rosch writes: 
 
There are few motor programs we carry out to items of furniture in 
general and several specific motor programs carried out in regard to 
sitting down on chairs, but we sit on kitchen and living room chairs using 
essentially the same motor programs. (ibid, p. 33) 
 
This is a solid argument for the fact that the large amount of common qualities do not 
emanate from the categorized objects, but from the categorization and interaction with 
them.  
On this basis we may argue that basic level categorization infuse our ways of action in 
relation to our life world, both bodily and intellectually.  
 
The fact that knowledge is mainly organized at the basic level is 
determined in the following way: When subjects are asked to list attributes 
of categories, they list very few attributes of category members at the 
superordinate level (furniture, vehicle, mammal); they list most of what 
they know at the basic level (chair, car, dog); and at the subordinate level 
(rocking chair, sports car, retriever) there is virtually no increase in 
knowledge over the basic level. (Lakoff, 1987, p. 47) 
 
Again Lakoff makes an important observation. All human beings are equipped with the 
same cognitive apparatus, however, the surrounding world decides the basic level in the 
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sense that the surroundings are decisive for what a culture defines as basic. A sealer or a 
whaler has other basic level categories than e.g. a farmer.  
Researchers from different knowledge domains have a different basic-level 
understanding of similar concepts. Thus the concept ‗model‘ is used and understood 
differently in the various knowledge domains. Even within the same knowledge domain 
there can be differences in the understanding of the same concepts — we could call it 
different ‗dialects‘. The intentionality is cognitively tied to a life-world and not only to 
the context of the concept. This should be understood in the way that the intentionality 
is also part of the knowledge domain into which the concept is weaved and from which 
it gets its meaning. On the other hand, it is the intention and the preunderstanding of the 
user, the user‘s domain knowledge, and the information need of the user, that form the 
decisive part in how the user understands the concept.  
From the perspective of KO, we may argue, on the basis of the insight provided by 
cognitive semantics, that a vocabulary or classification system based on basic level 
concept and categories may be useful for users.   
Furthermore, the mechanism of basic level categorization is considered to apply to 
abstract concepts. However, the concept of mental images, as e.g. the basic level of 
‗dog‘ is different, because there may not exist an ostensive object that provides for a 
suitable image. The ‗image‘ may instead be a collection of experiences associated with 
the particular object, e.g. the origins of the concept, the context where it acquires its 
meaning, how it is related to theory, methods and models, etc. Unravelling the deeper 
meaning of an abstract concept may thus benefit from a historical approach to concept 
analysis.   
3.2.2 Cue validity  
Cue validity is a measure of conditional probability. Instead of necessary and sufficient 
conditions for membership of a category, membership may be established given the 
existence of particular features or cues.  
 
Cue validity is a probabilistic concept; the validity of a given cue x as a 
predictor of a given category y (the conditional probability of y/x) 
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increases as the frequency with which cue x is associated with category y 
increases and decreases as the frequency with which cue x is associated 
with categories other than y increases. The cue validity of an entire 
category may be defined as the summation of the cue validities for that 
category of each of the attributes of the category. A category with high cue 
validity is, by definition, more differentiated from other categories than 
one of lower cue validity. (Rosch, 1978, p. 30-31) 
 
Some cues may be more unique for a category than others, e.g. gills has a high cue 
validity for the category fish, lungs on the contrary has a low cue validity.  
According to Rosch, the highest cue validity within taxonomy would occur on the basic 
level category. Cue validity on a superordinate level would be low because the 
superordinate level includes many different objects that have few or no common 
attributes. Similarly on the subordinate level cue validity would also be low, because the 
particular kind of the basic level category differentiates it from other kinds within the 
same basic level category.  
3.2.3 Prototypes 
The classical model of conceptual categories is exclusive and defined by necessary and 
sufficient conditions. Meaning: A particular object can only be a member of one class, 
and membership is defined by a set of necessary and sufficient features that are defined 
by the class intension. Necessary means that an object must possess a full set of the 
class attributes to be a member, and, furthermore, sufficient means that possession of all 
the features of class attributes guarantees membership.  
However, the classical definition of concepts is faced with several difficulties:  
 
The difficulties faced by the classical model of conceptual categories are 
many. Three frequently cited shortcomings have provided the major 
motivation for the development of alternative theories. Firstly, for many 
everyday concepts, as Wittgenstein pointed out with his well-known 
example of GAME, adequate definitions in terms of necessary and 
sufficient features are simply not available. Furthermore, as Fillmore 
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(1975) pointed out in connection with the noun bachelor, even for those 
concepts that seem to have definitions, the definitions typically hold only 
within a specific domain […]. Secondly, what is here called ‗graded 
centrality‘ constitutes a problem; that is, the fact that some members of a 
category are judged ‗better‘, or ‗more representative‘ of the category than 
others: in a classical category, all members are equal. Thirdly, the 
classical model can offer no account of why category boundaries, in 
practice, seem to be vague and variable. (Cruse, 2004, p. 76-77) 
 
During her research, Eleanor Rosch introduced the concept ‗prototype effect‘, the fact 
that some representatives, members, things, animals, etc. are more typical for their class 
than others. The blackbird is considered more prototypical for the class of birds than the 
ostrich or the penguin. Rosch, however, rapidly abandoned the idea that categories, 
generally speaking, are organized from a prototype, and the other elements of the class 
graduate accordingly after this prototype. Prototype effect is, according to Rosch and 
Lakoff, no basic quality of the categories, but prototypicality is a sign of categorization.  
Considering the example of ‗dog‘, the concept ‗dog‘ denotes a prototypical gestalt that 
contains all empirically experienced dogs, but it does not exist empirically in itself. 
Thereby the prototypicality has become a sign of categorization.  
In the previous section, the first part of Lakoff‘s embodiment concept was introduced, 
including the key concepts ‗basic-level categorization‘, ‗cue-valitidy‘ and ‗prototype 
effect‘. The following section will explore the second part of Lakoff‘s embodiment 
concept. This part of the embodiment concept grants us knowledge about how we are 
able to transfer and intellectually understand the basic-level concepts. 
3.2.4 Kinaesthetic image-schemas 
The second part of the embodiment concept includes a theory about kinaesthetic image 
schemas, gestalt schemas through which the world is perceived, which again is defined 
through basic-level categories. Since basic-level concepts are grounded in embodiment, 
and the kinaesthetic image schemas are bodily understood and transferred through 
metaphors, metonymies, and radial structures, Lakoff‘s cognitive semantics takes a 
powerful biological turn, but it is not a matter Lakoff digs further into (see (Brier 1997) 
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for development of this aspect), yet, without interfering with biological matters, we 
shall adduce that it is through our senses that we receive the stimuli we categorize. In 
other words, the sense of smell is a cognitive mechanism that acts metonymically in the 
sense that a certain smell, scent, or aroma is able to evoke mental images of experiences 
tied to that particular scent. We also categorize things as something that smells nice, 
bad, unpleasant, and we react unconsciously on scents of the opposite sex etc. Our other 
senses are likewise. Lakoff writes: 
 
Kinestetic image-schematic structure: Image schemas are relatively 
simple structures that constantly recur in our everyday bodily experience: 
CONTAINER-PATHS, LINKS, FORCES, BALANCE, and in various 
orientations and relations: UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, PART-WHOLE, 
CENTER-PERIPHERY, etc. (Lakoff, 1987, p. 267) 
 
This quotation contains a definition of the kinaesthetic image schemas, which is central 
in our understanding and organization of the surrounding world. As Stjernfelt writes: 
 
These [kinestetic image schemas] play the role as pre-conceptual 
archetypes that can be used to comprehend more complicated and not 
fully understood phenomenological occurrences. They are generally of a 
spatial nature and concern the foundation of the biological organization 
of the body in space and time in its use of basic-level category objects. 
(Stjernfelt, 1992, p. 115) (translated from Danish) 
 
Put another way, we understand and conceptualize the phenomenological world by the 
way we move around in it. By means of kinaesthetic image schemas and basic-level 
concepts we categorize the world. Kinaesthetic image-schemas thus provide for a 
particular orientation, and that is strictly related to human cognition, it is an intellectual 
ability that intervenes in our understanding of the surrounding world.  
Furthermore, it may be argued that if the kinestetic image schema is a cognitive ability 
that provides for orientation in the world it may also influence how knowledge systems 
are organized. The idea of ‗core concepts‘ within a particular knowledge domain invoke 
the center-periphery distinction. The up-down distinction is operational within any 
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hierarchically organized KOS. Documents ‗contain‘ information and are ‗linked‘ by 
means of references. The part-whole distinction is important in thesaurus construction, 
here realized as narrow or broader concept relations.  
3.2.5 Metaphors, metonymy, and radial structures 
 
A standard dictionary definition describes a metaphor as ‗a figure of 
speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object is 
used in place of another to suggest a likeness between them‘. Although the 
theoretical adequacy of this definition may be questioned, it conveys the 
standard view that there is a difference between literal and nonliteral 
language; that figurative speech is nonliteral language and that a 
metaphor is an instance of figurative speech. (Routledge, 2001) 
 
The function of the metaphor is to transfer meaning between two separated and un-
related domains, e.g. by comparing features of one object to another.  
Lakoff makes a distinction between what he labels ‗conceptual metaphor‘ and a 
‗metaphorical expression‘. By this distinction, the conceptual metaphor becomes the 
general form and metaphorical expressions the instantiation of the conceptual metaphor.  
 
Conceptual metaphor:  Love is a journey 
Metaphorical expressions:  This relationship is foundering, 
  We are going nowhere, 
  This relationship is a dead-end street, we are at a cross-roads, 
  etc. 
  
(Kertesz, 2004, p. 48) 
 
From this perspective metaphors are not merely figurative speaking, or a matter of 
stylistics, but rather a genuine capacity for reasoning.  
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What constitutes the love is a journey metaphor is not any particular word 
or expression. It is the ontological mapping across conceptual domains, 
from the source domain of journeys to the target domain of love. The 
metaphor is not just a matter of language, but of thought and reason. The 
language is secondary. The mapping is primary, in that it sanctions the 
use of source domain language and inference patterns for target domain 
concepts. The mapping is conventional; that is, it is a fixed part of our 
conceptual system, one of our conventional ways of conceptualising love 
relationships. (Lakoff 1993, p. 208) 
 
Lakoff and Johnson (1980), understand the concept of the metaphor as a central tool for 
thought. Thinking is to depict parts of or structures from one mental space in another. 
The mental space Lakoff mentions is the ability to metaphorize, to transfer a perceived 
phenomenological world to cognitive structures through the kinaesthetic image 
schemas.  
Furthermore, the reasoning mechanism of the metaphor may provide for new ways of 
perceiving the world, it may create new ‗realities‘. Metaphors provide structures, i.e. a 
certain way of perceiving objects or problem areas. It has the ability to focus on certain 
aspects and blur others.  
Another important concept is metonymy. Like the metaphor, the metonymy possesses a 
mediating quality, which is to transfer meaning from a part to a whole, i.e. we can 
recognize the part in the whole, but also the whole in the part. Metonymy differs from 
the metaphor in that it does not blend different conceptual spaces. Another distinction is 
that metaphors operates on the basis of similarity, e.g. the similarity between ‗Love‘ and 
‗Journey‘, where metonymy operate on the basis of association, e.g. by whole-part 
relation: an author may for example be used metonymically as a representation for the 
whole body of his work.  
According to Cruse (2004), metonymy may be divided into ‗intrinsic‘ associations, 
which are inherent and relatively constant, and ‗extrinsic‘ associations, which are non-
inherent and contingent. Examples of intrinsic associations are ‗whole-part‘, 
‗individual-class‘, ‗entity-attribute‘, ‗different values on same scale‘, and ‗opposites‘. 
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An example of an extrinsic association according to Cruse is the phrase: ‗number 32 is 
not answering‘.  
Furthermore, Lakoff works with a third important transference structure, which is called 
the radial structure. This is based on both metaphorical and metonymical qualities. 
According to Lakoff, a radial structure is ‗one where there is a central case and 
conventionalized variations on it, which cannot be predicted by general rules‘ (Lakoff. 
1987), p. 84. The radial structures are structures that contain ideal members. The other 
members can only be identified through social rules/conventions and metaphorical and 
metonymical motivations. This means that the radial structures are conventionalized and 
have to be learned; radial structures are cultural phenomena. An example of a typical 
radial structure is the ‗mother‘ concept. The central, ideal content in the structure is 
described as follows: 
 
The central case, where all the models converge, includes a mother who is 
and always has been female, and who gave birth to her child, is married to 
the father, is one generation older than the child, and is the child‘s legal 
guardian. (Lakoff, 1987, p. 83) 
 
Lakoff reels off a string of ‗mothers‘: stepmothers, adoptive mothers, birth mothers, 
natural mothers, unwed mothers etc. who all diverge from the above-mentioned 
conditions, but still they are mother types. The presence of well-defined subgroups 
makes the concept ‗mother‘ a radial structure. However, Lakoff points out that not all-
possible variations exists as categories. 
 
There is no category of mothers who are legal guardians but who don‘t 
personally supply nurturance, but hire someone else to do it. There is no 
category of transsexuals who gave birth but have since had a sex-change 
operation. (ibid, p. 83) 
 
Metaphors, metonymies and radial structures represent different reasoning capacities. 
Metaphors provide transference of meaning by means of similarity, blending of 
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conceptual domains, metonymy by means of association, and radial structures by means 
of convention. 
A critique one may raise against Lakoff‘s cognitive semantics is his examples; they all 
represent everyday life situations. However, how may the functions of metaphor, 
metonymy and radial structures apply within scholarly communities? 
Within the LIS community several metaphorical conceptions are apparent; take for 
instance ‗knowledge is a resource‘, which clearly expresses a conceptual metaphor.  
 
Conceptual metaphor:  Information is a resource  
Metaphorical expressions:  Information need and information use 
  Exhaustive indexing 
  Query refinement 
  Information-as-a-thing 
  Information-as-a-process 
 
Other examples of LIS metaphors:  
 
Information literacy  
Information age 
Knowledge environment 
Knowledge domain 
Information pathology 
Knowledge map 
Knowledge structure 
Information value 
Value adding 
Information competencies  
 
Metaphors are paramount as well within scholarly communities, and are a powerful 
mechanism for reasoning and for expressing new and complicated meanings. 
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The function of a metaphor is thus to ‗blend‘ different concept space, and provide for 
new meanings. Metaphors may, however, be more or less creative and original. They 
are more effective when they provide for surprising relations between the source 
domain and the target domain. Metaphors may be considered a facilitator of new 
concepts; however, when a metaphor becomes generally accepted and used as a 
particular concept, as is the case with the list of LIS metaphors above, they function as 
symbols. 
Metonymy is also paramount within scholarly communities. Intrinsic metonymic 
concepts are widespread within KOS. The very function of subject indicators as 
representations of subjects is of this metonymical kind. The extrinsic metonymy is also 
paramount, e.g. shelving books, reading Shakespeare, text consumption, etc.  
The radial structured concepts are conventionally defined on the basis of cultural habits. 
They are not organized on the basis of logic, e.g. membership by means of necessary 
and sufficient conditions. Membership is defined by how the concept is used within a 
culture or community, and is thus highly domain specific. Identification of radially 
structured concepts therefore relies on domain knowledge.   
If these assumptions are correct, it should be obvious that domain knowledge is of 
utmost importance for information specialists that create subject categories and 
semantic tools for KOS. It should also be obvious that the meaning of concepts is 
contextual - we may identify particular semantic items automatically in documents, but 
how these semantic items should be understood relies on the complex interplay between 
the text communicated by the document and the cognitive abilities of the reader.  
3.2.6 Idealized cognitive models (ICM) 
The ICM is an important concept within the Lakoff tradition of cognitive semantics. 
The ICM is defined as a complex structured whole that functions on the basis of four 
kinds of structuring principles: propositional structures, image schematic structures, 
metaphoric mapping, and metonymic mapping (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). An ICM is 
defined as a mental model that controls how meaning is attributed to objects of the 
surrounding world.  
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The ICM concept is thus determined by culture. Lakoff‘s primary example of an ICM is 
the understanding of the concept ‗bachelor‘: 
 
[B]achelor is defined with respect to an ICM in which there is a human 
society with (typically monogamous) marriage, and a typical 
marriageable age. The idealized model says nothing about the existence of 
priests, ‗long-term unmarried couplings‘, homosexuality, Moslems who 
are permitted four wives and only have three…(Lakoff, 1987, p. 70) 
 
Lakoff furthermore states that the ICM structure is a gestalt that cannot be broken down 
into smaller meaningful entities without losing the wholeness. The idea of wholeness is 
significant in order to understand the complexity in the ICM-situation philosophy. 
Situations are not similar, but thematic variations; the theme is the ICM, and the 
variations are different cognitive structures derived from the ICM. Since we are talking 
about variations that share a similarity with the theme, we are able to recognize the 
situations and thereby register them as thematic variations.  
Because we talk about theme variations, we often experience that the ICM does not fit 
precisely with reality. Nevertheless, we know immediately what is meant when the 
topic is a bachelor, or a woman wearing a veil. The meaning is being created in the 
encounter between the two contexts: my preunderstanding of the concept and the 
context of which the concept or concepts are a part. In the sentence, ‗He has just 
become a bachelor in library and information science‘, the listener must have contextual 
knowledge about what a bachelor is; he must also know what a librarian is, and that it is 
possible (in Denmark) to educate bachelors in library and information science. If he 
doesn‘t know this, he cannot decode and understand the message. There is no logical 
relation between libraries and bachelors; the meaning is only created through the social 
use of the concepts. Lakoff says: 
 
If, on the contrary, someone tells me that the pope is a bachelor, another 
ICM will appear telling me that according to current definitions the pope 
cannot be a bachelor because among other things the pope is defined by 
his not being socially expected to marry… Under this account bachelor is 
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not a graded category. It is an all-or-none concept relative to the 
appropriate ICM. (Lakoff 1987, p. 71) 
 
The concept ‗bachelor‘ is thereby not a graded category. If one ICM does not fit the 
situation, another replaces it. Furthermore, there is a possibility that more than one ICM 
is triggered at the same time. Lakoff calls these ‗cluster models‘. Again he uses the 
mother concept as an example. Where the classical theory claims that it is possible to 
make a clear description of the mother concept to cover all types of mothers, Lakoff 
claims that the concept ‗mother‘ ‗is a concept that is based on a complex model in 
which a number of individual cognitive models combine and form a cluster model‘ 
(Lakoff, 1987), p. 74. 
The cluster model is defined by being a complex model within which a string of 
individual cognitive models are combined. The cluster model differs from the particular 
radial structured concept by consisting of a string of coordinated cognitive models, 
whereas the radial structure has a superior concept under which the other concepts are 
arranged. Each cognitive model in the cluster model can thus have a radial structure. 
Lakoff describes several different mother concepts that have in common some 
representation of ‗mother‘. However, the issue is not how many types of mothers there 
are, but how complex a relatively simple concept like mother is. The cluster model 
contributes with meaning to the mother concept, but Lakoff points out that there may be 
additional mother models. There is not, as in the particular radial structures, a central 
mother model where the radials form subcategories. The concept ‗mother‘ is dynamical, 
and the cluster model can be expanded with more models, or models can simply 
disappear. However, what is important in this discussion is the awareness of the fact 
that a concept can be defined through many ICMs.  
The meaning of a concept is thus defined through the situation in which the concept is 
used — that is, the appropriate ICM in the appropriate situation. The ICM provides 
meaning to the concept. However, the receiver/user must have knowledge of the ICM 
and be motivated in order to decode the meaning.  
The discussion of cognitive semantics raises some basic issues about the function of 
language and the meaning of concepts. According to Lakoff, language and cognition 
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cannot be separated. Language is embodied, which means that the properties of 
categories and concepts are consequences of the biological capacity of human 
perception and its experiences of acting in a physical and social environment (Lakoff, 
1987). Concepts and categories are meaningful only with reference to embodied 
experience, where meaning is attained by means of projecting metaphorical, 
metonymical and radial structures into the environment. The ICM has a synthetic 
function that determines the overall meaning of a concept.  
Based on the insights of cognitive semantics, concepts and categories cannot be 
determined by essentialist epistemology. Accordingly, KOS based on strong models of 
representation produce systems that are insensitive to the dynamics of communicative 
processes and knowledge production in discourse communities. The departure of 
cognitive semantics is that concepts and categories first and foremost are based in 
experience. Secondly, perception of reality is not neutral, but influenced by how 
language is used in communication. Thirdly, the human cognitive ability is connected to 
how the human body interacts with the environment; thus, kinaesthetic image-schemes 
play a fundamental role as pre-conceptual archetypes that influence the spatial 
perception of time and space and thus gives rise to basic level categorization and 
notions as core-concepts vs. periphery concepts. Fourthly, concepts and categories are, 
as a result of human cognitive capacity, essentially based on metaphor, metonymy and 
ICM. Essentialist epistemology should therefore be abandoned in favor of a socio-
cognitive and experientialist epistemology. 
I have dedicated some thought to the cognitive semantic approach, because it 
fundamentally proposes an alternative understanding of concepts that is in opposition to 
the essentialist definition of concepts. However: 
 
According to essentialism and most versions of cluster analysis, 
classifications are constructed according to qualitative similarities that 
can be used for explaining or predicting the behavior of a kind‘s members. 
[…]Historically based classifications, on the other hand, help us explain 
an entity‘s properties that are due to a sequence of events by highlighting 
the causal path underlying those events.(Ereshefsky, 2001, p. 29)  
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The historical approach bases its classification of objects on continuity, a sequence of 
events that explains the properties of an object. This approach gives priority to 
unraveling the fundamental assumptions that motivate the meaning of a concept. 
Concepts may be graded and prototypical; however, where the cognitive semantic 
approach explains conceptual meaning with reference to metaphor, metonymy and ICM, 
the historical approach classifies objects according to their causal relations rather than 
their intrinsic qualitative features.  
The historical approach is in particular explored in biological taxonomy, but is 
considered a principle not exclusively related to biology. ―In fact, any discipline that 
identifies the parts of an entity over time or identifies the path of a causal process 
employs the historical approach to classification‖ (Ereshefsky, 2001, p. 30).  
According to Hjørland, what Ereshefsky terms as the historical approach is too narrowly 
focused on the object of investigation, and should include the researchers‘ way of 
understanding the object of investigation as well.   
 
Historicism is the ideal of basing research on social contexts, on historical 
developments, and on the explication of researchers‘ pre-understanding. It 
is based on the understanding that observations are ―theory-laden,‖ or 
culturally influenced (as opposed to neutral and ―objective‖) processes 
(Hjørland, 2009, p. 1525) 
 
Accordingly, Hjørland argues that historicism is deeply related to hermeneutics and 
genealogical classification. ―To clarify a concept involves the uncovering of the 
discourses in which it has been developed and used as well as its underlying set of 
assumptions.‖(ibid., p. 1526) 
In the next section I will discuss how pragmatic pluralism may apply as a principle in 
the historical approach.  
3.2.7 The evolution of scientific concepts – pragmatic pluralism 
Pragmatic pluralism considers Peirce‘s distinction between metaphysical possibility, the 
realm of the consistently thinkable and independently real, within which the facts of 
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experience must be located, and epistemological actuality, the realm of concepts that is 
based on perceptual knowledge, and which can be characterized as a system of ideas 
that grasps or fixates the independently real through interaction.   
 
…the real world is ontologically one with independent reality as an 
infinitely rich continuum of qualitative events. It is, metaphysically, that 
independently real. Yet a world is dependent upon the meaning system that 
grasps in a way in which reality as independent is not, for a world is that 
perspective of the infinitely rich reality that has been ―fixed‖ or ―carved 
out‖ by a system of ideas. Knowledge is abstractive and selective. A 
world, though concrete, is nonetheless selective in the sense that a world, 
as the concrete content denoted by a system of meanings, is a way in 
which the concreteness of reality can be delineated, or ―fixed‖. A system 
once chosen, limits the alternatives possible within it, but alternative 
systems may be possible. (Rosentahl, 1994, p. 7-8)  
 
What is important in the above quotation is that we may distinguish between an 
independent reality, that contains infinite ongoing processes, and events that may be 
understood or explained only by a system of meanings. Rosentahl distinguishes for that 
reason between ―reality‖, which is metaphysically real, and ―a world‖ that is considered 
a logical fixation of an infinite number of possibilities. This distinction is in line with 
Bhaskar‘s conception of ‗intransitive natural reality‘ and the ‗transitive world‘ that is 
determined by social and historical perspective. 
Reality may thus be percieved and explained through a system of ideas and gives rise to 
Peirce‘s phenomenological categories. Peirce‘s phenomenological categories are 
distinguished in a trichotomy: Firstness, secondness and thirdness.  
Firstness is considered a potential of being. Secondness is an actualization of firstness, 
and thirdness mediates between the potential of being and the actualization. Thirdness 
then forms generality and habit. 
Reformulating the statement above, firstness, secondness and thirdness stands in a 
complimentary relation: Firstness is what is potentially possible, and, thus, consistent 
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thinkable (the world being perceptible and conceivable), secondness is actualization of 
what is potentially possible, and thirdness being actually or logically possible. This 
trichotomy thus both constitutes what is metaphysically independently real, and what is 
knowledgeable. Thus, the trichotomy both expresses the metaphysical categories of 
reality and simultaneously forms Peirce‘s phenomenological categories that express 
what is knowable. Peirce metaphysics and phenomenology thus supply each other in a 
self-corrective manner.  
As a consequence, concepts are, in the Peircean sense, fallible understandings of 
independent reality, and by fallible is meant that future investigations may continuously 
correct the meaning of concepts. In the Peircean pragmatic sense, concepts constitute 
the intelligible world; however, in order for concepts to be intelligible, reality must be 
intelligible as well.  
Accordingly, and with Bhaskar‘s distinction in mind, Kuhn‘s theory of paradigms could 
arguably be considered in line with Peirce‘s pragmatic pluralism. Knowledge as 
cumulative or knowledge as changing does not lie in opposition for Peirce, ―…rather 
knowledge as changing is also knowledge as cumulative, for any novel world emerges 
from a cumulative process or history, which yields enrichment of intelligibility both of 
the old and of the new‖.  (Rosentahl, 1994, p. 19) 
A paradigm is thus not randomly chosen, but motivated by reality and previous systems 
of knowledge. A paradigm in this sense constitutes a system of ideas that justifiably 
explains scientific knowledge, which cannot exist in isolation, but must somehow be 
connected, or be the result of previous and obsolete knowledge systems.  
In the next chapter I will elaborate on Peirce‘s phenomenological categories in relation 
to his semeiotic theory. For now, it is sufficient to recognize that concepts as conceived 
by Peirce, are complex units of knowledge that implicate a distinction between reality, 
which is the independent real, and the world, which is considered a possible conception 
of reality. That there may exist numerous explications of reality, and thus 
epistemological plurality, and that science provides for justifiable knowledge based on 
experimentalism. Furthermore, knowledge is considered cumulative, and developed in a 
continuum. Even though theories are incompatible (or incommensurable, as stated by 
Kuhn), new theories should be seen as a consequence of previous theories (or reactions 
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against theories); thus socio-cognitive concept theories emerge in opposition to 
objectivist concept theories. 
3.3 Discussing concept theory and KO 
In chapter 2 it was argued that KOS are semantic systems that at different levels of 
semantic granularity organize words, classes and concepts. In this chapter I have argued 
that different approaches to concept theory have important consequences for how 
concepts are determined, delimited and structured. The important discussion now is 
what these consequences mean in KO.  
Generally, systems falling under the different approaches to concept theory may be 
characterized as follows: 
 
Essentialism – systems based on formal syntax and logical decomposition, e.g.  facetted 
classification systems, objectivist terminology, ontologies   
 Epistemology: objectivism, rationalism and empiricism  
 Principle of semantic representation: univocity, standardization, vocabulary 
control, from general to specific  
 Universalistic  
 
Cluster analysis – statistical methods, e.g. bibliometri, associative relations, socio-
cognitive terminology, prototypicity, semantic networks  
 Culture relative epistemologies  
 Principle of semantic representation: semantic pluralism based on empirical 
studies, prototypes, semantic clusters  
 Synchronic, graded categories, based on perception 
 
The historical approach – discourse analysis, domain analysis, critical theory, pragmatic 
pluralism  
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 Unraveling the meaning of concepts by studying how they attach to 
developments in scientific studies, how they relate to theories and paradigms, 
how they are used in communication, written as well as oral 
 Domain analysis, discourse analysis, critical studies   
 Principle of semantic representation: genealogy, semantic pluralism based on 
scientific evidence and perspective  
 Diachronic, graded categories,  based on scientific evidence  
 
If concepts are considered from an essentialist approach, then priority is given to system 
designs that favor exclusive categories and logical decomposition. In particular, this 
includes systems that organize concepts from general to specific. This principle is 
dominant in the traditional types of KOS, and is in particular demonstrated by universal 
classification systems.  
Cluster analysis is less restrictive than the essentialist approach, and concepts are 
considered as complex units of knowledge that may be fuzzy and organized around a 
prototype. The idea of center – periphery organization is important; some objects falling 
under a concept may be less prototypical than others, and thus more periphery related to 
the prototypical example that defines the concept. In cluster analysis, the distinction 
between concepts and categories becomes unclear, simply because there is no single 
exclusive way of defining the necessary and sufficient properties of category members.  
Semantic networks, association test, and bibliometry
24
 are examples of how the 
principle of cluster analysis is applied in KOS. A cluster analysis thus provides for a 
snapshot of a semantic structure, based on some kind of similarity measurement.  
The historical approach in KO has in particular been advocated by Hjørland (Hjørland, 
2002b, 2009; Hjørland & Albrechtsen, 1995), as an important aspect of domain 
analysis. In relation to concepts, Hjørland argues that: 
 
Concepts are dynamically constructed and collectively negotiated 
meanings that classify the world according to interests and theories. 
Concepts and their development cannot be understood in isolation from 
the interests and theories that motivated their construction, and, in 
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general, we should expect competing conceptions and concepts to be at 
play in all domains at all times.(Hjørland, 2009, p. 1523) 
 
As a consequence, concepts should be understood by genealogically tracing their 
origins, investigating their historical development, and justifying their meaning and 
relations to other concepts by reference to scientific theories and discourse 
communities. 
3.4 Summary  
The focus of this chapter has been to investigate into different approaches to concept 
theory, and to discuss how different approaches to concept theory provide for 
fundamentally different understandings of concepts and, successively, different models 
of representation.  
This discussion is important because KOS‘s are, as argued in the previous chapter, 
considered semantic systems that organize concepts, based on different principles of 
representation, and at different levels of granularity.  
The distinction between essentialism, cluster analysis and the historical approach to 
concept theory has been valuable in order to determine the strength and weakness of 
different models of representation. Essentialism thus defines concepts by necessary and 
sufficient conditions, i.e. a concept has an intensional definition that objectively carves 
reality at its joints. The strength of essentialist models of concepts is their focus on true 
representation of facts, a belief in true essence of things, and invariable fixed properties 
that defines an entity. The weakness is that essentialism disregards the role played by 
language and culture in concept formation.  
Cluster analysis defines concepts according to prototypes, and thus abandons the 
essentialist approach to concept definitions. Language, communication and the social 
environment cannot be excluded from how concepts and categories are defined. In 
principle, this breaks with the universalistic approach to KO. Concepts are thus defined 
according to their purpose and use in actual communication.  The problem that arises in 
cluster analysis is how to delimit concepts. Concepts may be fuzzy and prototypical, but 
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questions arise about what properties should be determined important, and which should 
not. As an example of cluster analysis in linguistics, cognitive semantics is discussed. 
Cognitive semantics dismisses the classical essentialist approach to concepts and 
categorization, and formulates a thorough critique based on empirical evidence, 
according to which concepts and categorization, instead of being determined by 
necessary and sufficient properties, rather is motivated by experience, human cognitive 
abilities, motor action, cultural context, and linguistic phenomena as metaphor and 
metonymy. As is the case with essentialism, cluster analysis also defines concepts and 
categories according to some intrinsic properties; some are considered more important 
than others, and thus graded (prototypical) categories are established. Members of a 
category may thus share a cluster of similar traits, however, those traits may not be 
present in all the members of a category. However, cluster analysis provides a 
synchronic picture of concepts. 
The historical approach may be approached differently depending on theoretical and 
epistemological commitments. The historical approach, however, favors explanation 
based methodologies over qualitative similarity.  
Pragmatic pluralism, a term suggested by Rosentahl (Rosentahl, 1994), is related to the 
historical approach. Pragmatic pluralism is developed based in Peirce‘s distinction 
between metaphysical possibility and epistemological actuality, which corresponds to 
the semeiotic distinction between dynamical and immediate object (which will be 
explained in detail in chapter 5). Pragmatic pluralism thus argues that concepts are 
complex unites of knowledge determined by external reality; however, concepts are 
continuously modified by investigations. Furthermore, there may exist numerous 
explanations of reality, due to different approaches and knowledge interests, and, 
science provides for the justifiable knowledge. According to Peirce, knowledge is 
considered cumulative and developed in a continuum, and thus historically based.  
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4 Semiotics 
Introduction  
 
The function of this chapter is to provide for a general introduction to semiotics and a 
detailed presentation of Peirce‘s semeiotic theory. The objective is to investigate into 
the constituents of a sign, how signs may be classified and understood as signs of 
meaning. Furthermore, the function of the chapter is to investigate into how the 
different types of KOS‘s correspond to the sign classes demonstrated. Finally, the 
concept of pragmatic pluralism is revisited and discussed in relation to paradigm and 
concepts. The chapter thus connects the discussions of concept theory to semeiotic 
theory and sets up the premises for the concept ‗sign displacement‘ that will be the 
focus of chapter 5. 
4.1 Semiotics 
Semiotics is basically concerned with signs, their constituents and how they may be 
meaningful to somebody. However, semiotics is not a unified field or a methodology. 
There are several schools and branches of theoretical as well as applied semiotics. And 
the history of signs and the meaning of signs may be traced back to ancient times (cf. 
Nöth, 1990). The most common distinction of traditions made in semiotics is between 
the structuralist
25
 tradition stemming from the Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure 
(1857-1913) and the American philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). Both 
traditions are concerned with the formal conditions of signs, but differ significantly in 
their respective theoretical foundation. A common way to express their differences is by 
reference to their origin; - where Peirce‘s semeiotic theory is developed from the 
perspective of logic and scientific enquiry, Saussure‘s semiology is based in linguistics. 
The difference is even more clearly stated by Liszka:  
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Peirce sees semeiotic as supplying leading principles to sciences such as 
general and social psychology and linguistics; it also serves to establish 
criteria by which such investigations can derive good results from the 
employment of signs and shows, in general, the formal character of signs 
as such. So one might say that for Peirce the relation between linguistics 
and semeiotic is one of discipline to methodology, or empirical science to 
formal science, whereas for Saussure the relation is one of general to 
particular discipline. (Liszka, 1996, p. 16) 
 
Saussure had an interest in the general structure of ‗langue‘, and regarded ‗parole‘ as 
different arbitrary manifestations of ‗langue‘. Saussure separates language from external 
reality. Meaning depends on the structure of language and the intra-relationships of 
signifier/signified. We know the meaning of words by its distinction and difference to 
other words, not by its correspondence to objective reality. 
Other key figures related to the structuralist school of semiotics are the Danish linguist 
Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1966) who established the ‗Copenhagen school‘, and is 
associated with ‗glossematics‘ and ‗Prolegomena: A Theory of Language‘, the French 
structuralist Roland Bathes (1915-1980), and the Lithuanian linguist Algirdas Greimas 
(1917-1998), who developed a version of semiotics named generative semiotics.  
Peirce discussed the nature of signs vigorously on several accounts throughout his 
extensive and lifelong work; The French mathematician Robert Marty discovered 75 
sign definitions in the writings of Peirce. These definitions are not fundamentally 
different in nature, but illustrate the continuous development and complexity of Peirce‘s 
semiotic. (Marty, Thellefsen, & Sørensen, 2005).  
Peirce semeiotic is not dedicated to linguistic signs, but is developed from the 
perspective of logic and is connected to the scientific method. To Peirce, linguistic signs 
are important, and are considered the means of oral and written communication; 
however, Peirce‘s mature semeiotic theory is also sensitive to sign processes that take 
place both inside humans and outside human cognition, e.g. in nature.  
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Key figures following the Peircean pragmatic school are the American semiotician 
Charles W. Morris (1901-1979), the Italian poly math Umberto Eco (b. 1932), and the 
American founder of zoosemiotics Thomas Sebeok (1920-2001)
26
. 
4.2 Peirce‘s semeiotic27 
As stated previously, semiotics is a field that consists of different schools and branches 
of theories of applied nature. Peirce‘s conception of semeiotic and consequently his 
definition of a sign, became gradually more sophisticated as his idea of pragmaticism 
developed, and vice versa; however, the basic trichotonomical structure of the sign 
remains largely the same. Yet, it is difficult to formulate a concise, exclusive definition 
of Peirce‘s semeiotic; because the semeiotic theory is closely related to other areas of 
Peirce‘s philosophy.  
Fundamentally a sign consists of three interrelated irreducible parts: a sign, an object 
and an interpretant (CP 2.228).  
Peirce‘s work on semeiotic progressed through different periods of his life, and his 
definition of sign (representamen, sign vehicle, or ground), object and interpretant 
evolved and became gradually more sophisticated and complex. Consequently, Peirce‘s 
theory of semeiotic, can be divided into three main stages: An early phase that 
establishes the basic constituents of the sign structure
28
, an interim stage, where Peirce 
worked on a classification of sign types and a final stage where the object is divided 
into the ‗immediate object‘ and the ‗dynamical object‘. Also, the interpretant is here 
divided into several trichotomies that address different conceptual levels in the 
signification process. One important trichotomy is the division of the interpretant into 
the ‗immediate interpretant‘, the ‗dynamical interpretant‘ and the ‗final interpretant‘ 
(CP 4.536; 8.314-315). The different conceptual levels of the interpretant will be 
addressed in detail in chapter 5. 
Peirce‘s early account of semeiotic suggests the concept of infinite semiosis. A sign 
process is thus always a consequence of a previous sign process, and the interpretant 
will always establish itself as a sign in a successive sign chain.  Also, Peirce‘s early 
account of a sign is considered nominalistic and associated with cognition.  
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An interesting feature of Peirce‘s early account is that he is keen to 
associate signs with cognition. […] We can see this from Peirce‘s early 
idea that every interpretant is itself a further sign of the signified object.  
Since interpretants are the interpreting thoughts we have of signifying 
relations, and these interpreting thoughts are themselves signs, it seems to 
be a straight-forward consequence that all thoughts are signs, or as 
Peirce calls them ―thought-signs‖ (Atkin, 2006) 
 
According to Peirce: 
A sign stands for something to the idea which it produces, or modifies. Or, 
it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for 
which it stands is called its object; that which it conveys, its meaning; and 
the idea to which it gives rise, its interpretant. The object of representation 
can be nothing but a representation of which the first representation is the 
interpretant. But an endless series of representations, each representing 
the one behind it, may be conceived to have an absolute object at its limit. 
The meaning of a representation can be nothing but a representation. In 
fact, it is nothing but the representation itself conceived as stripped of 
irrelevant clothing. But this clothing never can be completely stripped off; 
it is only changed for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite 
regression here. Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another 
representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as 
representation, it has its interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series. 
(CP 1.339) 
 
Peirce‘s first classification of signs consists of three sign types: ‗Icon‘ (or likeness), 
Index‘ and ‗symbol‘. An icon relates to its object by mere quality, an index relates to its 
object by correspondence to fact, and the relation of a symbol is an ‗imputed character‘ 
(CP 1.558). Later (the interim stage), Peirce developed the three types into ten classes 
(see fig. 4:2) of signs, based on three sign trichotomies
29
.  
 
 1 2 3 
1 Qualisign Icon Rhem  
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2 Sinsign  Index  Proposition/dicent sign 
3 Legisign Symbol Argument 
Table 5: The three trichotomies (CP 2.243-52) 
The first trichotomy is concerned with the formal features of the sign, i.e. ―…the 
general conditions of signs being signs‖ (CP 1.444). 
The second trichotomy is concerned with the necessary conditions by which signs can 
say something truthful about the objects they represent (CP 2.229). 
The third trichotomy should be understood as ―the necessary conditions of the 
transmissions of meaning by signs from mind to mind‖ (CP 1.444).  
Peirce named these trichotomies of semeiotic ‗formal grammar‘ (CP 1.559, 4.116, 
8.342), ‗critic‘ (CP 1.191, 2. 92), and ‗formal rhetoric‘ (CP 1.559, 8.342).30  
 
So, whereas semeiotic grammar is the study of what must be true for signs 
qua signs and critical logic is the study of the conditions for the proper 
use of signs, or truth, formal rhetoric is the study for the formal conditions 
under which signs can be communicated, developed, understood, and 
accepted. (Liszka, 1996, p. 11) 
4.2.1 Phaneroscopy 
Peirce named his phenomenology ‗phaneroscopy‘ which is the study of the phaneron 
(the phenemonon), by which Peirce meant: ―the collective total of what is in any or any 
sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or 
not.‖ (CP 1.284) 
 
What I term phaneroscopy is that study which, supported by the direct 
observation of phanerons and generalizing its observations, signalizes 
several very broad classes of phanerons; describes the features of each; 
shows that although they are so inextricably mixed together that no one 
can be isolated, yet it is manifest that their characters are quite disparate; 
then proves, beyond question, that a certain very short list comprises all of 
these broadest categories of phanerons there are; and finally proceeds to 
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the laborious and difficult task of enumerating the principal subdivisions 
of those categories. (CP 1.286) 
 
The elements being studied in Peirce‘s phaneroscopy are indecomposable elements 
exemplified by the most basic categories that according to Peirce are three and only 
three (CP 1.292; 1.418): A first, ‗quality‘; a second, ‗actuality‘; and a third, ‗law‘. 
Examples of monadic qualities are red, bitter, tedious, hard, heartrending and noble, 
which are all qualities of things and events.  
The phaneroscopic categories are thus named: ‗firstness‘, ‗secondness‘, and ‗thirdness‘. 
To Peirce, firstness is latent and vague and is contained in the external world. Firstness 
exists by virtue of itself, sui generis, independent of anything. Firstness is called 
monadic on the basis of this monovalent relation. A pure monad is a quality which in 
itself is without parts, without any features, and, furthermore, it is not embodied. 
Secondness is defined as a dyadic relation between the sign and its object. Peirce‘s dyad 
is defined as follows: ―The dyad is an individual fact, as it existentially is; and it has no 
generality in it. The being of a monadic quality is a mere potentiality, without existence. 
Existence is purely ‗dyadic‘‖ (CP 1.328). The relation is dyadic, that is, something 
‗else‘ exists as a binary entity to something ‗first‘. To a force — a counter force, to will 
— corresponding unwillingness, etc. (CP 1.24). 
The relation between firstness and secondness is dyadic in the sense that the quality in 
itself does not constitute the fact, but is tied to the fact. Thirdness is defined as the 
category of generality, comprehensibility, rationality, and regularity (CP 2.436; 2.332; 
5.536). The concept ‗force of habit‘ (CP 1.299-300) is central to Peirce, thus, he 
considers natural laws as manifestations of habit formation in nature.  
Thirdness is the mediator between firstness and secondness. Thirdness completes the 
triad, and the triad signifies the triadic relation. The triadic sign is thus more than 
merely a binary relation, and the triad is non-reducible. Peirce describes the relationship 
between thirdness on one hand and firstness and secondness on the other hand in the 
following way: 
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By the third, I mean the medium or connecting bond between the absolute 
first and last. The beginning is first, the end second, the middle third. The 
end is second, the means third. The thread of life is a third; the fate that 
snips it, is second. A fork in a road is a third, it supposes three ways; a 
straight road, considered merely as a connection between two places is 
second, but so far as it implies passing through intermediate places it is 
third. (CP 1.337) 
 
Thirdness is thus identical with the Interpretant of the sign (Dinesen, 1994). For a sign 
to mean something there must be some kind of regularity behind. This regularity could 
be a social habit — a reaction to the sign — or the sign could designate some regularity 
in nature. Let me summarize the nature of and relations between firstness, secondness, 
and thirdness with a quotation from Peirce: 
 
First is the conception of being or existing independent of anything else. 
Second is the conception of being relative to, the conception of reaction 
with, something else. Third is the conception of mediation, whereby a first 
and a second are brought into relation… The origin of things, considered 
not as leading to anything, but in itself, contains the idea of First, the end 
of things that of Second, the process of mediating between them that of 
Third…In psychology Feelings in First, Sense of reaction Second, General 
conception Third. …In biology, the idea of arbitrary sporting is First, 
heredity is Second, the process whereby the accidental characters become 
fixed is Third. Chance is First, Law is Second, and the tendency to take 
habits is Third. Mind is First, Matter is Second, Evolution is Third. (CP 
1.32) 
 
In the previous section, Peirce‘s early account of the sign has been addressed, followed 
by the three important basic phaneroscopic categories, namely: firstness, secondness 
and thirdness. In the following section Peirce‘s sign trichotomies and sign classes are 
addressed in further detail.   
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4.2.2 Sign trichonomies 
According to Peirce, a sign implicates the interplay of three constituents; the three 
trichonomies that addresses each of the basic phaneroscopic categories in relation to 
firstness, secondness, and thirdness (see fig. 3:1). Peirce explains:  
 
First, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, 
or is a general law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its 
object consists in the sign‘s having some character in itself, or in some 
existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant; 
thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility 
or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason. (CP 2.243) 
 
The first division of the sign trichonomies is within the category of firstness, which in 
the sign triad is the representamen. It consists of qualisign, sinsign and legisign. The 
qualisign is defined as being a quality of a sign. Before the manifestation of the sign, 
another sign must carry it. Since a quality is — what it is — positive and within itself, a 
quality can only describe an object due to some kind of resemblance or a shared 
element, i.e. a qualisign necessarily has to be an icon, and when a quality is a logic 
possibility, the qualisign can only be interpreted as a sign of being, i.e. as a rheme. An 
example of a qualisign is the experience of red. The color red will, of course, be carried 
by some thing or some event (secondness). 
The following model establishes an overview of the sign types distributed into the 
respective axis of the sign. The model also serves the purpose of connecting the sign 
trichiotomies into sign classes.  
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Figure 4:1. Firstness, secondness and thirdness: The figure shows how the sign types relate to 
firstness, secondness, and thirdness. Each leg in the triangle corresponds to the parts in the sign relation: 
Representamen, object and interpretant. The graph is thus made with firstness closest to the center, 
secondness in the middle, and thirdness farthest away from the center. The figure quoted from (Brier, 
2008, p. 277) 
 
The first class of the sign, starting from the inner circle of the axis of the representamen, 
is 1)
31
 a qualisign (CP 2.254). After the qualisign comes the sinsign. The sinsign is an 
actual thing or event as a sign. The sinsign exists only through its qualities; therefore it 
contains or carriers several qualisigns.  
Sinsigns have the following combinations: 2) an iconic sinsign, 3) a rhematic indexical 
sinsign, and 4) a dicent indexical sinsign (CP 2.255-257). 
The third class in the first trichonomy is the legisign. Peirce defines the legisign as a law 
which is a sign. The lawfulness is defined and determined by the users. That is why the 
legisign is a conventionalized sign. Each conventionalized sign is a legisign, but not 
necessarily the other way around. Peirce states that the Legisign is not a single 
particular object which one has to agree on as being a carrier of meaning, but is a 
general type. We are still within the category of firstness, or the representamen part of 
the triadic sign. 
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Take the letter A as an example of the differences between qualisign, sinsign and 
legisign. The letter A can be interpreted as 1) black strokes (qualisign), 2) a successful 
example of a type in a composing room (sinsign), or representing the class we call ‗the 
letter A‘ (legisign). So the fifth to tenth sign categories are Legisigns: 5) iconic legisign, 
6) rhematic indexical legisign, 7) dicent indexical legisign, 8) rhematic symbol legisign, 
9) dicent symbol, and, finally, 10) an argument (CP 2.258-263).  
The best-known and most used trichonomy is the representamen-object relations: Icon, 
index, and symbol.  
The icon is a sign that shares a resemblance to the object it represents. Common 
examples of iconic signs are photographs, since they resemble the object (i.e. the model) 
they depict. Thus, a photograph is an icon, and sometimes an index, when the 
photograph has a causal relation to the object it depicts.  
Index means reference (to something). This class is constituted of signs which have a 
causal relation to the objects they describe. The sign refers to the object, which it 
describes by virtue of a relationship where the sign is caused by the object, like smoke 
is an index for fire. An index is thus a sign that stands for its object by virtue of a direct 
reference to the object, i.e. footsteps points to the person who walked past.  
A symbol is a sign that refers to its object, which it denotes by virtue of a law. Peirce 
clarifies this by stating that the law is an association of common ideas, it means that the 
symbol will be interpreted as pointing to the object. Thus, a symbol is a sign that has 
meaning solely by virtue of rules and conventions. A sign being conventionalized 
means that among users there is an agreement on the meaning of the sign. Letters, 
words, numbers are such examples of symbolic signs.  
According to Peirce, the symbol is a genuine sign. The relation between the sign and the 
object is sustained solely through the interpretant. ―A Genuine Sign is a Transuasional 
Sign, or Symbol, which is a sign which owes its significant virtue to a character which 
can only be realized by the aid of its Interpretant.‖ (CP 2.92) 
Without the interpretant there is no relation between the sign and the object. It is this 
non-reducible triadic unity which makes the sign genuine.  
The third sign trichonomy – the intepretant - consists of rheme, dicent sign, and 
argument, and constitute the meaning or synthesis of  a sign relation.   
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Rhemes refers to possible objects. As examples of rhemes one can mention nouns, as 
they clearly refer to possible objects. As Umberto Eco claims, signs are the prerequisite 
for lying, since the object does not have to be present at the same moment as the 
representamen. So the objects referred to are only possible.  
Dicent signs are signs of actual existence. For that reason, the dicent sign cannot be an 
icon. The icon does not provide an opportunity of interpretation. In order to describe the 
case, to which they are interpreted as a reference, dicent signs must necessarily contain 
a rheme. Examples of dicent signs are whole sentences, i.e. propositions.  
The argument is a lawsign. An argument represents its object in its capacity of a sign. 
This means that something is being stated about the sign. An example of an argument is 
whole passages of text, i.e. meaningful links of dicent signs, or simply an inference 
based on propositions. 
The category of thirdness has the function of mediation between a first and a second. 
Thirdness is thus distinct from the other categories, in that it relates to the meaning of 
the sign. 
4.2.3 The ten sign classes  
Peirce develops a classification of 10 basic sign classes. The 10 classes of signs are a 
consequence of classes logically excluding each other. A qualisign will always be a 
rhematic iconic sign, and a symbol will always be a legisign, and an argument will 
always be a symbolic legisign, etc. Peirce‘s ten basic classes of sign types are organized 
figure 4:2 and illustrates that two classes, which border on each other with a thin line, 
share similarities in two ways, for example indexical sinsign (3, 4) or (1, 5), that are 
both iconic and rhematic. But where the thick black line divides the classes between 2 
and 6, 6 and 9, 3 and 7, this is not the case, and neither can classes share similarities if 
they do not border on each other. The classes have been given the shortest possible 
names that distinguish them from each other. The names of the classes are in bold. 
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Figure 4:2. Peirce’s ten basic classes of sign types (CP 2:254) 
 
In this way, Peirce manages to conceptualize ten basic different categories of signs. The 
sign classes are defined as thoroughly as they are, because it is my intention to 
underline the interplay between the classes, and to stress the fact that index terms 
contain elements from all the sign classes that are defined through firstness, secondness, 
and thirdness.  
In relation to KO, a subject indicator, as e.g. an index term functions as an interpretant 
and thus resides in the category of thirdness; however, thirdness is defined as the most 
developed sign category - the category for reasoning, representation and mediation. A 
subject indicator will therefore always be a conventionalized term; and, whether it is a 
controlled subject indicator (a descriptor) or not, a subject indicator must be a symbol. 
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A controlled subject indicator, however, is a symbol that is either a lexeme within a 
system of interrelated lexemes, or a numerical code that likewise is part of a systematic 
organization of codes. The meaning expressed by a subject indicator is therefore also 
determined by its relation to other subject indicators. 
A subject indicator thus labels a concept; meaning that an object that falls under a 
concept is labelled by a particular subject indicator. Therefore, a subject indicator also 
has to be a Legisign, because there needs to be some kind of regularity behind an 
expression. Furthermore, a subject indicator would in isolation be a rhem which 
corresponds to a word (or in the case of KOS, term lists). Subject indicators are, 
therefore, in the terms of semeiotic, rhematic symbols (see fig. 4:2 (8)). 
Following this line of thought a bit further, the more developed sign, a dicent symbol, 
would include a general idea, thus rendering the sign with a proposition of some kind. 
The rhematic sign may correspond to the arbitrary sound pattern, the signifier of 
Saussure; however, a dicent symbol includes a signified in relation to an object. In other 
words, a dicent symbol may be defined as meaningful propositions about the world. 
 
A Dicent Symbol, or ordinary Proposition, is a sign connected with its 
object by an association of general ideas, and acting like a Rhematic 
Symbol, except that its intended interpretant represents the Dicent Symbol 
as being, in respect to what it signifies, really affected by its Object, so 
that the existence or law which it calls to mind must be actually connected 
with the indicated Object (CP 2.262).  
 
As we may infer from this quotation, there resides an idea of correspondence in the 
quotation above that the proposition should be connected with the object indicated by 
the proposition. We may thus speak of true and false propositions about objects.  
The argument works through the principles of logic. An argument, thus, includes the 
dicent symbol, and has the function of inference by means of the logical principles of 
induction, deduction and abduction.  
The purpose of this excursion through the basic sign categories is to demonstrate that 
representation is complex and that the indexing process implies these elements of logic. 
Within communication and linguistics the types of signs we address are almost 
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exclusively related to the category of thirdness, the interpretant, but it is important to 
realize that the category of thirdness emerges on the basis of a first and a second. The 
signs that emerge on the basis of the phaneroscopic categories of firstness and 
secondness are presupposed in the category of thirdness. Therefore, an argument, which 
may be regarded as the most developed sign category, includes the Legisign of firstness, 
the symbol of secondness and the ability to connect the sign with its object by means of 
reason, which is the function of thirdness.   
In the above section Peirce‘s concept of sign has been presented, and the various sign 
classes have been addressed; now I will demonstrate how indexing or knowledge 
representation may be related to different types of signs. It is argued that the process of 
indexing necessitates a differentiation of sign classes. 
4.2.4 KOS and sign classes revisited 
Revisiting the taxonomy of Hodge (2000), the different types of KOS may be related to 
their forms of logic. Knowledge organization systems are systems that express different 
levels of semantic relations. The function of the first level semantic system (term lists) 
is to establish a controlled vocabulary of index terms used to state the subject of a 
document.  Furthermore, 
 
The purpose of controlling vocabulary is to avoid authors defining 
meaningless terms, terms which are too broad, or terms which are too 
narrow, and to prevent different authors from misspelling and choosing 
slightly different forms of the same term. (Garshol, 2004, p. 381) 
 
Term lists consequently provides authority control of subject terms, and, thus, 
consistency in indexing. Additionally, 
 
It is common to distinguish between term and concept by saying that the 
former is the name of a concept, and that the same concept may have 
multiple names, and also that the same term may name multiple subjects. 
A controlled vocabulary consists of terms, and not directly of concepts, 
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and in general each term will be disambiguated to refer to a single subject 
(that is, there will be no duplicate terms) (Garshol, 2004, p. 381) 
  
Consequently, the term names a concept, but not the concept as a whole, but a particular 
aspect of that concept. In relation to the sign category of thirdness, term lists establishes 
a connection between a sign (a symbolic rheme) and its object. The ‗Term‘ is the sign 
vehicle; it is a rheme that stands for an object by means of a particular standardized 
subject relation. However, the term is also symbolic because it is based in a 
conventionalized meaning, and a legisign, because any symbol adheres to a general law. 
Considering the sign categories within the context of KOS, a rhematic symbolic legisign 
is a common noun, which names an item. Accordingly, term lists are semantic tools that 
provide lists of common nouns. Term lists consequently relates to the sign category of 
rhematic symbolic legisigns (or just rhematic symbols).   
Peirce writes: 
 
A Rhematic Symbol or Symbolic Rheme [e.g., a common noun] is a sign 
connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way 
that its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to 
certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general 
concept, and the Replica is interpreted as a Sign of an Object that is an 
instance of that concept. (CP 2.261) 
 
Classification and categorization schemes represent a more developed level of KOS. A 
class is thus defined by properties, which determine the class members. Consequently, a 
class implies reasoning between two target areas. For instance, between a particular and 
a general, x is a kind of y, i.e. by defining the particular x as a kind of a general type.  
 
A Dicent Symbol, or ordinary Proposition, is a sign connected with its 
object by an association of general ideas, and acting like a Rhematic 
Symbol, except that its intended interpretant represents the Dicent Symbol 
as being, in respect to what it signifies, really affected by its Object, so 
that the existence or law which it calls to mind must be actually connected 
with the indicated Object. (CP 2.262) 
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The dicent symbol picks aspects of the object according to a particular intended 
interpretant (see table 6). However, an object may be picked according to different laws 
for instance, the subject of a document may be judged differently by different 
classification systems, by different indexers and by different scientific communities.  
Relationship lists are semantic tools that provide for a hierarchical organization of 
concepts and, furthermore, express different types of subject relations between 
concepts.    
 
An Argument is a sign whose interpretant represents its object as being an 
ulterior sign through a law, namely, the law that the passage from all such 
premisses to such conclusions tends to the truth. Manifestly, then, its 
object must be general; that is, the Argument must be a Symbol. As a 
Symbol it must, further, be a Legisign. (CP 2.263) 
 
 
 Phenomenological 
category 
Relation to 
object 
Relation to the 
interpretant 
Semantic 
category 
1. level KOS Legisign  Symbolic Rhematic  common noun 
(words, terms) 
2. level KOS Legisign  Symbolic Dicent  
 
Proposition, 
description, 
assertions 
3. level KOS Legisign  Symbolic Argument  Inference 
(A syllogism) 
Table 6: Three semantic levels of KOS  
 
The argument functions at a more general level than the rhematic symbol and the dicent 
symbol. The argument is speculative, and provides for different kinds of inferences 
between a sign and its object. The argument may consider a sign relation as probable, 
necessary or possible. The probable relation relates to induction, the necessary to 
deduction and the possible to abduction.  
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Accordingly, relationships between a rheme and its object may be provided by means of 
inductive reasoning, i.e. an instance of an object that gives rise to a general idea, i.e. a 
usual interpretant
32
 that is based on previously experienced instances of a particular 
kind. 
The deductive function, which is an aspect of classification and thesaurus systems, is 
expressed by the hierarchical structure that organises classes in sub-classes and terms in 
narrow and broader terms.   
The abductive function provides relations between terms or concepts that are neither 
probable nor necessary, but possible. A possible relation between terms or concepts is 
less strict, but instead associative. In thesaurus systems the function of ‗related term‘ is 
an associative relation that may give rise to new ideas or alternate search strategies.  
4.2.5 Paradigms and concepts 
The meaning of a sign is related to its object. And, as argued by Bhaskar, an object may 
be conceived as either intransitive or transitive, the former addressing the realist claim 
that reality exists independently of a perceiving mind, and the latter, that human social 
activity emerges from the intransitive reality, and produces socially contingent systems 
of knowledge. 
Therefore, we may argue that scientific knowledge about intransitive objects gradually 
evolves in the direction of certainty; however, that may not be the case with transitive 
objects. 
The concept of realism is by no means as simple. Realism is as put by Niiniluoto 
(2002), an overstrained catchword in philosophy that is promoted with divergent and 
more or less exclusive definitions. For example, we may speak of ontological or 
metaphysical, semantical, epistemological, axiological, methodological and even ethical 
realism. And one may be a realist about one of these matters, but anti-realist about 
others. What is meant by the concept of realism, therefore, needs to be explicated 
further.  
The simplest level of explication is the basic realist claim that a mind-independent 
reality exists, no matter what we may think about it. The mountains existed before man, 
and will probably continue to exist interdependently of human perception. However, 
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this kind of argument seems rather obvious, and even declared anti-realists may agree 
that a mind independent reality exist; it is a question of beliefs. Differences emerge 
however when we relate realism to conception or epistemology. We may thus believe 
that a mind independent reality exists, however, we may at the same time believe that 
this mind independent reality, no matter how real we believe it to be,  remains hidden, 
and inarticulate. As argued by proponents of the ‗linguistic turn‘ in philosophy of 
language, perception and cognition are inseparable from language. Language thus 
influences how concepts are formed and how reality is perceived. This insight was what 
Wittgenstein proposed in his ‗Philosophische Untersuchungen‘ (Wittgenstein, 1958). 
Similarly, the concept of objectivism is related to realism, and subjectivism is regarded 
as the logical opposite. However, the distinction between objective and subjective needs 
further explication.   
Firstly, the distinction between objective and subjective is not mutually exclusive. Even 
generals are observed subjectively. E.g., the concept of an intepretant relates to a 
process of interpretation within the sign trichotomy that presumes a mind.  Secondly, 
objectivism is related to realism by claiming that truth is corresponding with facts.  
However, what may be stated as facts may more correctly, according to pragmatic 
philosophy, be thought of as provisional knowledge claims that are revisable by future 
investigations. The experimental fact is thus determined based on what is likely induced  
from observations and leaves room for future experimentation.  
We may also speak of two different kinds of realities, one that is independent of what 
we may think about it (ontological realism), and one that depends on perception and 
social conduct (epistemology). But, if subjectivism takes part in the production of 
knowledge, how is it possible to claim an independent reality, and how do we know it is 
not merely another figment of subjective or even social imagination? Some standard 
common sense answers to this problem are ‗why go around a table if it is merely a 
figment of imagination?‘, or ‘How can certain general laws of nature be discovered if 
they are not real?‘, and ‗if predictions can be grounded in the assumptions of general 
laws of nature, would it not verify the existence of general law and, thus, an objective 
reality?‘ As put by Outhwaite (1987, p. 19), ― Realism is, then, a common-sense 
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ontology, in the sense that it takes seriously the existence of the things, structures and 
mechanisms revealed by the sciences at different levels of reality.‖  
However, knowledge which is based on experience and common sense realism may be 
based on a false ontology. That is why there is an element of belief in science; we must 
be confident that scientific theories produce true or at least provisionary true 
knowledge, otherwise science is a meaningless enterprise. Still, ―This does not mean 
that any theory or explanation is as good as any other; only that there is no 
philosophical concept of Truth which can provide the ultimate seal for a particular 
account‖ (Outhwaite, 1987, p. p. 33). 
Peirceian semeiotic constitutes a theory of reasoning (critic), and the pragmatic maxime 
constitutes a mode of inquiry (methodeutic), (CP 2.191). ―But pragmatism does not 
undertake to say in what the meanings of all signs consist, but merely to lay down a 
method of determining the meanings of intellectual concepts, that is, of those upon 
which reasonings may turn.‖(CP 5.8) 
It is important at this point to point out that for Peirce the pragmatic maxime is a general 
method for ascertaining the meaning and truth of an intellectual conception by 
considering its conceivable consequences, that which may follow logically from the 
conception. Furthermore, for Peirce, the Pragmatic maxime is connected to his concept 
of truth, where truth is that upon which reasoning in the long run may turn.   
Consequently, according to Peirceian philosophy, we should be optimistic about science 
and the outcome of scientific investigations. However, we should also be prepared to 
revise or abandon theories and beliefs if their conceivable consequences turn out to be 
false. The Norwegian Peirce scholar Peter Skagestad summarizes Peirce‘s pragmatic 
realism in the following way: 
 
The real is that which remains confirmed by all investigators in the long 
run, that which forms the object of the final opinion that will be reached 
through the indefinite prolongation of inquiry. Knowledge does not, 
therefore, consist in the subjective feeling of certainty of any individual, 
but in that final and unshakeable consensus which the community of 
investigators reaches when nobody any longer doubts a particular belief. 
(Skagestad, 1981, p. 29) 
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Peirce is a fallibilist: Any belief or conception may turn out to be false, and any 
knowledge claim or belief should be critiqued if we find reason to doubt it.  
There may be affinities between Peirce‘s fallibilism and Popper‘s falsificationism, cf. 
(Chauviré, 2005); both are dedicated to the logic of scientific discovery, Peirce 
promoting a critical common senseism, and Popper a critical rationalism.  Both are 
realists at the ontological level, but differ in their view on the status of induction (Peirce 
claiming that verification is possible in the long run vs. Popper introducing the concept 
of falsificationism: truth can never be verified, only falsified due to the problem of 
induction). 
A parallel to the realism of Peirce may be seen in the contemporary philosophy of 
critical realism. The British philosopher and sociologist, Roy Bhaskar, argues in favor 
of a critical or transcendental realism (Bhaskar, 1978), where reality is conceived in 
three separate domains: 
1. the real (made up of entities, mechanisms etc.) 
2. the actual (made up of events) 
3. the empirical (made up of experience) 
These domains are distinct and resemble Peirce phaneroscopic categories: firstness, 
secondess and thirdness. There is contingency between level 1 and 2, and 2 and 3; 
however a third presupposes a first and a second. In other words; actualization, i.e. 
manifestations of events, is contingent, but dependent on it being possible. Events 
cannot occur without entities or mechanisms performing these events. Human social 
activity cannot occur without a biogenetic life form, and knowledge emerges from 
experience. Knowledge is, thus, emergent properties of human social activity. 
Consequently, knowledge is indirectly about reality, based in social activity, and, 
therefore, we may consider our knowledge to be on the path of increased certainty, or 
else time will show that it rests on false interpretations or knowledge claims. 
Peirce describes the conditions of scientific progress in the following manner: 
 
The only end of science, as such, is to learn the lesson that the universe 
has to teach it. In Induction it simply surrenders itself to the force of facts. 
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But it finds ... that this is not enough. It is driven in desperation to call 
upon its inward sympathy with nature, its instinct for aid, just as we find 
Galileo at the dawn of modern science making his appeal to il lume 
naturale. But in so far as it does this, the solid ground of fact fails it. It 
feels from that moment that its position is only provisional. It must then 
find confirmations or else shift its footing. Even if it does find 
confirmations, they are only partial. It still is not standing upon the 
bedrock of fact. It is walking upon a bog, and can only say, this ground 
seems to hold for the present. Here I will stay till it begins to give way. 
(CP 5.589) 
 
Accordingly, science does not provide objective certain knowledge, but provisionary 
knowledge. The ground which at some point in time seemed solid may give away, and 
one may have to revise the entire knowledge base in order to find a new footing on the 
mushy ground of science.  
There may be, as argued in the previous chapter, some resemblance between Peirce‘s 
fallibilism and Kuhn‘s paradigm theory. According to Kuhn, scientific knowledge is 
organized around a paradigm, which is a socially constructed hegemonic knowledge 
structure that serves the purpose of consolidating what counts as valid knowledge 
within a scientific domain.   
According to Kuhn and Peirce, scientific knowledge is not absolute, but amendable to 
change. But where Kuhn, as agued by Skagestad, sees the change of paradigms as non-
cumulative and, successively, theories within different paradigms as incommensurable, 
Peirce regard science as cumulative (cf. CP 1.157).  
 
… few thinkers familiar with the history of science would deny that 
scientific terms change their meaning through changes in scientific theory. 
What is controversial is only weather such changes are progressive or 
arbitrary. This does not make Peirce‘s position equivalent to Kuhn‘s; 
Peirce held that scientific terms grow more precise through the progress 
of knowledge, hence their changes of meaning have a definite direction, 
that of greater precision. By maintaining, for instance that the term ‗mass‘ 
in Einsteinean physics is incommensurable in meaning with the term 
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‗mass‘ in Newtonian physics, Kuhn appears to deny that meanings change 
in the direction of increased precision, and his conclusions seems to be 
that the meanings of scientific terms change in an essentially arbitrary 
manner which can be asserted only by historical research. (Skagestad, 
1981, p. 127) 
 
This difference pointed out by Skagestad pinpoints the common understanding of the 
difference between Peirce‘s pragmatic realism and Kuhn‘s constructivism. 
Consequently, Kuhn cannot be a realist about concepts or knowledge, because changing 
paradigms are considered incommensurable and changes the meaning of concepts and 
what counts as knowledge within a community. According to Peirce, science does not 
advance by revolutions, but by ―…each researcher‘s taking advantage of his 
predecessor‘s achievements and by his joining his own work in one continuous piece to 
that already done.‖ (CP 1.157) 
In chapter 3, however, it was argued that Peirce and Kuhn may be related under the term 
‗pragmatic pluralism‘. According to this view, a paradigm may be considered what 
Peirce argues as provisional knowledge. The important argument is that Kuhn‘s theory 
of paradigms and their epistemic nature may correspond with Peirce‘s notion of fallible 
knowledge (CP 1.37; 2.142), consequently,  
 
Reality answers our questions and determines the workability of our 
meaning structures, but what answers it gives are partially dependent on 
what questions we ask, and what meaning structures work are partially 
dependent upon the structures we bring  
… 
Consequently, there must be a pragmatic interplay between our concepts 
and actual experience (Rosentahl, 1994, p. 10) 
 
Fallible knowledge may be justified by experience, however, it is relative to what is 
already known, and to theories believed to be true. Knowledge is thus emerges from 
community and collateral experience. Accordingly, Kuhn‘s notion of a paradigm 
resembles Peirce‘s notion of universe of discourse that determines a set of premises and 
methodological possibilities. It sets up a system of knowledge that determines and limits 
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what count as knowledge. However, alternative systems of knowledge may be possible. 
A system of knowledge may be delimited by facts, but facts are never  neutral or 
independent of perspective and the selective knowledge process.  
4.3 Summary 
In this chapter I have provided a short overview of the most important concepts related 
to Peirce‘s semeiotic. It is by no means exhaustive, but sufficient in order to establish a 
basic understanding of how the sign classes are connected and related to the 
phaneroscopic categories: Firstness, secondness and thirdness. This basic understanding 
of semeiotic is prerequisite for the argumentation that follows in the next chapter, which 
has a particular focus on the category of thirdness and the elaboration of the concept 
‗sign displacement‘.  
As described above, Peirce‘s semeiotic theory developed through different stages. First, 
a nominalist stage, that analyzed the function and constituents of the sign from the 
perspective of logic, thus, giving priority to symbols as in formal logic. Later, Peirce 
developed his sign system and established a system of 10 sign types. The addition to the 
previous conception of the sign is its basis in three sign trichotomies, where the 
category of firstness is introduced. A sign is, thus, considered a combination of the three 
trichotomies which creates 10 possible types. I have demonstrated that KOS‘s may be 
analyzed according to the semantic levels that relate to different types of semeiotic 
thirdness.  
In Peirce‘s mature semeiotic, the object is divided into immediate and dynamical object, 
and the interpretant is divided into several trichotomies. In particular, the division of the 
interpretant into the ‗immediate interpretant‘, the ‗dynamical interpretant‘ and the ‗final 
interpretant‘ (see fig. 4:2), is important because it expresses the general level of 
signification and can be elaborated by further trichtomies into a semeiotic theory of 
concepts and communication. Also, it expresses the provisionary relationship that exists 
between a sign and its object. Consequently, a sign cannot represent its object 
absolutely, but only immediately.  
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This insight is important in relation to KOS, because a KOS establishes an immediate 
relation between a user request and an information system. Furthermore, the distinction 
between dynamical and immediate object suggests that the relation between a subject 
representation and the subject itself (the whole concept) is incomplete, but motivated by 
perspective and preunderstanding. 
Finally, the concept of realism was discussed and related to the concept of pragmatic 
pluralism and Kuhn‘s paradigm theory. I have thus, by means of Rosentahl‘s work, 
established a connection between Peirce pragmatism and idea of fallible knowledge, and 
Kuhn‘s theory of paradigms.  
What remains is to investigate the relation between a representation of some kind and 
the meaning attached to it. The relationship between a representation and its meaning is 
thus the focus of the next chapter.  
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5 Thirdness and the concept of sign displacement 
Introduction 
 
This chapter has a particular focus on the function of the interpretant in Peirce‘s 
semeiotic. Three trichotomies of the interpretant are discussed and related to 
‗signification‘, ‗cognition‘, and ‗communication‘. These separate trichotomies of 
interpretants provide for a full spectrum of the signification process. The concept of 
sign displacement is developed and related to the distinction between the immediate 
object and dynamical object, and KOS‘s are considered in relation to communication.  
5.1 Sign displacement 
The concept of sign displacement as a particular understanding of the relation between 
firstness and thirdness was introduced by Torkild Thellefsen in his Ph.D. (2002). The 
concept of sign displacement is here defined as a displacement between nature and 
culture, where nature is considered that which exists independently of intellectual 
concepts, i.e. an ontological ground, and culture is considered the intellectual and 
cultural determination of what counts as knowledge. T. Thellefsen explains: 
 
A sign displacement is the semiotic gap between a Representamen and a 
sign. For a Representamen to become a sign, it must merge with an object 
through an interpretant. A sign only exists as a sign when it contains an 
object and an interpretant. The Representamen does not contain an object 
or an interpretant. A Representamen expresses possibility whereas a sign 
is a concrete interpretation of the Representamen. Therefore, the 
displacement occurs from potentiality to concreteness.(ibid., p. 48) 
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Figur 5:1 Sign displacement (cited from T. Thellefsen 2002, p. 76). 
 
In the terms of Rosentahl (Rosentahl, 1994), the concept of sign displacement may be 
explained by the dialectic relation between ‗reality independent of our thinking‘, 
(metaphysical possibility), and the world that at least partly is a social product 
(epistemic possibility). 
 
Reality independent of our thinking exerts an influence on our ways of 
thinking about it, but what facts and objects it contains is partially 
dependent upon the conceptual framework in terms of which we delineate 
objects and facts within the backdrop of a world. Indeed, according to 
Peirce ―External Fact‖ can change in accordance with the way human 
minds ―feel, think, or suffer.‖ (ibid.,p.  6) 
 
Another way of explaining the concept of sign displacement is by contrasting the 
phenomenological level of signification with the ontological level. As illustrated by the 
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figure 5:2, it is impossible meaningfully to separate the phenomenological and 
ontological level. According to Peirce, phenomenology is concerned with all that is in 
any way or in any sense present to mind. 
 
I will not restrict [phenomenology] to the observation and analysis of 
experience but extend it to describing all the features that are common to 
whatever is experienced or might conceivably be experienced or become 
an object of study in any way direct or indirect (CP 5.37) 
 
The categories of firstness, secondness and thirdnes are fundamental categories of 
nature and thought and, thus, implicated by the phenomenological categories. However, 
firstness may be described as the mode of being, or sheer potentiality, secondness the 
brute facts or particularity, and thirdness successively the possibility of meaning, 
generality and continuity.  
 
 
 
Figure 5:2: The nine types of signs. The figure illustrates the nine types of signs and how they relate. 
The sign types as trichotomies of firstness, secondness and thirdness (the vertical dimension) provides for 
the phemenological dimension of the sign system. The lower horizontal line illustrates the ontological 
type of firstness, secondness and thirdness.  
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At a meta-level the concept of ‗Nature‘ (see fig. 5:1) is understood as the semeiotic 
system related to firstness (qualisign, sinsign, legisign). ‗Nature‘ may be perceived as 
something that has existence by virtue of self-containment and self reference. Nature 
may analytically be understood as the fundamental pool of semiosis that provides for 
the possibility of emerging sign systems of more developed kinds.  
Secondness (icon, index, symbol) may be understood as the semeiotic system related to 
‗Man‘. Man, or any species emerges from firstness, or in more general terms, matter 
grows out of the potential of firstness.  
Thirdness (rheme, dicent sign, argument) may be understood as the semeiotic system 
related to culture. Culture emerges from man, and the interpretant is therefore related to 
cultural activities. Culture is what separate man from beast, by the power of reflection 
and intelligence. Animals are able to produce symbols – however, man is the only 
species capable of producing arguments. (cf. Stjernfelt, 2006)  
The concept of sign displacement relates to the distance between the category of 
firstness and thirdness. ―…nature is being displaced through man as an axis of 
reflection into culture‖ (T.Thellefsen, 2002, p. 82). 
Thirdness enables man to perceive and speculate about nature, and to generate ideas and 
theories about the universe.  
Furthermore, the semeiotic categories of secondness and thirdness emerge from 
firstness. For that reason, ‗Man‘ and ‗Culture‘ develops as autonomous complex and 
even contingent systems not separated, but integrated as a whole. Therefore, we may 
analytically speak of a representamen as a first; though a genuine sign will always 
include a first, a second and a third.  
Thirdness is the semeiotic category of interpretation that provides observations of 
objects with a particular meaning; therefore thirdness is a chief principal in any kind of 
knowledge representation. Discussing knowledge, knowledge systems and their 
manifestations is eventually a matter of thirdness.   
Sowa (1999, p. 61-32) explains the category of thirdness (rhem, dicent sign, argument) 
by the following example: 
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1. An individual can be recognized as a human being or as a subtype, such as man 
or woman, by sensory impressions (Firstness), independent of any external 
relationships. The type label Woman characterizes an individual by properties 
that can be recognized without regard to any relationships or other entities. 
2. The same individual could be classified relative to many other things, as in the 
concept types Mother, Attorney, Wife, Pilot, Employee, or Pedestrian. A 
classification by any of those types depends on an external relationship 
(Secondness) to some other entity, such as a child, husband, airplane, employer, 
or traffic. 
3. Thirdness focuses on the mediation that brings the first and second into relation. 
Motherhood, which comprises the act of giving birth and the subsequent period 
of nurturing, relates the mother and the child. The legal system gives rise to the 
role of attorney and client. Marriage relates the wife and husband. Aviation 
relates the pilot to the airplane. The business enterprise relates the employee to 
the employer. And the activity of walking on a street that is dominated by 
vehicles relates the pedestrian to the ongoing traffic. 
 
We may speak of inherence, causality and community. The rheme (a first of thirds) has 
some inherent qualities or properties that are independent of anything else. The 
semantic label ‗woman‘ is characterized by properties that can be recognized without 
necessary relations to other entities. A woman is a particular that may correspond to the 
intellectual category ‗woman‘, however, the rheme is connected with its object by 
association of general ideas. Therefore, a rheme includes a symbol, and the rhematic 
symbol must be a general and, thus, a legisign. Therefore, the semantic label ‗woman‘ 
has particular properties or qualities that relate the semantic label to a particular idea or 
knowledge of a woman.  
The woman may, however, be a mother, which relates the individual to another. Being a 
mother necessitates a child. Therefore this example shows a dyadic and necessary 
relation between two entities and is therefore a dicent sign (a second of thirds). The 
dicent sign is related to a proposition and is affected by its object. It also relates to facts, 
and thus includes a rhematic symbol.  
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Formally, the argument (a third of thirds) is the conclusion derived from the proposition 
suggested. It follows from the previous sign categories that it must be symbolic because 
it constitutes a synthesis of a rheme and dicent sign, which both are symbolic. 
The synthesis addressed as community
33
, relates the first and second in a third; ―A 
‗something‘ in which a community is contained‖ (Sowa, 1999, p. 61). The concept of 
motherhood relates the mother and the child. A third is irreducible to a second, and a 
second irreducible to a first. Motherhood requires both a woman and a child. Apart from 
the biological perspective, there are also social perspectives that provide norms and 
values about the concept of motherhood. A mother may be defined as a woman giving 
birth to a child; motherhood furthermore includes cultural values. Motherhood is, 
therefore, a general categorization that is defined within a community. In other words, it 
functions as an idealized cognitive model (ICM).  
It is important at this point to consider that the trichotomy of thirdness constitutes a 
whole and the intellectual property of the sign system. The qualities connected to a 
rheme relate to an idea forming a particular class, not to objective essences of 
particulars, as e.g. proposed by Aristotle.  
Peirce was not a classical essentialist, even though he spoke of essences. The essence of 
a class, according to Peirce, relates to the nature of an idea. Peircian essences are of the 
nature of habit, and habits are subjected to evolution and final causation. To Peirce, the 
essence of a class is its defining idea, which is its final cause. By a natural class, Peirce 
means ―a class of which all the members owe their existence as members of the class to 
a common final cause.‖ (CP 1.205). Furthermore, Peirce describes the natural class as:   
 
Every class has its definition, which is an idea; but it is not every class 
where the existence, that is, the occurrence in the universe of its members 
is due to the active causality of the defining idea of the class. That 
circumstance makes the epithet natural particularly appropriate to the 
class. (CP 1.214).  
 
The idea defines a natural class, and the idea of a natural class is shared by the members 
of a universe of discourse. Furthermore, the defining idea of a natural class motivates 
the emergence of a community. The idea contains generative life, spreads, and as Peirce 
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writes in his third Monist article, ―The Law of Mind‖ (1892): the idea ―…tend[s] to 
spread continuously and to affect certain others, but gain[s] generality and become[s] 
welded with other ideas‖ (CP 6.104) Furthermore, also in ―The Law of Mind‖ Peirce 
identifies the following elements of an idea: ―the first is its intrinsic quality as a feeling. 
The second is the energy with which it affects other ideas…The third element is the 
tendency to bring along other ideas with it‖ (CP 6.135). Liszka interprets the spreading 
of ideas in the following way: 
 
The idea of a singular thought, a singular sign, is a fiction; all signs are 
the result of previous ones, each sign has a history, a tradition behind it. 
Sign activity is a process, a semeiosis, governed by the principle of 
synechism or continuity (Lizka, 1996, p. 84) 
 
The continuous development of ideas is a general and fundamental semeiotic principle.  
The Dutch Peirce Scholar Meno Hulsvit summarizes Peirce‘s concept of final cause and 
natural class in the following way:  
 
Peirce‘s view may be summarized as follows: things belong to the same 
natural class on account of a metaphysical essence and a number of class 
characters. The metaphysical essence is a general principle by virtue of 
which the members of the class have a tendency to behave in a specific 
way; this is what Peirce meant by final cause. This finality may be 
expressed in some sort of microstructure. The class characters, which by 
themselves are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for membership 
of a class, are nevertheless concomitant. In the case of a chair, the 
metaphysical essence is the purpose for which chairs are made, while its 
having chair-legs is a class character. The fuzziness of boundary lines 
between natural classes is due to the fuzziness of the class character. 
Natural classes, though very real, do not exist; their reality is of the 
nature of possibility, not of actuality. The primary instances of natural 
classes are the objects of scientific taxonomy, such as elementary particles 
in physics, gold in chemistry, and species in biology, but also man-made 
objects and social classes. (Hulswit, 2002, p. 132) 
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Consequently, by final cause Peirce meant the general principle according to which 
members of a class tend to behave. Classification must be related to a purpose, which is 
its cause. As proposed by Hulswit, Peirce‘s view may be understood as causal 
pluralism.  
 
…by denying that final causes are static, unchangeable entities, Peirce 
avoided the problems attached to classical essentialism […] by 
eliminating arbitrariness, Peirce also avoided pluralistic anarchism. (ibid, 
p. 132) 
 
By denying that final causes are static, and acknowledging the proposition of Hulswit 
that Peirce‘s view may be understood as Peirce‘s causal pluralism, we may consider 
concepts of any kind as the intellectual property of a class.  
The category of thirdness (the category of the interpretant) represents the intellectual 
capacity of relating perceived objects of any kind to general concepts.  
In the next section, I will explain in further detail how the interpretant functions as a 
relative between a sign (representamen) and an object, and how we may argue for 
causal pluralism without giving in to relativism, and how this relates to subject 
representation in KOS.  
5.2 Peirce‘s interpretants revisited 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the interpretant is the most distinctive and 
innovative feature of Peirce semeiotic. The interpretant is what we understand as the 
meaning of the sign/object relation (Atkin, 2006). The sign process starts with the 
object, the object determines the sign. However, as one may imagine, the object in its 
totality includes distinctive features that are more or less relevant for the signification 
process. For instance, ‗a book‘ (representamen) may signify a book (object) by 
particular distinctive features as e.g. being a physical entity containing pages with 
writing, having an author, a title, a publisher etc. Of minor importance for identifying a 
book as a book is for instance its color, genre, type of paper used, its subject, quality of 
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the text etc. These features are, however, also important features of the object. The point 
is that the meaning of a sign depends on relevant features. A sign or a concept reduces 
the complexity of an object by addressing particular relevant characteristics; 
consequently, an object may be multifaceted complex and simultaneously take part in 
different signification processes.   
In Peirce‘s late semeiotic, and as a consequence of the mature scholastic realist Peirce 
developed into, the object is divided into ‗the immediate object‘ and ‗the dynamical 
object‘. The relation corresponds to the example above, the book in its totality 
constitutes the dynamical object – however, the distinctive features that signify the 
object constitutes the immediate object. The immediate object is therefore the object as 
it appears at any point in semiosis, the ‗real object‘, i.e. the dynamical object, is the 
object as it really is. This distinction is important, because the immediate object is 
provisionary and may involve some erroneous interpretations of the dynamical object.   
The interpretant determines the meaning or understanding we reach of a sign/object 
relation. Still, ―… the sign signifies its object only in virtue of some of its features. 
Additionally, the sign determines an interpretant by focusing our understanding on 
certain features of the signifying relation between sign and object.‖ (Atkin, 2006)  
In his later works, Peirce elaborates on the function of the interpretant and three 
trichotomies are of particular interest: Firstly, as stated above, the interpretant is divided 
into ‗the immediate interpretant‘, ‗the dynamical interpretant‘ and ‗the final 
interpretant‘. In ―Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism‖ (1906), Peirce 
describes the interpretants in the following way:  
 
In regard to the Interpretant we have [...] to distinguish, in the first place, 
the Immediate Interpretant, which is the interpretant as it is revealed in 
the right understanding of the Sign itself, and is ordinarily called the 
meaning of the sign; while in the second place, we have to take note of the 
Dynamical Interpretant which is the actual effect which the Sign, as a 
Sign, really determines. Finally there is what I provisionally term the 
Final Interpretant, which refers to the manner in which the Sign tends to 
represent itself to be related to its Object. (CP 4.536) 
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Peirce here describes a distinction of the interpretant at a general level of semiosis, 
which constitutes the formal conditions for the signification process.  
In other words, the immediate interpretant is defined as the total unanalyzed effect that a 
sign produces on a perceiving mind. The immediate interpretant is an abstraction, 
consisting in a possibility. The immediate interpretant of a sign, for instance of a term, 
would be a mind‘s recognition of it as being a term (a rhem). The immediate 
interpretant is ―…all that is explicit in the sign itself apart from its context and 
circumstances of utterance.‖ (CP 5.473).  
The dynamical interpretant is the actual effect produced by a sign on a perceiving mind 
(CP 8.343). It is our understanding of the sign at some instance in the semeiotic process 
(Atkin, 2008). The dynamical interpretant relates to actualization, to events that occur, 
which may provoke physical or mental action. Peirce describes the dynamical 
interpretant as the ―effect actually produced on a mind‖ (CP 8.343), or as the ―actual 
effect which the sign, as a sign, really determines.‖ (CP 4.536) 
The final interpretant is described as ―that which would finally be decided to be the true 
interpretation in consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate 
opinion were reached.‖ (CP 8.184). The final interpretant, then, is our understanding of 
the dynamical object, the end of inquiry, that is, if we had reached a true understanding 
of the dynamic object. Peirce's notion of inquiry is clearly central here. 
Atkin (2008, p. 69), summarizes the elements of the sign and signification in Peirce‘s 
final account of signs as follows: 
 
1. the sign 
2. the dynamical object  
 (the real object as it is known at the end of inquiry) 
3. the immediate object  
 (the object suggested by current understanding, and generated by previous 
 dynamic interpretants) 
4. the immediate interpretant 
 (our general understanding of form, or syntax, of the sign)  
5. the dynamic interpretant 
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 (the actual understanding of the dynamic object at some interim stage in 
 the semeiotic chain/process)  
6.  the final interpretant 
 (the understanding of the dynamic object at the end of inquiry) 
 
 
 
Figure 5:3: The dynamics of the sign: The figure summarises the constituents of the sign. The object 
determines the sign/representamen, and is divided into immediate and dynamical object. The interpretant 
which is the meaning of the sign is divided into immediate, dynamical and final interpretant.  
 
The second trichotomy, that functions at the level of cognition, divides the interptetant 
into ‗the emotional interpretant‘, ‗the energetic interpretant‘ and ‗the logical 
interpretant‘. This trichotomy may be considered as a specification of the dynamical 
interpretant
34
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that the divisions of the interpretant are relatively synonymous or analogous. The 
advantage of Liszka‘s argument is that it is true to the systemacy of firstness, 
secondness and thirdness (see table 7). And as a consequence, we may consider the 
three elaborations of the intepretant as different analogous levels of abstractions.  
 
In all cases [the Interpretant] includes feelings; for there must, at least, be 
a sense of comprehending the meaning of the sign. If it includes more than 
mere feeling, it must evoke some kind of effort. It may include something 
besides, which, for the present, may be vaguely called ―thought‖. I term 
these three kinds of interpretant the ―emotional‖, the ―energetic‖, and the 
―logical interpretants.‖ (EP 2.409) 
 
The emotional interpretant relates to quality, a feeling, the energetic interpretant relates 
to action, and the logical interpretant relates to a proposition.  
 
There is almost always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence 
that we comprehend the proper effect of the sign, although the foundation 
of truth in this is frequently very slight. This "emotional interpretant," as I 
call it, may amount to much more than that feeling of recognition; and in 
some cases, it is the only proper significate effect that the sign produces. 
(CP 5.475) 
 
Peirce uses the example of music to demonstrate the emotional interpretant. The 
emotional interpretant may, however, cause an effect - for instance, listening to music 
may generate associative images, awaken past experiences. The logical intepretant is the 
meaning of the sign.  
 
[The energetic interpretant] never can be the meaning of an intellectual 
concept, since it is a single act, [while] such a concept is of a general 
nature. But what further kind of effect can there be? 
In advance of ascertaining the nature of this effect, it will be convenient to 
adopt a designation for it, and I will call it the logical interpretant, 
without as yet determining whether this term shall extend to anything 
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beside the meaning of a general concept, though certainly closely related 
to that, or not. Shall we say that this effect may be a thought, that is to say, 
a mental sign? No doubt, it may be so; only, if this sign be of an 
intellectual kind -- as it would have to be -- it must itself have a logical 
interpretant; so that it cannot be the ultimate logical interpretant of the 
concept. It can be proved that the only mental effect that can be so 
produced and that is not a sign but is of a general application is a habit-
change; meaning by a habit-change a modification of a person's 
tendencies toward action, resulting from previous experiences or from 
previous exertions of his will or acts, or from a complexus of both kinds of 
cause. It excludes natural dispositions, as the term "habit" does, when it is 
accurately used; but it includes beside associations, what may be called 
"transsociations," or alterations of association, and even includes 
dissociation, which has usually been looked upon by psychologists (I 
believe mistakenly), as of deeply contrary nature to association. (CP 
5.475-6) 
 
Peirce here defines the logical interpretant as the meaning of a general concept. It is an 
intellectual sign, but it is not the ultimate meaning as suggested by the final interpretant. 
Consequently, I consider the logical interpretant the provisionary meaning of 
intellectual concepts. 
A third trichotomy divides the interpretant into ‗the intentional interpretant‘, ‗the 
effectual interpretant‘, and ‗the communicative interpretant‘ (or cominterpretant). The 
third trichotomy relates the interpretant to the process of communication.  
 
There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind 
of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the 
mind of the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the 
Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the 
minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any 
communication should take place. This mind may be colled the commens. 
It consits of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and 
interpreter, at the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its 
function. (SS 196-7) 
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 Firstness  Secondness Thirdness 
Signification Immediate 
interpretant 
Dynamical 
interpretant 
Final interpretant 
Cognition Emotional 
interpretant 
Energetic 
interpretant 
Logical interpretant 
Communication Intentional 
interpretant 
Effectual 
interpretant 
Cominterpretant 
Table 7: Three analytical levels of the interpretant  
 
This elaboration of the sign structure provides for some interesting aspects which is 
relevant for KO. Firstly, the relation between the immediate object and the dynamical 
object suggests that the immediate object expresses a partial understanding of the 
dynamical object. Secondly, where the immediate interpretant is the syntax or general 
feature of a sign, the dynamical interpretant is our understanding of the sign at some 
instance in the sign process. The dynamical interpretant is therefore an actual 
understanding of the dynamical object at some interim stage of inquiry; it provides an 
incomplete understanding of the dynamical object. 
 
Immediate objects, then, are accumulative and inferential, and are 
connected to each other by more than sharing a dynamic object; they 
represent different stages of understanding in the same information 
gathering process. (Atkin, 2008, p. 74) 
 
The final interpretant is the interpretant that will remain unchanged during any further 
investigation and interpretantion. The final interpretant is thus the final understanding of 
the dynamical object at the end of enquiry; consequently, the determination of the 
dynamical object implies a series of dynamical interpretants and immediate objects.  
In relation to KOS‘s, the immediate level of the interpretant, expresses the formal 
structure of the system. We may for instance distinguish term lists from classification 
systems and thesauri. The dynamical interpretant as stated by a subject indicator is the 
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actual but incomplete determination of the dynamic object at some interim stage in the 
semeiotic chain/process, and consequently dynamical interpretants constitute immediate 
objects. The final interpretant would be the stage where the immediate and dynamical 
object becomes one. The final interpretant thus stands for the dynamical object, and at 
the end of enquiry it would be the final meaning of a concept. Within science, the final 
interpretant would be the true relation between sign and object. One may argue that the 
final interpretant is beyond reach because scientific theories are continuously modified. 
Therefore, the final interpretant is rather the telos of the signification process. 
According to Peirce, science develops according to an ideal, which is the final 
interpretant, and, thus, from this perspective, Peirce considers science progressive.  
From the perspective of KOS, the final interpretant would be considered the true 
relation between subject representations and the subject itself as determined by the 
scientific community.  
The division of the interpretant into the trichotomy of immediate, dynamical and final 
interperetant provides a formal and general explanation of the different stages in the 
signification process. The final stage, which is the final interpretant, expresses the telos 
towards which end the signification process may turn at the end of inquiry.  
 
My Final Interpretant is […] the effect the sign would produce upon any 
mind upon which the circumstances should permit it to work out its full 
effect.  
[…] 
…the Final Interpretant is the one Interpretive result to which every 
Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered. […] 
The Final Interpretant is that towards which the actual tends. (SS 110-
111) 
 
The second trichotomy divides the interpretant into the emotional, the energetic and the 
logical interpretant, and is considered from the perspective of an interpreting mind, thus, 
relating the signification process to thought. Consequently, the logical interpretant is the 
meaning of an intellectual concept (CP 5.476; 5.480-6). The meaning of an intellectual 
concept emerges through the stages of the emotional interpretant and the energetic 
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interpretant; within science, it could be an idea, a hunch, that is motivated by an object 
(a phenomenon) that develops and becomes manifest, and eventually becomes fixated in 
a concept which is the logical interpretant. Accordingly, the logical interpretant follows 
the trajectory of the final interpretant that is the ultimate end of discovery. 
Subject representations are logical interpretants. However, subject representations may 
be motivated by other interests than the final interpretant of a particular scientific 
concept. Therefore, the meaning of subject representations may deviate from the 
scientific meaning that is defined and grounded in the scientific community. 
The third division of the interpretant, the trichotomy of intentional, effectual and 
cominterpretant, is considered from the perspective of communication.  
As is the case with the roadmap, a model or representation includes a perspective and a 
purpose. I consider the concept of causal pluralism as mentioned in the previous section 
to apply to that phenomenon. An object may motivate different kinds of representations 
that relate to different purposes. There are many legitimate ways of dividing the world 
into categories and kinds. Accordingly, a classification as suggested by a particular 
KOS unites objects that share a particular resemblance, and scatter unlike objects. 
However, what is like and unlike is not absolute, but relates to the purpose and 
perspective of the classification.  
Because an object can be represented or classified differently by selecting different 
qualities of the object, a subject representation communicates a particular meaning. 
Consequently, concepts that are developed and expressed by terminology within a 
particular community communicate a specified meaning which is unique and 
presuppose a particular specialized knowledge. The function of terminology is to label 
this specialized knowledge. The meaning communicated by a subject representation 
presupposes a deliberate intention. Additionally, an interpreting mind expects a 
particular meaning signified by the representation which of course is based in domain 
knowledge. We may consequently speak of different kinds of interpretants that relate to 
the communication process.  
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5.2.1 The intentional, the effectual and the communicative interpretant 
In relation to communication, and in particular in relation to KOS‘s, the ‗intentional 
interpretant‘, ‗effectual interpretant‘ and ‗communicative interpretant‘ are of interest, 
because they address the communicative relation between an utterer and an interpreter. 
The utter, in the case of a KOS, represents an intended meaning by means of a subject 
representation.  
The meaning of a subject representation consequently depends on what Peirce calls ‗the 
commens‘, or communicative interpretant (or just cominterpretant).  
The cominterpretant is based in collateral experience, meaning, for instance that if an 
utterer communicates a particular concept to an interpreter, the communication process 
will depend on the experience of the interpreter. If the communication is to be a success, 
the utterer and interpreter are required to share the same symbolic system of 
representation, say scientific language, and collateral experiences.  
From the perspective of KOS, we may consider the subject representations of a KOS as 
logical interpretants that reflect a particular structure and meaning of the dynamical 
object.  
Considering the success of a KOS by its ability to establish a cominterpretant (or in LIS 
terms provide relevant documents), thus depends on a match between different sign 
systems.  
A subject representation that is considered an intentional interpretant, stated by a KOS, 
communicates that particular documents fall under a particular subject category, and 
may be described by a particular  subject indicator.  
The effectual interpretant relates to how a perceiving mind understands the meaning of 
a subject indicator.  
The communicative interpretant is the ultimate effect of signification, where the 
intentional meaning and the effect produced in a perceiving mind is identical. The 
communicative interpretant consequently represents the stage in a communicative 
process where an utterer and a perceiver share a common understanding of an object 
communicated by means of a shared terminology. This last statement summarizes the 
major challenges of KOS. 
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5.3 Summary 
The function of the interpretant is to establish a connecting bond between a 
representamen (a sign) and its object. The interpretant is the meaning of the sign 
relation; however, the interpretant also establishes a displacement between a sign and its 
object, because the interpretant is considered the intellectual and-/or habitual property of 
the sign process. Consequently, the relation between a sign and its object is not 
absolute, but motivated by a particular mindset or cultural understanding, and of course 
by the object itself.  
A KOS establishes a connection between a user and a database of document 
representations; however, the subject indicators structured within a KOS may be more 
or less appropriate according to the perspective of users.  
This phenomenon may be explained semeiotically by means of the interpretant. 
According to Peirce, the interpretant can be divided into the immediate interpretant, the 
dynamical interpretant and the final interpretant. The immediate interpretant relates to 
structure, the dynamical interpretant to provisionary meaning, and the final interpretant 
to the final meaning of the sign, at the end of inquiry. However, this division of the 
interpretant constitutes only the formal properties of the signification process.  
A second division of the interpretant, the emotional, the energetic and the logical 
interpretant, relates to the process of cognition, and, accordingly, a concept is 
considered a logical interpretant and is defined as the meaning of an intellectual 
concept. The logical interpretant is in this case the concept as it is formed, discussed and 
understood within a community; its representation in a KOS constitutes a fixation that 
establishes a particular understanding of a concept. However, the subject representation 
provided by a KOS represents an immediate object. This distinction is what is meant by 
sign displacement in KOS. From the perspective of semeiotic, the objects represented 
by KOS‘s are not genuine concepts, but replicas of concepts that interpret a particular 
meaning of a dynamical object which for some users may be considered correct, but 
which may be considered faulty or misleading by other users.  
In this chapter I have explored the function of the interpretant in Peirce‘s semeiotic; I 
have elaborated on the interpretant and discussed it in relation to subject representation, 
Chapter 5: Thirdness and the concept of sign displacement 
 133 
and I have explained how KOS‘s establishes or instantiates a replica of subject 
categories that relate to the dynamical object of a subject, which again is formed and 
developed within communities.  
In the next chapter I will analyze the interoperability of cognitive semantics and 
Peirce‘s semeiotic theory. In chapter 3, cognitive semantics was related to cluster 
analysis and Peirce‘s semeiotic theory to the historical approach. The question remains 
to investigate whether these theories are incommensurable. The historical approach does 
not disregard or exclude clusters, as elements in concepts, but instead of empirical 
qualitative similarity, priority is given to scientific explanations. The historical approach 
may thus explain the occurrence of clusters or graded categories.  
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6 Developing the dynamical communication model 
Introduction 
 
In chapter 3, three philosophical approaches to concept theory was discussed: 
essentialism, cluster analysis and the historical approach. It was argued that cognitive 
semantics, as formulated in (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), is related to 
cluster analysis. However, the concept cluster analysis is, in the terms of (Ereshefsky, 
2001) understood in a broader sense than mere statistical clusters, and includes concepts 
which cannot be defined exclusively by necessary and sufficient properties, as fuzzy 
conceptual categories, prototypes and idealized cognitive models (ICM). It is also stated 
that linguistic phenomena as metaphor and metonymy play an important role in 
communication and representation. The historical approach emphasizes the importance 
of causal relations, and downplays the significance of qualitative similarity. Qualitative 
similarity is important, but causal and genealogical explanations are considered even 
more important.  
Chapter 4 and 5 introduced Peirce‘s semeiotic theory and the concept of sign 
displacement. Sign displacement is considered an interpretive distance made by the 
interpretant that goes between nature and our understanding of nature. In this 
perspective, reality cannot be perceived neutrally or objectively, but only mediated, and 
understanding is thus influenced by perceptive abilities, theories and pre-understanding.  
In this chapter, the cognitive semantic approach is revisited and analyzed from the 
perspective of semeiotic theory. The ideas of ICM, basic level concepts, metaphors and 
metonymy are important reasoning mechanisms, and, as suggested by Lakoff, these 
reasoning mechanisms form central parts of human cognitive capacity.  Even though 
Lakoff argues in favor of experiential realism, reality can only be perceived by means of 
these reasoning capacities, which additionally are biased by language, culture, pre-
understanding and interests. These cognitive mechanisms and social circumstances are 
not disregarded by Peirce‘s semeiotic theory; however, Lakoff seems to reproduce a 
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dualism (even though Lakoff rejects Cartesian dualist metaphysics!) between reality and 
perceived reality, or, more precisely, by arguing that our knowledge about reality is 
motivated by external reality, but also distanced from it. Concepts and categories are 
embodied and, in other words, the knowledge about the world is rooted in experience.  
Peirce metaphysics argues in favor of a dialectic relation between reality and perceived 
world. What provides the perceived world with a telos is the independent reality, and 
our knowledge may be biased by cognition, pre-understanding, culture, theories, etc., 
however ideally reality corrects our knowledge about it in the long run. Lakoff‘s 
concept of reality may thus seem incompatible with Peirce‘s metaphysics; however, the 
functions of basic level categorization, metaphor and ICM may also be seen as 
processes of signification, and related to the interpretant. 
The discussion of cognitive semantics and semeiotic theory leads to the development of 
the concept ‗significance effect‘. Significance effect is thus considered an effect of 
meaning, where concepts at a basic level provide for the most inclusive level of 
understanding about category members. The concept of significance effect is developed 
further and eventually seen within the context of communication, and the 
communication model, ‗the Dynacom‘, is proposed as a semeiotic communication 
model joining together the notion of basic level categorization, metaphor and ICM, at 
the level of the interpretant.   
6.1 Cognitive semantics and semeiotic theory – can they work together? 
As proposed by Lakoff, cognitive semantics provides for an alternative view on human 
cognition and language formation. It is anti-reductionistic, it opposes the strict 
formalization of cognitive science, and it is, furthermore, pragmatic in the sense that 
concepts are situated and purposeful. Additionally, cognitive semantics relates concepts, 
categories and meaning making to the embodied mind. Any kind of knowledge relates 
to the human capacity of sensing and categorization. Categorization is thus considered a 
cognitive pre-linguistic ability that provide for a particular kind of organization. 
However, actualizations of categories are culture-dependent. As discussed above, the 
concepts ‗bachelor‘ and ‗mother‘ are highly culture-sensitive concepts. Scientific 
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concepts are similarly dependent on context and use. They may be organized around a 
basic level category, and express a particular ICM that may be organized around a 
prototype, see   (Bryant, 2000; Kertesz, 2004; Temmerman, 2000).  
Cognitive semantics thus argues fiercely against objectivist philosophies of 
categorization. Concepts do not comprise to a fixed set of necessary and sufficient 
conditions, and involves more than matching a list of attributes. Lakoff speaks of 
embodied realism, instead of disembodied or neutral realism, in terms of absolute truth, 
and, most importantly, Lacoff‘s critique dismisses logic and mathematics as neural and 
disembodied modes of reasoning (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). 
Embodied realism believes that 1) there is a world independent of our understanding of 
it, and 2) we can have stabile knowledge of it. However, our concepts and reasoning 
and, thus, knowledge about the world are characterized by our brains and bodies 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1999).  
As discussed within the semiotic section, Peirce‘s semeiotic theory is derived from 
logic. Logic is the governing principle of Peirce‘s semeiotic categories, and thus seems 
incompatible with cognitive semantics that reject traditional logic and objectivist 
rationality as appropriate tools for linguistic analysis. However, even Lakoff needs logic 
in order to establish distinctions between categories, even if categories are graded - how 
is membership confirmed if not by some kind of fuzzy logic? Lakoff‘s critique against 
logic relates to essentialism and absolute truth.  
As is the case with Lakoff, Peirce emphasizes the importance of community in which 
meaning of language becomes fixed and gradually more stabile.  
Furthermore, both Lakoff and Peirce would agree that the meaning of any linguistic 
sign can only be fully understood in terms of how it is meaningful in practice.  
Lakoff claims that cognitive semantics is in accordance with basic realism, which he 
describes by the following statements: 
 
Basic realism involves at least the following: 
a commitment to the existence of a real world, both external to human 
beings and including the reality of human experience 
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a link of some sort between human conceptual systems and other aspects 
of reality 
a conception to truth that is not merely based on internal coherence  
a commitment to the existence of stable knowledge of the external world 
a rejection of the view that ―anything goes‖ – that any conceptual system 
is as good as any other. 
(Lakoff, 1987, p. 158) 
 
Lakoff claims his position to be experientialist, based on the cognitive capacities 
described above, and thus incompatible with any metaphysics that provide a strict 
dualism between human understanding and the nature of the world.   
Furthermore, categorization is a cognitive capacity that is part of human nature: Even 
though categories may be in accordance with the classic view, they exist along with 
prototype categories, and both are products of human mind and important for cognition. 
However: 
 
To say that classical categories are an invention (an important invention) 
of the human mind is not to say that no classical categories really exist. 
Certainly it is possible to create artificial categories of things to fit our 
cognitive models. It may even be the case that some classical categories 
do exist in nature. The point is that not all categories – either of mind or 
of nature – are classical, and therefore we cannot assume, a priori, as 
objectivist metaphysics does, that all of nature is structured by classical 
categories. (Lakoff, 1987, p. 160) 
  
Lakoff argues against objectivist metaphysics - concepts are cognitive models that may 
fit reality, but we have no way of determining whether our concepts actually correspond 
to some natural kind. The only access to nature is by experience, and our cognitive 
models are thus motivated by experience and modified by human cognitive ability, 
social and cultural habits, and language.  
As described by Lakoff, the ICM is based in culture, particular concepts as e.g. 
‗Mother‘ and ‗Bachelor‘ may be understood and defined differently in different 
cultures. Different cultures may emphasize diverse values when describing concepts, 
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and therefore an ICM correspond to a culture contingent reality. As pointed out by 
Lakoff, the ICM is a concept in actu, the meaning of an ICM relates to its use within 
culture. Furthermore, an ICM may organize categories according to a prototype, i.e. 
family resemblance.  
Even though Peirce never discusses graded categories, the Icon may provide for this 
kind of reasoning. The Iconic relation between a sign and an object is related by means 
of similarity. This similarity may be abductive, metaphorical and possible, but not 
necessarily probable or true. We may thus argue that the members within prototypical 
categories are related by means of Icons. Essentialist categorization determined by 
necessary and sufficient conditions is on the other hand based on inductive and 
deductive logic which resemble the indexical mode of reasoning. 
In summary, we may argue that Peirce and Lakoff share similarities regarding rejecting 
absolutism and Cartesian metaphysics. Also, both cognitive semantics and pragmatic 
semeiotic emphasize the importance of social and cultural activity. They differ with 
regard to their claims of realism. Experiential realism, or embodied realism, as claimed 
by Lakoff (1987), agrees with traditional dominant views that are committed to the 
existence of a real world, that recognizes that the real world restrains our conception of 
it, that truth is conceived as something that goes beyond mere internal coherence, and 
that acknowledges the existence of stabile knowledge of the external world. However, 
experiential realism holds, in contrast to the dominant traditional views, that human 
reasoning is only possible by means of the body, and that reasoning grows out of the 
nature of the organism and that all this contributes to its individual and collective 
functioning. 
 
Experientialism is thus defined in contrast to objectivism, which holds that 
the characteristics of the organism have nothing essential to do with 
concepts or with the nature of reason. On the objectivist view, human 
reason is just a limited form of transcendental reason. The only roles 
accorded to the body are (a) to provide access to abstract concepts (b) to 
provide ―wetware,‖ that is, a biological means of mimicking patterns of 
transcendental reason, and (c) to place limitations on possible concepts 
and forms of reason. On the experientialist view, reason is made possible 
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by the body – that includes abstract and creative reason, as well as 
reasoning about concrete things. Human reason is not an instantiation of 
transcendental reason; it grows out of the nature of the organism and all 
that contributes to its individual and collective experience: its genetic 
inheritance, the nature of the environment it lives in, the way it functions 
in that environment, the nature of its social functions, and the like. (Lakoff, 
1987, p. xv) 
 
According to Lakoff & Johnson (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999), truth depends on 
understanding, which means that truth related to embodiment is never objective and 
absolute, but is not subjective either, but relative to the function of general human 
perception. ―Because we all have pretty much the same embodied basic-level and 
spatial-relations concepts, there will be an enormous range of shared ―truths,‖ as in 
such clear cases as when the cat is or isn‘t on the mat.‖ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 
107) 
Peirce‘s realism is closely related to his pragmatic maxim and is therefore often referred 
to as pragmatic realism cf. (Skagestad, 1981). Also, Peirce‘s conception of realism is 
dynamic. The object of a sign can never be fully exhausted by the interpretant, but only 
aproximated by means of immediate objects.  
 
We must distinguish between the Immediate Object, -- i.e. the Object as 
represented in the sign, -- and the Real (no, because perhaps the Object is 
altogether fictive, I must choose a different term, therefore), say rather the 
Dynamical Object, which, from the nature of things, the Sign cannot 
express, which it can only indicate and leave the interpreter to find out by 
collateral experience (CP 8.314) 
 
As a consequence, reality may be approximated by means of inquiry (the pragmatic 
maxim), however, never fully reached.  
Peirce‘s semeiotic theory provides for a deeper and more comprehensive theory of 
cognition than Lakoff‘s. An important achievement of Lakoff is that he addresses the 
function and interdependencies of language and cognition in a very direct manner. 
However, the basic realism or experientalism suggested by Lakoff has a tendency 
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towards a kind of subjective empiricism (Mammen, 1994). How would Lakoff explain 
generality and continuity? 
According to Michael Haley:  
 
A genuine communion of thoughts and feelings between different minds 
(and not just between human minds, either!) is not only possible but is 
actually reliable because of the inherently analogical structure of thought 
and feeling. It is not that I can ever know for sure that my own 
visual/mental experience of ‗red‘ is exactly like yours; but what I can 
know, if I can know anything at all, is that ‗red‘ must occupy in your 
visual/mental experience a place that is reliably analogous to the place it 
occupies in mine. Note that Peirce even extends the confidence he has in 
such analogies to one form of metaphor – synesthesia (the blind man‘s 
imagination of ‗red‘ as ‗the blare of a trumpet‘). More than anything else, 
however, what makes such analogies between different mental experiences 
reliable is their groundedness in a larger analogy – the cognitively 
foundational analogy between the human mind and external nature. In 
short, to whatever extend we really are capable of understanding nature, 
it is only because our minds are like nature. And it is only within the 
context of this large likeness that we are capable of understanding 
ourselves and one another – which includes expressions of our thoughts 
and feelings to one another through poetry, music, and ordinary 
conceptual metaphor.  (Haley, 1997, p. 434) 
 
In other words, our concepts and categories are motivated by the same external nature 
that we as human beings ourselves are a part of. Consequently the structure of external 
nature is analogue to the structure of mind, which may explain why we can 
communicate confidently and agree about external objects.  
Therefore, the dualism between nature and our understanding of nature reproduced 
(even though he argues against it) by Lakoff, is nullified by Peirce‘s analogy. External 
space and mind-space ultimately belong to one and the same continuum (Haley, 1997).  
For Peirce, image schemata are important for any language. Any language would need 
temporal relations, spatial relation (Lakoff‘s container metaphor and kinesthetic 
scheme) and metaphor.  
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If a logician had to construct a language de novo--which he actually has 
almost to do--he would naturally say, I shall need prepositions to express 
the temporal relations of before, after, and at the same time with, I shall 
need prepositions to express the spatial relations of adjoining, containing, 
touching, of in range with, of near to, far from, of to the right of, to the left 
of, above, below, before, behind, and I shall need prepositions to express 
motions into and out of these situations. For the rest, I can manage with 
metaphors. (CP 2.290 footnote P1) 
 
According to Peirce, the metaphor is the cognitive ability to unite different conceptual 
expressions into new expressive forms. It resembles the metaphor of Lakoff, and is 
considered, as indicated by the quotation above, an important cognitive mechanism.  
Metaphor is not just a rhetorical trope; it is a fundamental conceptual or cognitive 
mechanism, and furthermore: 
 
… metaphor goes beyond human language… in expressing and embodying 
relationships that are fundamental to human thought and consciousness. 
(Haley, 1997, p. 422) 
 
And,  
 
Metaphor […] embodies a peculiar sort of relationship between things; 
namely, it involves understanding one thing in terms of another thing of a 
different kind. (ibid, p. 422-423) 
 
However, a difference between Peirce and Lakoff may be identified in how they relate 
metaphors to embodiment. Even though Lakoff defines his epistemology as experiental 
realism, it is primarily related to culture. Even though Lakoff defines the mechanisms of 
cognition as pre-linguistic, language is formed by culture and related to a 
conventionalized use. The metaphor is for instance related to the kinesthetic scheme, 
and whether the feeling of happiness relates to ‗up‘ or ‗deep‘ which are metaphorical 
opposites, is culturally motivated.  
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Peirce defines his understanding of the metaphor as a hypericon. 
 
Hypoicons may be roughly divided according to the mode of Firstness of 
which they partake. Those which partake of simple qualities, or First 
Firstnesses, are images; those which represent the relations, mainly 
dyadic, or so regarded, of the parts of one thing by analogous relations in 
their own parts, are diagrams; those which represent the representative 
character of a representamen by representing a parallelism in something 
else, are metaphors. (CP 2.277) 
 
The metaphor as a cognitive mechanism is based on structural analogy. Furthermore, 
the metaphor is related to the logic of abduction, thus, providing for the ability to 
generate new insights by means of parallelism. The metaphor may thus be understood 
as a possible relation of new meaning.  
 
The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. It is an act of insight, 
although of extremely fallible insight. It is true that the different elements 
of the hypothesis were in our minds before; but it is the idea of putting 
together what we had never before dreamed of putting together which 
flashes the new suggestion before our contemplation. (CP 5.181)  
 
Even though Peirce did not provide for a comprehensive theory of metaphor, it is 
obvious that the idea of metaphorical reasoning is related to the logic of abduction 
because it blends different cognitive schemes and provides for new insights. 
However, unlike Lakoff, an apparent consequence that may be deduced from Peirce is 
that the metaphor is not just a cultural or socially contingent phenomena, it is rather a 
mechanism that stands in relation to an external Mind. Consequently, the metaphor may 
reveal real and true structural affinities between an object and the interpretant. Scientific 
concepts may reflect reality because there is a structural analogy between the categories 
of the mind of the subject and the categories of reality. Peirce thus believes that true 
knowledge is possible in the long run.  
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…human opinion universally tends in the long run to a definite form, 
which is the truth. Let any human being have enough information and 
exert enough thought upon any question, and the result will be that he will 
arrive at a certain definite conclusion, which is the same that any other 
mind will reach under sufficiently favorable circumstances. [---] There is, 
then, to every question a true answer, a final conclusion, to which the 
opinion of every man is constantly gravitating. He may for a time recede 
from it, but give him more experience and time for consideration, and he 
will finally approach it. The individual may not live to reach the truth; 
there is a residuum of error in every individual's opinions. No matter; it 
remains that there is a definite opinion to which the mind of man is, on the 
whole and in the long run, tending. (CP 8.12) 
 
This line of thought is different from Lakoff‘s cognitive semantics. Theoretically, 
Lakoff remains within the realm of cultural relativism. According to Lakoff, concepts 
and the meaning they provide, are embodied, language dependent and formed by 
culture.  
Lakoff claims experiental realism, and ties this to the cognitive abilities of Man; the 
meaning of language and categorization simply resides in embodied experience. There 
exists no objective, disembodied truth, thus, the world is not mirrored by language.  
 
Experientialism is Lakoff's basis for rejecting the doctrine of 
'metaphysical realism' ([Laskoff],p. 260), in which reality is independent 
of human embodiment; on the other hand, the 'realism' component rescues 
him from the solipsism of 'total relativism'. (Edwards, 1991, p. 531) 
 
Peirce would argee that experience and culture matters, as he formulated as the first of 
his cotary propositions: ―Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.‖ (CP 
5.181) However, Peirce considers reality independent of human cognition. What is real 
is not a matter of human thought; human thought is contrarily analogous to reality, and 
correctible by future experiences. Even though we may speak of structural affinities 
between a sign and an object, it is only by means of interpretation – the function of the 
interpretant – that this relation is maintained.  
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In short, to whatever extent we really are capable to understand nature, it 
is only because our minds really are like nature. And it is only within the 
context of this large likeness that we are capable of understanding 
ourselves and one another – which clearly includes the expression of our 
thoughts and feelings to one another through poetry, music, and ordinary 
conceptual metaphor. (Haley, 1997, p. 435) 
 
Seeing mind and reality as structurally bounded and analogous, refutes the dichotomy 
between external reality and perceived reality.  
Lakoff‘s concept of embodiment places the focus on human perceptive abilities, and, as 
a consequence, concepts and knowledge about reality are biased by our senses and the 
modus operandi of the body. In Lakoff‘s terms, knowledge will therefore always be 
circumstantial and relative to embodiment and culture.   
Peirce would on the other hand argue that the structural affinity between reality and 
mind means that knowledge, however provisionary it may be, also includes the 
possibility of being relatively stable and true.  
From this analysis, Lakoff‘s cognitive semantics is more related to constructivist 
theories than realist theories and Peirce vice versa. In other words, in Lakoff‘s terms, 
reality is constructed by human perception. It may be independent of human thought, 
but our understanding of reality goes though embodied reasoning. In Peirce‘s terms 
Man is nature, and the thought of man is analogous to the thought of nature. Our 
knowledge about reality is mediated by signs, and signs are based in the 
phenomenological categories of firstness (potentiality), secondness (actuality) and 
thirdness (continuity).  
I will not take this discussion any further, but just summarize that the realism claimed 
by Peirce and Lakoff is fundamentally different, and regarding the status or truth value 
of concepts and knowledge their views are incompatible. However, from the perspective 
of semeiotic there are some interesting aspects involved in Lakoff‘s notion of basic 
level categorization, metaphor and ICM. This will be the area of discussion in the next 
section. 
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6.2 Stating the concept of significance-effect 
Based on the theoretical discussion above, concepts can be considered more or less 
significant within a community. Apparently important concepts such as ‗information‘, 
‗knowledge‘ and ‗media‘ are highly significant concepts within the field of LIS, and the 
approach toward these significant concepts differs from other domains that may define 
the same concept in a different context with different perspectives and meanings.  
As discussed above, concepts are context dependent, and may, even though related, 
demarcate a particular disciplinary interest which is of minor interest within other 
disciplines.  
Basic level categorization provides for a hierarchical organization within categories. A 
‗chair‘ is considered a basic level category, where ‗furniture‘ is more inclusive and thus 
a superordinate category and ‗rocking chair‘ is a more specific category of chairs, and 
thus a subordinate category. In section 3.2.1 basic level categorization was reviewed 
and it was argued that even though basic level categorization is connected to experience, 
abstract concepts may follow a similar mode of categorization.   
 
Superordinate level Knowledge  Information Text 
Basic level Knowledge 
organization 
Media Document 
Subordinate level Different kinds of 
representation 
systems 
Different kinds of 
media products 
Different kinds of 
documents, types, 
genres etc.  
Table 8: Examples of basic level categorization within LIS concepts 
 
Table 8 provides for some examples of basic level categorization within LIS, however, 
these examples are also very general, and, it may be difficult to establish the same 
structuring principles at a more advanced level, at least with reference to Lakoff‘s 
definition of basic level (see p. 65-66). It seems meaningless to argue that ‗bibliometry‘ 
and ‗information architecture‘ are basic level concepts. Of course we may relate 
‗bibliometry‘ to ‗empirical methods‘ and ‗statistics‘, we may also be able to exemplify 
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subordinate levels of the concept, e.g.: ‗co-citation analysis‘, ‗bibliographical coupling‘, 
etc., however what becomes evident is that the definitions provided by such abstract 
concepts depends on acquired knowledge, and is cannot alone be reduced to a simple 
matter of ostentation, mental images and motor movements.  
When speaking of abstract concepts, and in particular technical terms, categorization 
therefore depends on what is already known by the interpreter (in semeiotic terms: 
collateral experience).  Even though Lakoff‘s definition works well when speaking of 
actual objects as e.g. furniture or cats and dogs, when related to abstract concepts the 
definition needs to be modified.  
In relation to metaphor, I provided some examples of metaphors in section 3.2.5, 
metaphor is a cognitive mechanism that structures a particular understanding of an 
expression. Metaphors are paramount also in technical language, and functions as a 
delimitation of a cognitive space (universe of discourse). A metaphor is a parallelism 
that transfer meaning between to unrelated domains, thus motivating new perspectives 
and modes of reasoning. In semeiotic, the metaphor is related to the icon and abduction. 
The ICM determines the schematic structure of a category. Knowledge about reality is, 
thus, organized by mental models and our experience of the external world. ICMs may 
provide for graded or prototypical categories and cluster categories (see section 3.2.6).  
The meaning of an ICM is relative to culture. Its meaning depends on context and use 
within a cultural environment. The same applies for scholarly communities. ICMs, as 
e.g. exemplified by Temmerman (2000) and (Bryant, 2000), also exist in scientific 
communities, and depends on theoretical and paradigmatic commitments.  
The concept of significance-effect is related to basic-level categorization, however by 
providing a semeiotic perspective, significance-effect is defined by the following 
implications: 
 
Significance-effect: (following the definition formulated in (Thellefsen, et al., 
2003))
35
 
 Relates to a basic level of cognition where we organize most of our knowledge. 
Within a knowledge domain this is an important implication that provides for a 
hierarchical orientation within the concept space  
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 Organizes the domain knowledge. 
 Express a ‗force of habit‘, either social or natural. 
 Relates to the logical interpretant. 
 Possess an immense source of references (universe of discourse). 
 Submit general but domain-specific information to the user (collateral 
experience). 
 
Within a particular community, core concepts are considered significant because they 
address a particular, specified meaning and motivate a particular line of thought. 
Concepts have an effect because significant concepts tend to influence how objects are 
perceived. Furthermore, the conceptual level the significance-effect may indicate the 
most inclusive level of information about category members, thus following the same 
structure as basic level categorization.  
The concept of ‗banking‘ thus stimulates a particular line of thought which is related to 
finance and investment.  
LIS concepts as ‗documents‘ and ‗KOS‘ stimulate a particular professional line of 
thought that includes objects and processes related to indexing of documents. We may, 
thus speak of indexing systems and documents at a very general level, and still be able 
to communicate a particular activity.  
The concept of significance-effect resembles the concept of basic level effect in its 
ability to establish an inclusive and general level for concepts, a mid-level that 
establishes communicative economy. However, significance-effect re-contextualizes 
basic level categorization within the framework of pragmatic semeiotic. According to 
Lakoff, the basic level categorization is connected to the cognitive competencies of man 
and is relative to culture. It is a concept that is based in cognitive psychology and 
establishes a critique of traditional Aristotelian categorization. From the perspective of 
semeiotic significance-effect is an effect of meaning that relates to an object by means 
of an icon (similarity) and index (necessity), or a symbol (convention). The ability to 
decode the significance-effect of a technical term, relate to what is already known about 
the object. The more knowledge that is possessed by the interpreter, the more 
knowledge is communicated by the term.  
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The purpose of figure 6:1 is to illustrate the relation between concepts, the symbol 
representing objects and their meaning at a particular point in time. An idea (a concept) 
has a tendency to bring other ideas about, and consequently, contribute to the 
development of new concepts. A concept may, therefore, at one point in time have a 
particular definition, and at later point have altered or transformed into a new meaning.  
As shown by Temmerman (2000), there is empirical evidence that shows that categories 
at one point in time defined exclusively have altered their meaning and have become 
more fuzzy and polycentric or radially structured. This indicates that concepts and 
categories are formed within communities, and their meaning is determined by how 
they are used, for what purpose they are defined and by their underlying theoretical 
commitments.  
 
 
Figure 6:1: The timeline of concept representation 
 
The sign that signifies or stands for a conventionalized meaning within a community 
may therefore be defined as symbols. In semeiotic terms, all conventionalized signs are 
symbols. Terminologies are examples of highly conventionalized symbols that names a 
particular concept. However, concepts may transform and develop into new meanings, 
but still be signified by the same linguistic symbol. Therefore, concepts include a 
historical dimension that influences their meaning. New meanings may be attributed by 
means of metaphors that blend non-related concepts and provide for new insights.  
Time
Particular 
convensionalized meaning 
at a certain point in time
Concept 
representation
Object represented by 
convensionalized 
symbol
Particular 
convensionalized meaning 
at a certain point in time
Contept 
representation
Object represented by 
convensionalized 
symbol
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Within the field of LIS, the development of information technology has altered or added 
new information to the definition of key concepts. The meaning of a document has been 
supplemented by electronic media; the Internet has pushed forward a reconsideration of 
basic library services. Metaphorical buzzwords such as ‗blogging‘ and ‗social‘ or 
‗collaborative tagging‘ has entered the vocabulary of LIS, and is now regarded as 
particular kinds of Internet based and uncontrolled KOS (Macgregor & McCulloch, 
2006). The point is that changes in the surrounding habitat, motivates changes in 
concepts.   
6.3 Significance-effect and knowledge domains 
The following section addresses and specifies how we may distinguish knowledge and 
knowledge domains as socially organized sign systems. 
Generally, a distinction is made between natural science and human science (humanities 
and social sciences), and the kind of knowledge produced in these contexts.  
In the natural sciences, knowledge is associated with truth and objectivity, and is 
connected with the hypothetic deductive method. Scientific knowledge within natural 
science is therefore related to evidence and proof provided by experiments and tests. 
The human sciences tend to have a more differentiated and somewhat more relative 
view about knowledge. Within human sciences the objects of investigation are different 
from the objects studied in natural science. A common statement is that the physicist 
studies nature, not books; the historicist studies literary sources. Within the social 
sciences the objects of investigation may be human social interaction and institutions 
within in society. These objects are made by man and are therefore influenced by 
culture, social processes and human conduct. 
However, a knowledge domain is not necessary tied to a profession. A knowledge 
domain is rather tied to a specific context, i.e. a community that maintains and sanctions 
certain activities. Therefore, within the domain of science, research must adhere to the 
conventions of the domain in order to be accepted by fellow researchers. Within the 
domain of a private household other rules for acceptable behavior is prevalent.   
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Knowledge, and what count as knowledge is thus first and foremost dependent on the 
regularities that are sanctioned by a community.  
Therefore, in order to consider what count as knowledge in a knowledge domain it is 
imperative to relate knowledge to: 
 
 Communication: by what means knowledge is communicated within a 
community. 
 Stability: how knowledge creates stabile structures of concepts and terminology 
that enables successful communication. 
 Concepts:  concepts and concept relations are important elements in a 
knowledge domain. Concepts create distinctions and unite and separate objects 
within a community.   
 Terminology: how the conceptual structures of a knowledge domain may be 
addressed and maintained by means of highly conventionalized linguistic signs.  
6.3.1 The dynamical communication model – The Dynacom 
Relating knowledge to communication has some important consequences. Firstly, 
knowledge is an act performed by a communicator with intent and purpose.  
Secondly, communication takes place by means of signs and sign systems, which may 
be of written, oral or schematic types.  
Thirdly, knowledge in order to be communicated, must adhere to a familiar (or general) 
knowledge base. This knowledge base may be addressed as the collateral experience of 
the community.  
Fourthly, in order for the communication to be meaningful, the communication must 
relate to a common ground or community, a universe of discourse that frames the basic 
theoretical assumptions of the community.   
Figure 6:2 illustrates a communication model based in the triadic model, placing 
collateral experience and the universe of discourse as implicit parts of the interpretants.  
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Figure 6:2: The Dynacom model. The model was published in (Thellefsen, et al., 2006)  
 
The communication model illustrates how the significance-effect emerges as an effect 
caused by a meaning intentionally communicated by an utterer.  
The communication model consists of a triad of interpretants; the intentional 
interpretant should therefore be understood as the sender of a message. The effectual 
interpretant represents the occurrence of a meaning effect established by the perception 
made by the receiver of the message. However, any communicative act may result in an 
interpretive effect. The correct interpretation of a message requires a conceptual 
community. The community is in the model represented by the universe of discourse, 
and the meaning of a concept is considered the cominterpretant in the semeiotic model. 
The cominterpretant is also what distinguishes the model from the traditional 
communication transference model à la Shannon and Weaver. The cominterpretant and 
the concept of universe of discourse signify that within a communicative situation 
exemplified by two communicators addressing an object from the same viewpoint, i.e. 
the same scientific perspective, the cominterpretant is more likely to occur. Contrarily, 
if two communicators representing opposing paradigms or different fundamental values 
were to communicate, the cominterpretant is less likely to occur. Furthermore, the 
sender of a message need not be a person, it could be an information system, e.g. a 
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particular KOS, or it could be a commercial brand, e.g. institutions communicate with 
intent as well as a person. 
The significance-effect is therefore defined as an effect of meaning. As such, the 
significance-effect is the result of a communicative process that requires the presence of 
collateral experience that unites an utterer and a receiver with a common ground or 
background knowledge. Of course, it is also an idealistic model, and significance-effect 
should be regarded as scalable.  
―In one sense […] a community requires that its members be capable of 
coming into an immediate or mediate intellectual relation; in other words, 
the first formal condition of having a community is that its members are 
capable of mediative or sign-interpreting capacity to some degree. 
Second, there must be some connection or relation, especially a 
communicative one, between such sign users. Third, […] this connection 
or relation must be established as ―ours‖ in some sense, that is, there 
must be some identification with this relation on the part of those so 
related. The first condition allows the possibility of the second, since signs 
enable us to transform objects or events into meanings, which in turn 
allow the possibility of something being shared and shared in a 
communicative fashion. The second condition allows for the possibility of 
the third, since identifying shared meanings as ―ours‖ assumes that there 
is, first of all, something that can be shared.‖ (Liszka, 1996, p. 83) 
 
As discussed above, knowledge is fallible. History shows us that what at a particular 
point in time was regarded certain knowledge, may be altered by new discoveries, 
therefore, no knowledge is absolute and certain. However, collateral experience may 
provide for provisionary stabile knowledge claims. If a community shares collateral 
experience about specific objects, it may choose to address these objects by 
conventionalized concepts and terminology that offer a more efficient communication. 
The Dynacom model and its constituting parts will we discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
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6.4 Summary 
Lakoff and Peirce formulate quite different approaches to concepts and categorization. 
Based in experientialism and embodiment, Lakoff argues that knowledge and 
categorization are based in human perception, and argues against objectivist theories 
that claim absolute truth, and correspondence between external reality and perceived 
reality. Even though Lakoff dismisses Cartesian dualism, it seems like a dualism is 
reproduced by Lakoff‘s definition of experiential realism because it basically agrees 
with basic realism, that acknowledges the existence of a real world external to human 
beings, a commitment to the existence of stabile knowledge about the external world, 
and a rejection of the view that any conceptual system is as good as any other. But, on 
the other hand, Lakoff claims that our conception of the world is based in experience, 
language and bodily motor movements. Categorization is thus a product of human 
mind. Consequently our knowledge about the external world is obscured by our 
cognitive abilities.  
In summary, Lakoff thus reproduces a distinction between a mind independent external 
world and knowledge about the external world. 
Peirce acknowledges the existence of an external world however, he explains the 
relation between human mind and nature by means of structural affinity. We may thus 
acquire a relative stabile knowledge about the external world because nature and human 
mind belongs to the same continuum.  
The concept of significance-effect is proposed, and is developed from the analysis of 
Lakoff‘s and Peirce‘s respectively different approaches to concepts. Basically, 
significance-effect is considered a synthesis between basic level categorization and 
Thirdness. Significance-effect thus considered implicates that concepts may be 
organized according to a basic level however, significance-effect is also an effect of 
meaning that is relative to the interpreter. Significance-effect is therefore dynamical, 
and determined as interplay between collateral experience and a universe of discourse.  
In chapter 5, the concept of sign-displacement was introduced based on the elaborate 
divisions of the interpretant. Table 7 demonstrates three analytical levels of the 
intepretant with regard to signification, cognition and communication. The Dynacom 
was developed based in the triad of communication, thus, involving an intentional 
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interpretant - a communicator with intent, an effectual interpretant - an addressee of the 
message, and the cominterpretant - the level that unites the sender and receiver of a 
message in mutual understanding. The Dynacom incorporates the idea of significance-
effect that, thus, stands for an effect of meaning, mutually understood in the 
communication process.  The value of the Dynacom is that it is a dynamical 
communication model that deliberately functions at the level of the interpretant. It does 
not presuppose a human communicator. The intentional interpretant may be 
communicated by an information system, and it summarizes the idea of social 
knowledge (the cominterpretant), e.g. a paradigm, and the interpreters state of 
knowledge. This means that the significance-effect is graded, and dependents on shared 
experience. It is thus implied that a sign communicates a meaning about state of affairs 
within a community, but the effectual interpretant depends on how much the interpreter 
already knows about the sign. Consequently, KOS communicates by means of different 
types of subject representations, but, where the KOS‘s are relatively stabile, the effect 
produced in a perceiving mind may vary significantly based on the perceiving minds 
expertise and state of knowledge.   
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7 Discussion: How does the Dynacom contribute to our 
understanding of KO and KOS? 
Introduction  
 
As demonstrated in chapter 2, KOS's are considered semantic systems that express 
semantic relations of different granularity. It was argued that the ontology was the most 
developed kind that in principle is capable of incorporating the full spectrum of 
semantic relations demonstrated by other KOS's. It was also argued that KOS's 
generally are tools that exercise authority control over semantic units, and thus favor 
strong (formal) models of representation based in objectivist semantics. Thus, in the 
organization of knowledge, priority has in particular been given to theories and methods 
that have a particular focus on the processes and semantic structures within systems, 
more than theories and methods focusing on the process of interpretation and, thus, 
pragmatic meaning.  
Extending the discussion of semantics into concept theory, it was demonstrated that the 
distinctions between the three philosophical schools of concept theory, as formulated by 
(Ereshefsky, 2001): Essentialism, cluster analysis and the historical approach, provided 
for a useful theoretical framework for addressing the nature of different kinds of KOS. 
Essentialism assumes concepts to be objective, universal and enduring, and thus based 
in rationalist or empiricist epistemology. Cluster analysis assumes concepts to be 
graded, prototypical and context sensitive, and thus dismisses the essentialist idea of 
objective concepts and categories. Cluster analysis was thus related to socio-cognitive 
and culture relative epistemologies. The historical approach gives priority to methods 
unravelling the meaning of concepts by means of historical investigations, in order to 
determine how they are developed and related to theories and paradigms; and, 
furthermore, how concepts are used in communication in a social environment. The 
historical approach was also related to theories favoring an interpretive framework, as 
e.g. discourse analysis, critical theory, pragmatic pluralism and genealogy.  It was 
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argued that the semeiotic approach developed in chapter 4-6 is in line with the historical 
approach.   
In chapter 6 a synthesis between cognitive semantics and semeiotic was developed, and 
concluded in the concept of significance-effect, which is an effect of meaning that 
depends on conceptual alignment between an utterer and an interpreter.  
This chapter is focused on the last part of the research question: ‗Can semeiotic and 
cognitive semantic theory offer a more elaborate understanding of concepts, and how 
concepts are organized and represented?‘  
Based in the semeiotic analysis summarized in the Dynacom, six principles are 
identified as important in relation to KOS development.  
7.1 What may be learned from the semeiotic analysis and how may 
semeiotic theory influence the conception and development of KOS? 
Basically, the semeiotic analysis tells us that signs are motivated by an object. An object 
is an exterior to a mind, however, an object may be perceived in a certain manner and 
be meaningful to a mind only by means of interpretation. The interpretation of an object 
produced by a mind thus generates an immediate object that corresponds to the 
interpretative habit performed by the mind.  This habit of interpretation is the function 
of the interpretant. The interpretant level of the sign vehicle thus connects the sign with 
an object. 
Concepts are considered logical interpretants of an immediate object in the sign chain. 
The logical interpretant is defined as the meaning of an intellectual concept. The 
meaning of intellectual concepts, however, is determined by a common ground which is 
the context of the sign relation.  
 
Thus the essential office of the copula is to express a relation of a general 
term or terms to the universe. The universe [of discourse] must be well 
known and mutually known to be known and agreed to exist, in some 
sense, between speaker and hearer, between the mind as appealing to its 
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own further consideration and the mind as so appealed to, or there can be 
no communication, or "common ground," at all. (CP 3.621) 
 
Therefore, concepts must be generals that, in order to be communicable, must be 
determined by something else than a subjective mind. The meaning of intellectual 
concepts, thus, relates to general ideas that are shared by a speaker and a hearer within a 
universe of discourse. The following subsections express six principles that, based in 
the semeiotic analysis and the Dynacom, are considered important in relation to KOS 
development. 
7.1.1 Determining the domain (the universe of discourse) 
Fundamentally, a KOS is a systematic conceptual system which is designed with one 
purpose, namely, to provide feasible representations of subject data that support the 
process of information retrieval. As a consequence, a KOS is a system of representation 
that stands for something else. However, what is the character of this ‗something else‘? 
What is the object? Does a KOS represent a terminology? Concepts or categories? Or 
simply a particular professional way of thinking in terms and categories? Based on the 
discussions of KOS in chapter 2, I consider the last question to be the right one. A KOS 
may use terminology to represent concepts and categories; however, the structure of a 
KOS is deeply rooted in the professional praxis and functionality of libraries. As a 
consequence, a KOS may be more or less distanced from the disciplines it represents. 
This may be a trivial point, and many library users have learned to live with the 
peculiarities of KOS‘s. However, a less trivial point is that the organization principles 
conducted by a particular KOS demonstrate a way of thinking that may be inadequate 
or, at  worst,  misleading for users, simply because the principles of semantic structures 
dominate at the expense of pragmatic approaches. The point is that if concept theory is 
more actively reflected by KOS designers, it may have a positive effect on the quality of 
KOS. This point is, however, difficult to demonstrate empirically.  
As demonstrated by Hodge (2000), different types of KOS can be identified and 
arranged according to semantic complexity and formal expressiveness. KOS's are thus 
organized according to three main types: Term lists, classification and categories, and 
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relationship lists. These may of course be divided even further, as described in section 
2.1.1.  
The KOS design should meet the knowledge of a community regardless of whether it is 
a scientific discipline, a public institution or a commercial enterprise, which means that 
concepts should be determined pragmatically. In particular Hjørland have advocated in 
favor of a pragmatic approach that includes the scholarly, socio-cognitive, discourse 
specific and paradigmatic dimensions of KOS (Hjørland, 2007b). Concepts and concept 
relations should be determined according to how they are understood, used and 
communicated within a community. This perspective is sensitive to the social 
organization of knowledge, which is in line with domain analysis and socio-cognitive 
terminology and the semeiotic approach promoted here. Furthermore, many concepts 
are fuzzy, and knowledge about objects that fall under a particular concept may be 
incomplete, which means that concepts in many cases are organized according to 
prototypes. As demonstrated by Temmerman (2000), concepts that at one point in time 
have been defined clear cut can gradually become fuzzy as a consequence of research 
developments within a community.   
The meaning of a concept is, thus, determined by a universe of discourse. A universe of 
discourse can be as loosely defined as a language game, or more strictly determined as a 
set of logical premises. What is important is that the universe of discourse must be 
shared, as a common stock of knowledge, in order for correct interpretation to be 
possible.  
 
In every proposition the circumstances of its enunciation show that it [the 
universe of discourse] refers to some collection of individuals or of 
possibilities, which cannot be adequately described, but can only be 
indicated as something familiar to both speaker and auditor. At one time it 
may be the physical universe, at another it may be the imaginary "world" 
of some play or novel, at another a range of possibilities (CP 2.536). 
 
Furthermore, 
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The point is that a Universe of Discourse is connected to a common field 
of interests and purposes and that objects are identified and developed 
only in relation to that common field. (Joswick, 1996, p. 99)   
 
Accordingly, a universe of discourse could be exemplified as one way of  navigating  
through KOS representations, e.g. recognizing the meaning of (NT, RT, BT) in a 
thesaurus, or navigating and understanding the structure of a classification system or an 
ontology. 
7.1.2 Determining the social organization of communities (collateral experience) 
Being sensitive to the social organization of the particular community is important, 
because the meaning of concepts is anchored within a social context. Consequently, 
within scholarly communities, paradigms are essential because paradigms provide for 
the general perspective that support theories and methods and, thus, have major impact 
on how concepts are understood.  
Collateral experience is closely related to a universe of discourse. Collateral experience 
exists within a universe of discourse, but where the universe of discourse determines the 
possible organization of objects, collateral experience is the actual knowledge about 
concepts shared by speakers and hearers within a community. Peirce explains:  
 
… I point my finger to what I mean, but I can't make my companion know 
what I mean, if he can't see it, or if seeing it, it does not, to his mind, 
separate itself from the surrounding objects in the field of vision. It is 
useless to attempt to discuss the genuineness and possession of a 
personality beneath the histrionic presentation of Theodore Roosevelt with 
a person who recently has come from Mars and never heard of Theodore 
before (CP 8.314, 1909). 
 
Collateral experience is, thus, the stockpile of knowledge acquired through 
interpretations of various dynamical objects. According to Pharies (1985), collateral 
experience also includes purely contextual information.  
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If my companion calls ‗beautiful‘ a person I know to be undeniably ugly, I 
may infer, on the basis of this collateral knowledge (and perhaps, on the 
basis of knowledge of my friend‘s personality, past utterances, relation to 
the person spoken of, the nature of the conversational situation, the 
presence or absence of the person spoken of, etc. – in sum, the entire 
universe of discourse), that my friend is speaking ironically (Pharies, 
1985, p. 19) 
 
The quotation of Pharies demonstrate that a communication process always includes a 
complex of past and present experiences.  
In relation to a scholarly domain, the collateral experience would include the knowledge 
acquired through reading books, attending seminars, through exercises, how to perform 
certain activities, etc., all aspects that simultaneously are at play when communicating 
about an academic problem.   In summary, collateral experience consists as a complex 
network of different kinds of knowledge, e.g. embodied knowledge, practical 
knowledge, iconic, indexical and symbolic knowledge, situational, propositional and 
argumentative knowledge, etc.  
The Dynacom, see fig. 6:2, demonstrates how the universe of discourse and collateral 
experience takes part in the communication process as implicit or sub-cognitive 
elements of the interpretation.    
7.1.3 Determining the principle of communicative alignment - the cominterpretant  
 
There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind 
of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the 
mind of the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or say 
the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the 
minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any 
communication should take place. This mind may be called the commens. 
It consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and 
interpreter, at the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its 
function. (EP 2:478, 1906) 
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The success of communication presupposes the occurrence of a cominterpretant. The 
cominterpretant occurs if the speaker and hearer share a similar understanding of a 
universe of discourse, and also share similar ideas about what is communicated, the 
latter being collateral experience. If the intentional and effectual interpretant can be 
made identical, e.g. by means of dialogue, ―the cominterpretant occurs as the identity 
between the interpretation of the parties engaged in a dialogue‖ (Dines Johansen & 
Larsen, 2002, p. 210). 
Consequently, the cominterperetant thus constitutes a state of shared understanding, or 
communicative alignment.   
7.1.4 Determining the principle of pragmatic pluralism 
Terms are symbols, and are names for concepts. A term is a rhem, a concept is a unit of 
meaning. A concept is motivated by an object, and the meaning of an intellectual 
concept is conveyed by the logical interpretant.  
The object, ‗that to which a sign refers‘, is divided into the immediate object and the 
dynamical object. The immediate object is a mind's understanding of the dynamical 
object. The dynamical object motivates the signification process; however, the reality of 
the dynamical object is independent of the sign. The logical interpretant is considered 
the meaning of an intellectual concept, but the logical interpretant is not considered an 
ultimate or final interpretant, and therefore the logical interpretant represents an 
immediate object.  
The terminology provided by a KOS represents concepts of a community; however, the 
relation between the concepts represented by the KOS and the ‗live‘ concepts used 
within a community is similar to the difference between the immediate object and the 
dynamical object. A KOS representation is motivated by, and is a replica of, the 
dynamical object. However, by being an immediate object, it is biased by perspective 
and interests different from the community it represents.  
A KOS establishes a semantic structure of subject representations (logical 
interpretants); however, a KOS should be considered a quasi-mind, and, thus, the end of 
other minds' speculation. The terminology of a KOS thus suggests a particular meaning 
and organization of concepts that is rooted in the theories and methodologies of KO. 
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Therefore, it is important to incorporate theories and methods that are sensitive to the 
dynamics of a social environment, the dynamics of concepts, and the theories and/or 
paradigms that determine which theories are applied and how concepts are understood.  
The concept of pragmatic pluralism is discussed by (Rosentahl, 1994), and is developed 
as a principle that emanates from Peirce realism and pragmatism. Skagestad (1981), 
uses the term ‗pragmatic realism‘ about what Rosentahl names pragmatic pluralism. 
Both suggest that an object may be ascribed different meanings depending on 
perspective. Consequently, based on the principle of pragmatic pluralism, 
correspondence between a representamen and an object is determined by a universe of 
discourse. Thus, different views (paradigms, scientific disciplines, practices) may 
produce different, equally valid interpretants based on the same object of investigation. 
As a consequence, the meaning of concepts is relative to research interests.  
7.1.5 Determining the principle of significance-effect 
Significance-effect is considered an effect of meaning. It is the result of a 
communication process that takes place within a universe of discourse, and it requires 
collateral experience. Thus, significance-effect is considered an effect of meaning 
determined by a universe of discourse communicated between an utterer and an 
interpreter.  
The significance-effect is, furthermore, considered an effect in the same sense as stimuli 
provoke a response. As a consequence, significance-effect is not by itself the whole 
meaning of a concept communicated by a speaker. Significance-effect is rather an effect 
of meaning that manifests itself as a consequence of the effectual interpretant 
determined by an interpreter. Different interpreters may, thus, in principle inhabit 
different significance-effects.   
This definition of significance-effect is different from the definition elaborated by T. 
Thellefsen (Thellefsen, 2009), which distinguishes between two types of significance-
effect, a normative significance-effect, which is considered the normative meaning of a 
concept, and a sub-cognitive significance-effect, which is considered an emotional 
effect of meaning.  
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The definition provided here does not distinguish between the two types of significance-
effect, but is considered a further elaboration of the definitions provided in (Thellefsen, 
et al., 2003; Thellefsen, et al., 2006). Here, significance-effect is determined as a 
relative effect of meaning, where the knowledge communicated by a concept is 
considered relative to the knowledge possessed by the interpreter. However, the 
definition used in this context, where significance-effect is considered relative to a 
universe of discourse and collateral experience, may correspond to the sub-cognitive 
significance effect as suggested in T. Thellefsen (2009). Future investigations are 
needed in order to clarify this aspect.  
7.1.6 Determining the principle of sign-displacement  
Fundamentally, a sign displacement adheres to the immediate object. An immediate 
object is defined as a mind's own representation of the dynamical object, and is, thus, 
displaced from the dynamical object. The displacement thus relates to the difference of 
perception of the dynamical object.   
From the perspective of a community, sign-displacement exists because concepts 
produced within a community are based in theoretical assumptions about the reality 
they are meant to represent. Consequently, concepts are provisionary, and may be 
continuously revised by future investigations.  
According to Peirce, the progress of science is determined by the dynamical object 
which is actual reality. The immediate object constitutes our interpretations of the 
dynamical object at some interim stage of inquiry. Accordingly, science may progress 
towards greater certainty. 
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7.1.7 Revisiting the Dynacom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7:1: The Dynacom revisited, including the levels of understanding 
 
Figure 7:1 demonstrates the Dynacom in relation to levels of understanding. At the 
lower level of communication, any utterance from a speaker may have an effect on a 
hearer, but this is not the same as to say that the communication process was successful, 
or that an exchange of shared meaning took place. The relation between the intentional 
interpretant and the effectual interpretant thus constitutes the lowest level of 
communicative interaction, and may be understood as mere transmission of utterances 
between a speaker and a hearer.    
The mid-level, determined by the significance- effect, is considered an effect of 
meaning, however, as indicated by the three levels of understanding, significance-effect 
is considered a relative effect of meaning. At this communicative level, the speaker and 
hearer may not share similar understandings of the concepts communicated, but the 
hearer must at least possess an idea about the concepts communicated. An example 
could be a professor communicating to his students, where there exists an asymmetry 
between the knowledge of the speaker and the knowledge of the hearer.  
Conceptual Alignment 
Relative effect of 
meaning 
Communication 
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At the most developed level of communication, the cominterpretant occurs. The 
communication between a speaker and a hearer is here considered symmetrical. An 
example would be two professors within the same domain participating in a debate. 
Conceptual alignment, thus, refers to a shared understanding of concepts, but not 
necessarily agreement of the academic value of concepts.  
Economists may agree that we are in the middle of a financial crisis; however, they may 
disagree in terms of how to intervene in order to secure the economical development of 
the future. 
The Dynacom is, thus, a dynamical model that determines the formal conditions for 
communication that includes different levels of understanding, and incorporates the 
possibility of disagreement at the level of the cominterpretant.    
7.2 Exemplification:  In this section, the six principles of the Dynacom 
model will be exemplified based on a case study in Occupational 
therapy.   
7.2.1 Understanding the universe of discourse (OT) 
Occupational therapy is, from the perspective of the American Occupational Therapy 
(AOTA), defined as ―…a science-driven, evidence-based profession that enables people 
of all ages to live life to its fullest by helping them promote health and prevent - or live 
better with - illness, injury or disability‖. (www.aota.org)1 
According to Cole & Tufano (2008), eight major trends may be identified within the 
profession of occupational therapy (OT). 
The first trend regards  how occupation of humans is  perceived, consequently, moving 
away from the medical model; patients are perceived as clients that make informed 
choices about treatment, instead of being  passive recipients of treatment. The second 
trend follows from the first, and is characterized as a holistic approach. The 
                                                 
1
 http://www.aota.org/Consumers/WhatisOT.aspx 
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reductionism of the medical approach, which is based in a mechanistic paradigm, is 
considered inadequate when dealing with the complex, interdependent unity of physical, 
psychological, social and spiritual aspects of human life. The third trend concerns the 
definition of occupation. According to Christiansen (Christiansen, 1999, p. 547), ―…the 
ultimate goal of occupational therapy services is well-being not health‖. Consequently, 
the view of occupation expands into all aspects of life (Cole & Tufano, 2008). The 
fourth trend identified relates to the understanding of cognition, sensation and 
neuroscience. Research in these areas provides for more specific strategies for 
intervention. The fifth trend in OT is that occupational science, all though related, is 
considered a separate academic discipline apart from occupational therapy. 
Occupational science is not merely a frame of reference or a model of practice, but the 
scientific study of occupation (Wilcock, 2008). The sixth trend is the establishment of 
an evidence based practice. Evidence refers to research studies showing the 
effectiveness of OT techniques. Occupational therapists need to justify and provide 
evidence to clients as well as to the community (Holm, 2000). The seventh trend relates 
to the human adaptation in the context of culture and community. The eighth trend is 
putting the client first, thus establishing a client-centered practice. This marks a clear 
departure from the medical model, and establishes a focus on the subjectivity of 
occupation from the client‘s perspective.  
Apart from these trends, OT is also characterized by its historical development, which 
can be divided into three main periods that exemplify different stages of scientific 
development. The contour of this development reviewed below is based on (Borg, 
Runge, & Tjørnov, 2003; Burke, 1984; Cole & Tufano, 2008; Kielhofner, 1997; 
Kielhofner & Burke, 1977). 
The first period is labelled ‗the classical paradigm‘, or ‗the paradigm of occupation‘. 
The second period is named ‗the mechanistic paradigm‘ and the third period, ‗the 
dynamical systems view', or simply, ‗a new emerging paradigm‘ (Cole & Tufano, 2008; 
Kielhofner, 1997).  
The early paradigm (1900-1940), ‗the (classical) paradigm of occupation‘, was focused 
on occupation and its role in human life and in health. Occupation was mainly 
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considered in its restorative function of lost abilities. The early paradigm thus 
emphasized a holistic viewpoint, seeing mind and body as a whole.  
The mechanistic paradigm aligned with the medical model of OT developed in the 
1950s, and was based on scientific rationality or scientism. The focus is shifted from the 
mind, body, environmental holism – towards neurological, anatomical and intrapsychic 
dynamics.  
The mechanistic paradigm provides for a change in practice. Holistic thinking is 
replaced by reductionism with emphasis on the internal workings of the human psyche 
and body. However, the narrow focus of the mechanistic paradigm fails to address 
problems that extend the pure mechanics of internal mechanisms, as e.g. what it means 
to function as an individual in a social environment, a society, or to strive for a 
meaningful life etc. These aspects of life are complex and non-reducible, and, therefore, 
outside the scope of the mechanistic paradigm. 
From the 1980s to the present, ‗the systems view‘, also referred to as ‗the dynamic 
systems view‘, has emerged as a new strong paradigm that is better equipped to 
approach the complex nature of daily living. From this viewpoint, the mechanistic 
paradigm, with its particular focus on understanding the architecture underlying 
occupational behaviour, is challenged by ‗the systems view‘ that replaces architecture 
with process.  
 
The emergent paradigm [the systems view] reflects the fact that practice is 
biopsychosocial. This means that therapists encounter a wide range of 
phenomena for which they require understanding and guidelines for 
action. The diversity of these many phenomena compels the field towards 
more than a single theoretical and practical system. (Kielhofner, 1997, p. 
95) 
 
This short presentation exemplifies how a historical approach is helpful in determining 
the character of OT. OT is thus described as an interdisciplinary scientific domain that 
has developed through the stages of three dominant paradigms, where the latter is still in 
development. 
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At a general level, this historical summary establishes a basic knowledge about the 
universe of discourse of OT, which is considered valuable for understanding how 
concepts, theories and methods are connected. Of course, further studies into the 
specifics of the different paradigms would be a valuable source of information that 
would qualify the development of a KOS.  
Further studies into the basic literature of OT would be valuable in order to determine 
different practices and schools of OT.  
7.2.2 Understanding the social organization of the community (Collateral experience) 
Collateral experience determines what must be known about a universe of discourse in 
order for communication to be meaningful. Also, collateral experience includes 
contextual information, thus, delimiting the possible meaning of expressions or 
concepts. This means that knowledge about communicative structures is important. This 
could include how and where valuable information sources are located, what sources of 
information  are important, which channels  communicate the latest knowledge and 
research of the field etc. Furthermore, collateral experience includes knowledge about 
the terminology of the field, about concepts, and how they attach to theories and 
methods, and, in the case of OT, practices of intervention in relation to clients. 
Collateral experience may also include knowledge about important institutions, about 
health care, about procedures and techniques experienced through practice etc.  
The universe of discourse and collateral experience thus constitute a level of experience 
that is present at a sub-cognitive level. Studies and enquiries into the collateral 
experience, e.g. in terms of tacit knowledge, may be valuable for determining concepts 
and concept relations in a KOS. 
7.2.3 Understanding the principle of communicative alignment   
As stated in 7.1.3, communicative alignment – or the cominterpretant – occurs in a 
communication situation when a speaker and hearer share a similar understanding of 
concepts. Communicative alignment is thus a measure of agreement of the meaning, 
context and use of concepts; however, communicative alignment is not the same as 
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consensus. In a communication situation, a speaker and a hearer may be in agreement 
about how particular concepts are understood, but simultaneously disagree about the 
commitments and consequences determined by particular concepts.  
In 7.2.1, the short historical summary of OT, it was stated that OT has developed 
through different stages of paradigms. Different paradigms favor different methods, 
and, thus, different understandings of how to approach human occupation. 
Consequently, individuals who subscribe to the dynamical systems' view may perfectly 
well understand the concepts and methods developed under the mechanistic paradigm, 
but still disagree. Communicative alignment is, thus defined, a shared understanding, 
which of course is a precondition for conducting a purposeful professional debate.  
7.2.4 Understanding the principle of pragmatic pluralism 
Pragmatic pluralism is an important concept, because it suggests that concepts may be 
related to different models of understanding and have different meanings dependent on 
context, perspective and use. OT, being an interdisciplinary research field, may thus 
import concepts, theories and methods from other research fields and redefine them 
according to the prevalent theories, methods and practice of OT. 
According to Kielhofner (Kielhofner, 1997, p. 106), there may within ‗the dynamical 
systems view‘ paradigm be identified eight different models of therapeutic intervention. 
The models are: 
 
 The biomechanical model 
 The cognitive disability model 
 The cognitive-perceptual model 
 The group work model 
 The model of human occupation 
 The motor control model 
 The sensory integration model 
 The spatiotemporal adaptation model 
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These models all form distinct universes of discourse, and provide for different foci and 
methods of therapeutic practice.  
7.2.5 Understanding principle of significance-effect  
As stated in section 7.1.5, significance-effect is an effect of meaning that depends on 
knowledge acquired by collateral experience within a universe of discourse. 
Consequently, significance-effect is relative to what is already known about an object.  
We may thus assume it to be likely that Kielhofner‘s eight models of intervention, 
mentioned previously, provide more sensible information to a professor of OT, than to a 
student of OT. Furthermore, we may also assume it to be likely that a KOS designer 
knows even less about the models. The significance-effect may, thus, be graded from 
the lowest level of acquaintance to the level of professional analytical insight. A concept 
thus communicates information relative to the knowledge state of the interpreter.  
A KOS should be designed with this diversity of knowledge states in mind.  
7.2.6 Understanding principle of sign displacement 
 The concept of sign displacement was developed in chapter 5, and is related to a 
particular understanding of a phenomenon at a certain point in time and of the 
phenomenon itself. Sign displacement is, thus, a condition of perception and reasoning. 
By means of theories and empirical investigations, it is possible to acquire knowledge 
about phenomena in the world; however, absolute knowledge about phenomena is 
beyond our grasp.  
Consequently, agreement about concepts at the level of the cominterpretant suggests 
that we may only agree to a certain extent about particular understandings about certain 
phenomena.   
The historical development of OT went through three paradigms, which suggests that 
the demand for providing treatment for clients has required theoretical and practical 
developments.  
The paradigm called ‗the dynamical systems view‘ thus incorporates aspects of the 
previous dominant paradigms, however, with a different theoretical approach. This 
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‗new‘ approach may provide for better treatment of clients, but may also eventually 
evolve into a new paradigm in the future. At least that would be in line with the 
semeiotic and pragmatic logic of Peirce. 
Sign displacement thus expresses a particular understanding of the nature of knowledge, 
as a state of provision, that never will be absolute or complete, but rather continuously 
develops towards greater certainty.  
7.3 Summary  
In this section I have elaborated on the constituent parts of the Dynacom. The Dynacom 
constitutes a dynamical communication model that is developed based on Peirce‘s 
pragmatic semeiotic. The Dynacom functions at the level of the interpretant in a sign 
process, and expresses the fundamental conditions of communication. The Significance-
effect is an important outcome of the communication process, and is considered an 
effect of meaning relative to what is already known by an interpreter. The significance-
effect thus presupposes the sub-cognitive levels of a universe of discourse that frame the 
communication within a context and collateral experience, and that relates to the 
knowledge and acquaintance with the universe of discourse. Where the universe of 
discourse determines the possibilities of knowledge, collateral experience is the actual 
knowledge of concepts shared within a community.  
Being a dynamical model of communication, and thus related to a provisionary 
determination of concepts, the Dynacom transcends the idea of true correspondence 
between a representation and an object. Also, the model implicates that concepts always 
are negotiated by speakers and hearers.  
The principles were exemplified further by a minor case study. The function of this 
study was to provide for context information regarding the six principles discussed. The 
study does by no means claim to be exhaustive, but only indicative. Further research is 
needed in order to investigate the usefulness of the Dynacom model in KOS 
development.   
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8 Conclusion  
In this dissertation I have enquired into the relationship between different forms of 
KOS‘s and their communicative functions. The investigation has been carried out by, 
firstly, demonstrating that KOS‘s are semantic systems that function at different levels 
of granularity, and that KOS‘s are systems of representation that depend on reasoning 
and language. Furthermore, I have demonstrated that traditional KOS‘s are prescriptive 
and related to strong models of representation, thus, favoring rational models of 
representation. It was furthermore argued that KOS‘s, at different levels of granularity, 
include several types of semantic relations, mainly based in a syntactical, structural 
understanding of concepts. However, it was also demonstrated that other kinds of 
semantic relations based in a pragmatic and discursive understanding of concepts was 
needed. The semeiotic approach was here argued, to offer a theoretically and practically 
oriented view that embraces a wide perspective on concepts, knowledge and 
communication. The semeiotic theory approaches the meaning of concepts from three 
levels of understanding (see table 3): the level of signification, the level of cognition 
and the level of communication. In particular, the level of communication is of interest 
because it implicates the other levels, and suggests that concepts are determined by use 
in a context.  
Secondly, I have analyzed KOS‘s in relation to concept theory and demonstrated that 
KOS‘s can be characterized by being related to different theories of concepts. The 
theoretical distinction between different approaches to concept theory was based on 
(Ereshefsky, 2001), where concept theory was divided into three main philosophical 
categories: essentialism, cluster analysis and the historical approach. Cluster analysis 
was given particular attention, because it includes a graded socio-cognitive approach to 
concept theory.  It was argued that cognitive semantics as formulated by Lakoff (1987) 
and Lakoff & Johnson (1999), is related to cluster analysis, and the cognitive schemes 
as basic level categorization, metaphor and ICM constitute important principles of 
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conceptual structure. Also, the cognitive schemes were later related to the interpretant in 
the semeiotic approach.  
The aim was here to demonstrate that concepts are anchored in a non-reducible complex 
of socio-linguistic and pragmatic context. And also that awareness of this founding may 
contribute to KOS development. Furthermore, the concept of pragmatic pluralism was 
introduced, and related to the historical approach. Pragmatic pluralism, as argued by 
(Rosentahl, 1994), is developed from Peirce‘s distinction between metaphysical 
possibility and epistemological actuality, the latter being the realm of concepts that is 
based on perceptual knowledge. Rosentahl also connects pragmatic pluralism to Kuhn‘s 
theory of paradigms, and thus adds to an understanding of Kuhn that considers 
successive paradigms as continuous developments. Even though paradigms are 
considered incommensurable, a new paradigm must be motivated by the inadequacies of 
previous paradigms. Rosentahl‘s exposition of pragmatic pluralism suggests that 
concepts are determined by perspective. A given object may thus be understood 
differently, based in different knowledge interests. Therefore, concepts are never 
absolutely determined, but based on the consecutively developing knowledge interests 
of e.g. scientific communities.  
The discussion of KOS and concept theory summarizes the different kinds of KOS 
under the terms ‗essentialism‘, ‗cluster analysis‘ and ‗the historical approach‘.  
Having thus established a relation between KOS‘s and concept theory, Peirce‘s 
semeiotic is promoted as a theoretical framework that embraces the complex relation 
between representation, represented and interpretation, and one which matches the 
complex nature of concepts. The distinction between immediate object and dynamical 
object is introduced, expressing the provisionary relationship that exists between a 
representation and its object. This insight is important, because a concept will always 
establish immediate understandings of objects, and be subject to change, motivated by 
future investigations.  
Consequently, if concepts are themselves dynamical, based in provisionary knowledge, 
KOS‘s are also subjected to dynamical development. As a result, KOS‘s demand 
continuous maintenance.  
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Thirdly, based on Peirce‘s late semeiotic, the concept of sign displacement is developed. 
Sign-displacement is determined as a semantic distance between the immediate object, 
which is defined as the provisionary knowledge established by a particular theoretical 
and methodological outset, and the dynamical object, which escapes absolute 
understanding.  
Sign displacement may be considered in two dimensions: 1) One that relates to the 
status of scientific concepts, and, 2) one that relates to KOS representations of scientific 
concepts. The first type of displacement thus relates to the process of investigation that 
continuously sharpens or alters the understanding of concepts. The latter relates to how 
concepts are represented in systems, as e.g. KOS‘s that are more distanced from the 
research process, and thus may provide for more general or loosely defined concept 
representations. Both dimensions are important to realize in KOS development.  
It is consequently argued that, in order to reduce the semantic distance between KOS 
concept representations and the concepts used and defined by research and practice 
within communities, domain knowledge is imperative.   
Besides expressing a distance between an immediate object and a dynamical object, 
sign-displacement also relates to the interpretant. Three analytical levels of the 
interpretant were formulated (see table 7), which relate to signification, cognition and 
communication. At the level of communication, the fundamental chance for successful 
communication between an utterer and an interpreter is determined. As such, an utterer 
communicates intentionally, with an effect on an interpreter, and the communicative 
interpretant represent the stage where the meaning uttered and the perception interpreted 
are identical. Sign-displacement is thus a measure of conceptual divergence between an 
utterer and an interpreter in a communication process.  
Fourthly, based in the elaboration of sign-displacement the dynamical communication 
model, ‗the Dynacom‘, is developed. The Dynacom is based in the communicative level 
of the interpretant, however, as discussed, the cominterpretant occurs when an utterer 
and an interpreter share identical ideas about the concepts communicated. The 
possibility for the cominterpretant to uccor, thus implicates that something must be 
shared between the utterer and the interpreter. E.g., there must be a shared system of 
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communication, there must be a shared idea of context and knowledge, or else the 
cominterpretant would be unlikely to occur.  
The Dynacom is based on six principles, that summarize the theoretical discussions of 
the dissertation: 1) The universe of discourse, which frames the context of 
communication, 2) collateral experience, which states what must be known by the 
utterer and interpreter within the communication process, 3) communicative alignment, 
which represents a state of shared understanding of the concepts communicated, 4) 
pragmatic pluralism, the notion that the meaning of a concept is determined in relation 
to a universe of discourse, 5) significance-effect, a sub-cognitive effect of meaning that 
is determined by a universe of discourse and collateral experience and 6) sign-
displacement - that any representation determines an immediate object of a dynamical 
object. 
Figure 7.1 demonstrates the Dynacom related to different levels of understanding. At 
the most simple level, a communication between an utterer and an interpreter always 
has an effect. In a communication process you may be able to recognize the words and 
sentences, and even be able to recognize the communication as argumentative series of 
statements; however, you may perhaps not share a similar understanding of what is 
communicated. At the mid-level, the level of significance-effect, a relative effect of 
understanding is determined. We may speak of asymmetrical communication between 
an expert and a novice. The most developed level of communication is when the 
cominterpretant occurs, which is explained as conceptual alignment. Conceptual 
alignment presupposes symmetrical communication, e.g. two experts communicating 
about a problem within their field of expertise. An important point is that conceptual 
alignment does not presuppose agreement, only that the utterer and interpreter share the 
same understanding of the concepts communicated.  
The Dynacom thus constitutes the formal condition for communication between an 
utterer and an interpreter, and is related to the levels of understanding. I have, thus, 
demonstrated the scope of representation by different kinds of KOS‘s, related KOS‘s to 
concept theory, and, by means of semeiotic analysis, enquired into the nature of 
concepts and communication. I have, thus, also demonstrated that the semeiotic 
approach provides for a deeper analytical perspective on representation and 
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interpretation of concepts.  Also, by means of a minor case study in occupational 
therapy, I have demonstrated that the theoretical framework provided by semeiotic 
analysis suggests the six elements included by the Dynacom as fundamental elements in 
a communication process. The function of the case study is, however, tentative, and 
further research is needed in order to develop a more elaborated model of concept 
analysis useful for KOS development.  
8.1 The value of the dissertation 
The value of the dissertation is that it adds to the continuous theoretical reflection and 
development of KO. The dissertation, by means of semeiotic, adds to an interpretive 
framework of concept theory and based in this framework, develops a model of 
investigation that determines the fundamental levels of conceptual meaning based in 
communication.  
The dissertation contributes to the work conducted in (Thellefsen, et al., 2003) and 
(Thellefsen, et al., 2006), and thus takes the first tentative steps towards a semeiotic of 
knowledge organization that incorporate semantic theory, in terms cognitive semantics 
and paradigm theory, in terms of pragmatic pluralism.  
Further research based in the model is, however, needed in order to demonstrate the full 
value of the model in KOS development.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1
 Knowledge organization (KO): Within the library and information 
science (LIS) community, KO is particularly concerned with organization 
theories and -methods related to information sources and bibliographical 
systems. Knowledge organization systems (KOS) encompass all types of 
schemes for organizing information sources. KOS‘s include classification 
schemes, subject headings, authority files but also semantic networks and 
ontologies. The purpose of KOS‘s are retrieval and management of a 
collection of information sources (G. Hodge, 2000). 
2
 I use the term ‗information sources‘ for two reasons: 1. It represents an 
inclusive concept, and it embraces any object that motivates an 
interpretive act, and 2) by using the term ‗information sources‘ instead of 
‗document‘ the LIS debate of what constitutes a document is 
circumvented.  
3
 Information seeking and IR are both concerned with information 
behavior activities, but from different perspectives. Information seeking is 
concerned with a user‘s or group(s) of users‘ purposive seeking of 
information, in order to satisfy an underlying goal (Wilson, 2000). IR is 
concerned with the processes involved in representation, storage, 
searching, finding, filtering and presentation of information (Ingwersen & 
Järvelin, 2005).  
4
 Library and Information science (LIS) is a scientific field that includes 
different, more or less connected, disciplines. KO and KOS are considered 
fundamental areas of LIS; however, LIS also includes the disciplines of 
IR, bibliometrics and user interaction. 
5
 Cybernetics is the science that studies the abstract principles of 
organization in complex systems. It is concerned not so much with what 
systems consist of, but how they function. Cybernetics focuses on how 
systems use information, models and control actions to steer towards and 
maintain their goals, while counteracting various disturbances. Being 
inherently transdisciplinary, cybernetic reasoning can be applied to 
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understand, model and design systems of any kind: Physical, 
technological, biological, ecological, psychological, social, or any 
combination of those. Second-order cybernetics in particular studies the 
role of the (human) observer in the construction of models of systems and 
other observers (Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001) 
6
 Peirce preferred to name his brand of semiotics ‗semeiotic‘, due to its 
reference to the Greek term ‗semeion‘, which means sign, mark or token. 
7
 Collateral experience is the concept used by Peirce to address what is 
prerequisite in order to achieve a common ground for interpretation of 
signs in communicational interaction. (cf. CP 8.314).  
8
 LCSH: Library of Congress Subject Headings 
9
 TOTSH:  Thesaurus of Occupational Therapy Subject Headings 
10
 MESH: Medical Subject Headings 
11
 An enumerative classification system is a system that lists all the 
specific subject classes, as opposed to, for example, faceted systems, in 
which the specific classes are made by the indexer or searcher by 
combination of non-compound classes. The DDC, the UDC and the LCC 
are examples of enumerative systems (although, the DDC and especially 
the UDC, have some elements of faceted classifications) (Hjørland, 
2007a).  
12
 The term "thesaurofacet" was coined by Aitchison et al. (Aitchison, 
Gomersall, & Ireland, 1969) as the combination of a faceted classification 
and a thesaurus. 
13
 A hierarchy in which some vocabulary terms have more than one 
broader term. 
14
 Semantic network http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantic_network 
15
 PMEST is short for Personality, Matter, Energy, Space and Time 
16
 XML: Extensible Markup Language (XML) is a simple, very flexible 
text format derived from SGML (ISO 8879). Originally designed to meet 
the challenges of large-scale electronic publishing, XML is also playing an 
increasingly important role in the exchange of a wide variety of data on 
the Web and elsewhere. (W3F) 
17
 RDF: Resource description framework: The Resource Description 
Framework (RDF) integrates a variety of applications from library 
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catalogs and world-wide directories to syndication and aggregation of 
news, software and content to personal collections of music, photos and 
events using XML as an interchange syntax. The RDF specifications 
provide a lightweight ontology system to support the exchange of 
knowledge on the Web. (W3C) 
18
 See 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/162272/dictionary/31962/Ki
nds-of-dictionaries# 
19
 Terminology is a term with several meanings. It may refer to a database 
or vocabulary of technical terms, it may refer to a particular use of 
technical terms, and it may refer to the discipline itself. When the meaning 
intended is to refer to the discipline, Terminology is spelled with capital T.  
20
 Aristotle and Plato did not use the term ‗concept‘. but referred to reality 
as a relationship between  ‗essence‘ or ‗primary and secondary substance‘ 
(Aristotle) and ‗form‘ or ‗ideas‘ (Plato).  
21
 Cluster-analysis is generally associated with statistical methods. 
However, in Ereshefsky  (2001), the definition of cluster analysis includes 
theories that organize concepts according to a protype, and thus produce 
fuzzy and graded categories. An important feature with cluster analysis is 
some sort of similarity measure.   
22
 The Vienna Circle was formed by a group of scientists and philosophers 
in Vienna in the early 1920‘s, and established what should be known as 
logical positivism.  
23
 ―Rudolf Carnap is perhaps the most prominent representative of the 
logical empiricism or logical positivism school in the philosophy of 
science and logic‖. ―A student of Frege, Carnap was invited to Vienna, 
where he became one of the leaders of the Vienna circle‖. (Sebeok 1994, 
p. 96)  
24
 Bibliometry is a statistical, methodological approach that uses the 
bibliographical references of papers in academic journals to construe maps 
of research fields.  
25
 Structuralism and post-structuralism is often mentioned successively, 
and the latter may be regarded as a reaction to the former (Routledge, 
2001). However, structuralism is not a unified movement or common 
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activity of thought. ―Structuralism can be seen as the result of applying a 
synchronic framework of analysis to various regions of cultural and 
symbolic activity‖ (Sebeok, 1994). Structuralism relates meaning to 
structure, what counts as knowledge relates to codes and conventions 
within a community. This relates to human cultural activity in general, 
including scientific paradigms. 
26
 For detailed introduction to the field of semiotics see: (Chandler, 2002; 
Deely, 2001; Nöth, 1990; Sebeok, 1994) 
27
 Semeiotic is the term eventually preferred by Peirce in his later writings, 
and is used to here to indicate Peirce‘s version of semiotics. 
28
 Peirce‘s earliest attempt at defining a theory of semeiotic is promoted in 
his 1867 paper ‗On a new list of categories‘ (CP 1.545-6). 
29
 Peirce‘s account of 10 sign classes is extensively described in his 1903 
syllabus (EP 2. 289-99, CP 2.254-264). In Peirce‘s later account of 
semeiotic, Peirce proposed an account of 28 and 66 sign classes. However, 
they never received the same kind of treatment as the 10 sign classes. The 
transition from the account of 10 to 28 and 66 sign classes is, however, 
suggested by (Farias & Queiros, 2003, 2006).    
30
 Peirce has several names for his trichotomies, see (Liszka, 1996) 
31 The number corresponds to the number of sign class demonstrated by 
figure 3:2 
32
 Peirce classified several interpretants into different trichotomies. The 
most general consists of the immediate interpretant, the dynamic 
interpretant and the final interpretant. This classification covers all kinds 
of semeiosis, however, in relation to human communication, the 
interpretant is divided into the intentional interpretant, the effective 
interpretant and the communicational interpretant (or cominterpretant) 
(Peirce, 1977). Peirce divided this even further, and the effective 
interpretant is divided into the sympathetic interpretant, the percussive 
interpretant and the usual interpretant (CP 8.370). The usual interpretant is 
an effect of general meaning. The concept of usual interpretant is in 
(Thellefsen, Sørensen, Thellefsen, & Andersen, 2006) related to the 
concept of significance-effect, which will be discussed further in chapter 
7. 
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33
 Kant divided his universal classes into four categories, where the 
category of ‗relation‘ is made of ‗Inherence and subsistence‘ (substance 
and accident), ‗Causality and Dependence‘ (cause and effect) and 
‗Community‘ (reciprocity) (Wardy, 1998). Kant‘s category of relation 
resembles Peirce‘s triadic category of thirdness that include a first 
(legisign), a second (symbol) and a third (argument). A first is determined 
by inherent qualities, a second by reaction or causality and a third by 
mediation, synthesis, that which brings a first and a second into relation 
(Sowa, 1999).  
34
 Within the Peirce community, the relation between the different 
interpretant trichotomies has been discussed. According to (Fitzgerald, 
1966), the emotional, the energetic and the logical interpretant may be 
seen as a further specification of the dynamical interpretant, since they are 
actual effects on the interpreter. This view is supported by (Short, 1981), 
who argues that each immediate,  dynamical and final interpretant can be 
subdivided into emotional, energetic and logical interpretants. 
35
 In (Thellefsen, 2009), Torkild Thellefsen develops significance-effect 
further and distinguishes between a normative and a sub-cognitive 
dimension of significance-effect. The normative significance effect is thus 
relate to technical terms, and is defined as an effect of intentional meaning 
communicated by a technical term. 
 
The normative significance-effect is an effect of significance 
or communication of meaning that occurs whenever some 
mind or minds become exposed to an technical concept. The 
basic idea of the normative significance-effect is that the 
more knowledge an interpreter possesses about a given 
concept, the more information the concept communicates to 
the interpreter (Thellefsen, 2009, p. 119).  
 
Furthermore,  
 
…the significance-effect is the interpretive effect caused by a 
meaning intentionally communicated by an utterer to an 
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interpreter through mediation of a sign. In essence, the 
meaning communicated is similar to the meaning 
interpreted. This means that the interpreter must be able to 
interpret  the message the right way, or at least nearly the 
right way, which is the way intended by the utterer (ibid., p. 
124) 
 
Furthermore, the normative significance-effect depends on the sub-
cognitive significance-effect, which is considered the emotional center of 
any community; it preside the normative significance-effect, and 
maintains and communicates the emotional effects that are considered 
desirable by members of the community.    
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